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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the effectiveness of agro-ecosystem based PES 
programs to provide ecosystem services and achieve poverty reduction.  A 
case study from Tanzania known as the “equitable payments for watershed 
services (EPWS) program” piloted between 2008 and 2012 in Morogoro 
region has been used as the basis for an in-depth empirical study of an agro-
ecosystem based PES program. The case-study approach has combined 
mixed methods quasi experimental research design and propensity score 
matching technique to prioritise attribution of the livelihood and environmental 
outcomes of the intervention, which remain under-utilized in evaluation of 
conservation interventions.   
 
The thesis findings provide insights that while the poor can participate in 
agro-ecosystem PES programs, their participation can be hindered by initial 
investment costs of inputs such as on manure, improved seeds, hoes and 
spades. Farm size, farmers’ access to information, participation in the design 
phase, and the change in farm management required by the program are 
significant determinants of program participation. Also, while PES payments 
contribute to local livelihoods, the indirect financial and non-financial benefits 
provide greatest contributions to livelihoods. In relation to additionality 
impact, program participation increases the number of sustainable land 
management practices and land under agro-forestry and reforestation 
amongst program participants. Furthermore, expected benefits such as crop 
yields from constructed terraces and manure, fire wood and timber products 
iv 
 
from agro-forestry and afforestation interventions are likely to increase the life 
span of the practices.  
 
The design of agro-ecosystem PES programs should include upfront 
payments in addition to other incentives which should be made timely in 
phases to ensure compliance. Local training and paraprofessional, external 
training and both enhancement of local formal and informal rules are 
essential to enhance the adoption of practices and to stop illegal activities 
such as forest reserve encroachment, illegal logging and fire. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: quasi-experiment; propensity score matching; ecosystem 
services, payments for ecosystem services (PES); forest, agricultural based 
PES program, participation, livelihoods; agriculture; sustainable land 
management; water; Tanzania, Africa 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Agro-ecosystems are among the Earth’s major ecosystems that supply many 
ecosystem services beyond merely providing food, fiber, and fuel (Swinton et al., 
2006).  However, degradation of agro-ecosystems has been increasing at 
alarming rate because many ecosystem services produced by these landscapes 
exhibit the characteristics of public good, resulting into externalities (Ferraro and 
Kiss, 2002; MA, 2005a; Wunder, 2005; Paavola, 2007; Engel et al., 2008; 
Paavola, 2009). According to Pigou (2013), externalities are environmental 
problems for which no price is paid and no payment is received. Due to this, 
efficient allocation of resources cannot be achieved when externalities prevail 
(Paavola, 2007). To maximize social welfare, Pigou (2013) suggested that 
generators of positive externalities should be subsidized while the generators of 
negative externalities should be taxed. 
 
Payments for ecosystem services (PES), are designed in such a way that those 
who provide ecosystem services are rewarded through transfer of payments from 
those who benefit from ecosystem services (Pagiola and Platais, 2005; Wunder, 
2005; Engel et al., 2008). This PES mechanism has been defined by Wunder, 
(2005; 3) as  “… a voluntary transaction where well-defined ecosystem services 
(or land uses likely to secure those services i.e. water quality and quantity) are 
bought by a minimum of one service buyer, from a minimum of one service 
provider, if and only if the service provider continuously secures service provision 
(conditionality)”.  
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Globally, there are numerous PES initiatives being implemented at varying 
scales, ranging from local initiatives for conserving watersheds to regional and 
global arrangements for biodiversity and carbon sequestration services (Landell-
Mills and Porras, 2002; Corbera et al., 2007; Wunder et al., 2008). Other 
initiatives are for landscape beauty and for bundles of several ecosystem 
services (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). In their study, Landell-Mills and Porras 
(2002) identified about 300 programs and many other programs have been 
established since then (Wunder et al., 2008; Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013).  
 
Two broad categories of PES programs have been identified by Zilberman et 
al.(2008). The first category is land diversion or forest based PES programs, 
where lands are diverted from agricultural production to other uses and the 
second is the working-land or agro-ecosystem based PES programs, where land 
remains in agriculture but production activities are modified to achieve 
environmental objectives. The analysis of these categories suggests that the 
majority of PES programs in developing countries are implemented for services 
nested in forest ecosystems (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002) rather than for 
services nested in  agro-ecosystems (FAO, 2007b; Wunder et al., 2008; Ribaudo 
et al., 2010). In contrast, most PES programs in more developed countries such 
as in the European Union and United States are implemented for services nested 
in agro-ecosystems (Baylis et al., 2008; Wunder et al., 2008; Schomers and 
Matzdorf, 2013).   
 
In recent years, PES programs have been developed in developing countries with 
twin objectives, which are to supply ecosystem services and poverty reduction 
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(FAO, 2007b; Pagiola et al., 2008; Branca et al., 2011; Schomers and Matzdorf, 
2013). In developing countries, PES programs are expected to be more cost 
effective than other conservation approaches such as integrated conservation 
and development programs; and sustainable by creating a win–win scenario from 
mutual self-interest of service providers and users where conservation can 
generate ecosystem services and improve livelihoods (Pagiola and Platais, 2007; 
Engel et al., 2008; Miles and Kapos, 2008). Also, PES can generate new 
financing, which would not otherwise be accessible for conservation, while it can 
also be efficient by conserving services whose benefits exceed the cost of 
providing them (Engel et al., 2008; Miles and Kapos, 2008). 
 
However, challenges of attaining more than one objective with any single policy 
tool is emphasized in Tinbergen’s (1956) classic research on policy design. His 
analysis suggests that the effort to achieve both conservation and poverty 
reduction objectives with PES may be unrealistic (Zilberman et al., 2008) given 
that the link between environmental conservation and poverty alleviation is not  
necessarily linear (Wunder, 2005). Conversely, Huang et al.(2009) suggest that 
the dual PES objectives can only be achieved if (1) the poor control the lands that 
provide significant ecosystem services; (2), the poor are able to provide 
ecosystem services at a lower cost than the less poor; (3), the poor can be 
contracted at low transaction costs; and (4), the land use changes required to 
provide ecosystem services do not reduce the demand for labour or induce other 
indirect effects that could increase poverty.  
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A number of challenges can limit the feasibility of PES to achieve the supply of 
ecosystem services and poverty reduction objectives. These include  weak 
institutions and missing markets (Muller and Albers, 2004), missing technical 
support, availability of credits,  insecure land tenure and a lack of availability and 
access to information (Rios and Pagiola, 2009). Also, PES programs may result 
in discrimination towards poor small land holders who may lack formal land 
tenure titles or access to credit (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Kosoy et al., 2007). In 
addition, PES can delink communities from development when the poor are 
exposed to unevenly powerful institutions that deprive them of their legitimate 
land development aspirations (Romero and Andrade, 2004; Wunder, 2007). PES 
can also erode culturally rooted not-for-profit conservation values (Wunder, 
2007).  
 
These challenges suggest that, with huge investments being made in the 
conservation of ecosystem services in developing countries, greater knowledge 
of their effectiveness on rural development and conservation outcomes is needed 
(Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; Pattanayak et al., 2010).  However, when it 
comes to evaluating conservation intervention, Ferraro and Pattanayak (2006:1) 
argues that “the field of ecosystem protection and biodiversity conservation lags 
behind most other policy fields (e.g., poverty reduction, criminal rehabilitation, 
disease control)”. They also argue that “...far too long, conservation scientists and 
practitioners have depended on intuition and anecdote to guide the design of 
conservation investments” (Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006:1).  
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Impact evaluation is an essential mechanism to demonstrate accountability in 
spending funds on programs intended to deliver outcomes (White, 2006). It can 
enhance learning about change process, what worked, what did not and why 
(Leeuw and Vaessen, 2009). It can also justify how well a development project 
achieved its desired objectives and thus met payers expectations or how results 
compare with alternative uses of the invested resources (Bamberger et al., 2010).  
Knowledge gained from impact evaluation studies can thus provide critical input 
for the appropriate design of future programs.  
 
While there are impact studies for larger national level PES programs such as 
Uchida et al, (2007), Robalino et al., (2008a) and Arriagada et al., (2009), 
rigorous empirical studies on the livelihood and environmental outcomes of small 
scale agro-ecosystem based PES programs in developing countries, and Africa 
in particular, remain sketchy (Ferraro, 2009b). In developing countries and Africa, 
the implementation of PES programs on agro-ecosystems is recent but an 
interest in achieving a supply of ecosystem services and in rural development is 
considerable (Ferraro, 2009b; Branca et al., 2011; Lopa et al., 2012).  
 
Therefore, this thesis aims to investigate the effectiveness of agro-ecosystem 
based PES programs to provide ecosystem services and achieve poverty 
reduction to contribute to a geographical knowledge gap in the context of 
resource poor agro-ecosystems in developing countries and sub-Saharan Africa 
in particular. This research uses a case study from Tanzania known as the 
“equitable payments for watershed services (EPWS) program” piloted between 
2008 and 2012 in Morogoro region as the basis for an in-depth empirical study of 
6 
 
an agro-ecosystem based PES program. This case study promotes sustainable 
land management (SLM) practices such as terracing, agro-forestry and 
reforestation in the Kibungo sub-catchment in the Uluguru mountain watersheds 
to enhance water quality and quantity to downstream beneficiaries and reduce 
poverty to the service providers upstream (Lopa et al., 2012).  
 
In addition, by using quasi experimental mixed methods research design with 
propensity score matching, this study contributes to currently limited research 
that rigorously evaluates the outcomes and impacts of conservation interventions. 
Many conservation interventions including integrated conservation and 
development programs (ICDPs), subsidies and PES lack explicit frameworks for 
evaluating their success  due to the non-random nature of their design (Ferraro 
and Pattanayak, 2006; Ferraro, 2009a; Greenstone and Gayer, 2009; Ferraro 
and Pressey, 2015). As such, it is often difficult to disentangle the effects of an 
intervention (i.e. conservation outcomes or impacts such as the change in land 
use) from the effects of other policy measures and broader economic trends 
(Ferraro and Simpson., 2002; Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; Wunder, 2007; 
Margoluis et al., 2009; Djamhuri, 2012).  
1.2 The Specific Objectives of the Thesis  
i. To examine the factors that affect farmer participation in the EPWS 
program. 
ii. To evaluate the direct and indirect financial and non-financial 
livelihood outcomes of the EPWS program and distribution of 
outcomes.  
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iii. To evaluate the environmental effectiveness of the EPWS program 
in terms of its additionality, leakage effects, permanence of SLM 
practices and cost effectiveness in the supply of water ecosystem 
services. 
1.3 Thesis Structure  
Beyond this chapter which has introduced the thesis, Chapter 2 examines the 
pertinent literature related to the aim and objectives of this research. It examines 
the management of agro-ecosystems in developing countries, the basic principle 
of PES and the implementation of PES. The chapter also reviews the 
development and implementation of payments for watershed services (PWS) in 
Africa, and provides a critical review of the sustainable livelihoods framework that 
has been widely used in the impact assessment of conservation and 
development programs. The chapter concludes with a synthesis and reflection, 
highlighting the main research gaps that the thesis addresses. 
 
Chapter 3 then outlines the research approach, describing the case study, study 
location and research methodology. The multi-method quasi-experimental 
research design which incorporates quantitative and qualitative methods is also 
explained including the implementation of propensity score matching. The 
chapter further explains data collection methods, field work and approaches to 
the analysis of quantitative and qualitative data as well as description of the study 
villages.  
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In order to fulfil the first thesis objective, Chapter 4 examines participation in the 
EPWS program and uses both quantitative and qualitative methods to examine 
the determinants of landholders’ decisions to participate. The findings indicate 
that poor households are able to participate in the EPWS program and that their 
participation is not limited to simpler practices such as grass strips and trash lines 
but they also implement practices such as construction of terraces and agro 
forestry. On the determinants of participation, the findings show that farm size, 
farmers’ access to information, participation in the design phase of the program, 
and the change in farm management required by the program significantly 
determine farmer participation in the EPWS program. 
 
Chapter 5 fulfils objective two of the thesis investigating the direct and indirect 
financial and non financial livelihood impacts of the EPWS program. The chapter 
uses a mixed methods quasi-experimental research design employing both 
quantitative and qualitative methods with propensity score matching. The findings 
show that the EPWS conditional payments are an important source of cash 
income to farmers that have adopted SLM practices. In addition, the program has 
generated significant co-benefits such as increased land value, sources of 
income, average annual income, and crop harvests and livestock. Non-financial 
impacts such as the amount of training and relationships of trust amongst 
program participants were also increased. Also, the findings show that the 
increase in land value has reduced access to land amongst landless households 
who used to rent idle land. 
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Chapter 6 fulfils objective three of the thesis examining the environmental 
effectiveness of the EPWS program. The chapter investigates the EPWS 
program’s additionality effect, conditionality, permanence, leakages and 
spillovers, and its cost effectiveness in terms of transaction and opportunity costs. 
In relation to additionality, the findings show that the land under agro-forestry and 
reforestation practices has on average increased by 6.92% amongst the program 
participants. Also, the program participants have a greater number of SLM 
practices than non-participants. In addition, the temporal increase in program 
enrolment indicates the willingness of farmers to provide ecosystem services 
through PES. The program has also resulted in decreased incidences of fire, 
forest encroachment and illegal logging. 
 
Chapter 7 provides a general discussion of the research findings by integrating 
the results from Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  It provides the summary of findings, 
methodological reflections and synthesis of findings. 
 
Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter of the thesis.  It explains the implications of 
the findings and recommends future research direction. 
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 Chapter 2: Literature Review  
2.1 Chapter Outline 
This chapter provides a general review of the literature on ecosystem services, 
payments for ecosystem services (PES) including its definition, criticisms and 
implementation around the world as well as livelihood and environmental aspects 
of PES and evaluation in order to outline state of art, gaps and identify possible 
areas of contribution for this research.  More focused reviews of literature related 
to each objective are later presented in each empirical chapter (Chapters 4, 5 
and 6). This chapter begins by examining literature on the concept of ecosystem 
services and agro-ecosystem services and the challenges of managing 
ecosystem services in agro-ecosystems in developing countries. It then examines 
the basic principle of PES and its understanding in different contexts. In addition, 
the chapter examines the implementation of PES in developing and developed 
countries and the implications of actual service user financed and government 
financed PES programs. Furthermore, the chapter explores the implications of 
the forest based (i.e. land diverting) and agro-ecosystems (i.e. land modifying) 
based PES programs on the supply of ecosystem services and poverty reduction. 
In addition, the chapter provides a review of the development and implementation 
of the payments for watershed services initiatives and constraints to its 
development in Africa. Additionally, the chapter reviews evaluation methods that 
can be useful in the evaluation of conservation intervention like PES. The chapter 
concludes with a synthesis and reflection, highlighting the main research gaps 
that the thesis addresses. 
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2.2 Ecosystem Services Concept   
According to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment  (MA), ecosystem services 
are “the benefits people obtain from ecosystems” (MA, 2005a: v). These benefits 
are classified as supporting services, regulating services, provisioning services 
and cultural services (see Table 2.1) (MA, 2005a).  Agricultural ecosystems 
(agro-ecosystems) are among the Earth's major sources of ecosystem services  
that are directly managed by humans for food, fiber, and fuel production (Swinton 
et al., 2007). As human managed ecosystems, agro-ecosystems supply 
ecosystem services and demand other ecosystem services (Swinton et al., 
2007). They supply provisioning, regulating and cultural services while at the 
same time demand supporting services such as water and fertile soils to make 
them productive (MA, 2005a; FAO, 2007a). Among the most diverse classes of 
services provided by agro-ecosystems are regulating services which include the 
population dynamics of pollinators, pests, pathogens and wildlife, as well as 
fluctuations in levels of soil loss, water quality and supply, and greenhouse gas 
emissions and carbon sequestration (Swinton et al., 2007).  
Table 2.1.  Classification of ecosystem services according to MA 2005 
Types of 
Ecosystem Service 
Example of Ecosystem Services 
1.Provisioning services These include food, fiber, fuel, genetic resources, biochemical, 
natural medicines, and pharmaceuticals, ornamental resources 
and fresh water. 
2.Regulating services  These include air quality regulation, climate regulation, water 
regulation, erosion regulation, water purification and waste 
treatment, disease regulation, pest regulation, pollination and 
natural hazard regulation. 
3.Cultural services  These include cultural diversity, spiritual and religious values, 
knowledge systems (traditional and formal), educational values, 
inspiration, aesthetic values, social relations, sense of place, 
cultural heritage values and recreation and ecotourism. 
4.Supporting services  These include soil formation, photosynthesis, primary 
production, nutrient cycling and water cycling.  
Source: The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005a) 
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Despite their benefits to human well-being, many of the World’s ecosystems, 
including agro-ecosystems  are being degraded  at an alarming rate (MA, 2005a; 
FAO, 2007b). From an economic perspective, degradation of ecosystems occurs 
because many ecosystem services are externalities from the point of view of 
those who own and manage the systems (i.e. forest land or agricultural land) that 
provide services (Engel et al., 2008). Being externalities, Jenkins et al. (2010: 
1060) argue that “ecosystem services have been traditionally underprovided due 
to their lack of value in the marketplace”. As such, society fails to establish 
institutions that internalize the value of services provided by intact ecosystems 
(Pattanayak et al., 2010).  
 
This challenge has been enhanced by the fact that many ecosystems in 
developing countries including sub-Saharan African are non-excludable as it is 
often difficult to exclude others through physical or institutional barriers from 
exploiting the resources (Ostrom et al., 1994; Ostrom and Hess, 2007; Quinn et 
al., 2007; Fisher et al., 2009).  Natural or man-made resources that exhibit this 
character are known as common pool resources (CPRs). According to Hardin, 
(2009) common pool resources are degraded because of overuse because the 
open access nature of the commons allows the users to act in ways that 
maximize their individual benefits at the expense of costs that are often shared 
between all users.  
 
While exploitation of ecosystems benefited human well-being through increased 
outputs of food, timber, fresh water, fibre and fuel,  (MA, 2005a), the full costs 
associated with these gains have become apparent in some societies (MA, 
13 
 
2005a; FAO, 2007b). Intensive agriculture and water withdrawal from rivers have 
in many parts of the world caused the decline of fresh water supply and quality 
from the flow of nutrients, sediments and dissolved salts (MA, 2005a; FAO, 
2007b). Other costs include disruption to climate regulation, air quality regulation, 
erosion regulation, pest regulation and pollination services (MA, 2005a).  
 
Valuation studies of the social costs and benefits of conserving ecosystem 
services show that the benefits of conservation outweigh the cost of conservation 
management (Balmford, 2002; Turner, and Daily. 2008). They also report 
tremendous on-site and off-site direct and indirect benefits of ecosystem services 
conservation in increasing livelihood security (Costanza et al., 1997; de Groot et 
al., 2002; Zhao et al., 2004). Consequently, efforts to enhance conservation of 
ecosystems including to change the management of agricultural landscapes to 
reduce agro-ecosystem disservices or externalities are thought to be 
considerable (MA, 2005a; FAO, 2007b; Liniger et al., 2011). As such, various 
conservation measures including the adoption of SLM practices have received 
considerable interest for the management of ecosystems and agro-ecosystems in 
particular (Liniger et al., 2011).  
 
The adoption of SLM practices has the potential to enable land users to maximise 
the economic and social benefits from the land while maintaining or enhancing 
the ecological support functions of land resources  (Liniger et al., 2011: 19).  SLM 
practices seek to manage soil, water, vegetation and animal resources in an 
interconnected manner by integrating ecological, economic and socio-cultural 
dimensions (Brown et al., 2007; Liniger et al., 2011). As such, they can 
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ecologically combat land degradation, socially improve food security and reduce 
poverty, and economically safeguard agricultural practices by paying back 
investments made on the management of land (Liniger et al., 2011). Table 2.2 
shows examples of SLM practices identified by FAO (2003) that can sustain or 
increase land productivity, provide adequate water quantity, maintain water 
quality and reduce flooding and flood damage. These are grouped according to 
the expected objectives to be achieved. 
Table 2.2. Sustainable Land Management Practices at a Watershed Level 
Objectives SLM practices 
Sustain or 
increase land 
productivity 
Adopt integrated nutrient management (i.e., making a judicious use of 
inorganic and organic fertilizers and amendments and strengthening 
nutrient recycling mechanisms) 
Adopt agro forestry practices (i.e., incorporating trees into agricultural 
systems and stressing the multifunctional value of trees within those 
systems) 
Introduce crop rotations (i.e., growing a series of different types of crops 
in the same area in sequential seasons) 
Eliminate the use of fires for land clearing and pasture reclamation, 
promote improvements in forage quality and quantity, improve grazing 
activities 
Reduce erosion and stabilize slopes through residue recycling 
Use water harvesting practices and efficient irrigation, maintain drainage 
to prevent water logging and salinity build up 
Provide adequate 
water quantity 
and maintain 
water quality 
Use soil cover to enhance water infiltration and prevent soil crusting  
Use crop, forage, and tree species with high water-use efficiencies 
Protect vegetative filter areas in riparian zones and wetlands to remove 
excess sediment and nutrients (nitrogen, phosphorus) 
Manage household and livestock waste to prevent pollution of surface 
and ground water 
Use contour plantings, vegetative strips, and terraces 
Use cover crops (i.e., crops planted primarily to manage soil fertility, soil 
quality, water, weeds, and pests) and perennial vegetation 
Adopt no-till farming (i.e., growing crops without disturbing the soil 
through tillage) 
Promote integrated pest management (using pesticides only when other 
options are ineffective) 
 
Reduce flooding 
and flood 
damage 
Protect and maintain wetlands and regulate floodplains 
Plant deep-rooted vegetation to enhance infiltration and water 
consumption by plants 
Source: Adapted from FAO (2003) 
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Despite their ecological, social and economic benefits, the uptake of SLM 
practices by farmers in developing countries are often minimal (Liniger et al., 
2011).  Challenges that impede their uptake include knowledge gaps, opportunity 
costs related to land and adoption input costs such as labour and fertilizers or 
manure (Liniger et al., 2011). With regard to knowledge gaps, the adoption of 
new agricultural technologies is often hindered by lack of access to and 
inadequate training for farmers and local extension officers (TerrAfrica, 2007).  
 
With regard to the opportunity costs, the poor landholders are often affected  by 
short term or temporary negative economic returns associated with the transition 
phase from conventional agricultural to more sustainable practices with long run 
economic returns (FAO, 2007a; Liniger et al., 2011). For example, during the 
transition to new practices such as terraces, yields tend to vary or even decrease 
significantly as production systems adjust to a new equilibrium (Graff-Zivin and 
Lipper, 2008; Giller et al., 2009). These costs can lead to negative adoption 
behaviour on the part of poor landholders who may be confronted with higher risk 
aversion, higher discount rates and less capacity to make investments (Graff-
Zivin and Lipper, 2008). In addition, household size, education levels and farming 
experiences are often reported to constrain SLM adoption in developing countries 
(Graff-Zivin and Lipper, 2008). 
 
Other challenges that constrain the adoption of SLM practices in developing 
countries are access to and availability of financial facilities and uncertainties of 
land tenure. Often, poor landowners encounter difficulties in accessing financial 
facilities to support the up-front investment costs of adopting SLM practices 
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(FAO, 2007b; TerrAfrica, 2007). Also, insecure land tenure decreases the ability 
of a landholder to capture the future benefits of making investments in land 
productivity (Antle and Diagana, 2003). These challenges would suggest that, 
without adequate support to finance establishment, maintenance costs and 
opportunity costs, the adoption of SLM practices may not be possible for poor 
landholders (Amsalu and De Graaff, 2007). In addition, it has been argued that 
the failure to compensate landholders for the services their land provides to 
society is a key contributory factor in the rapid changes in land-use and decline of 
ecosystem services (Pagiola and Platais, 2005). As such, PES programs in 
agricultural lands are being implemented with the hope to reward conservation, 
bridging the barriers to adopting SLM practices by providing financial support and 
technical assistance (Branca et al., 2011) and thus potentially alleviating poverty 
in developing countries (FAO, 2007b; FAO, 2007a; Wunder et al., 2008; Branca 
et al., 2011). The adoption of SLM practices through PES payments are expected 
to improve the agricultural livelihoods of the landholders who adopt them as well 
as to improve ecosystem services such as water quality and quantity (Branca et 
al., 2011). In addition, PES programs are expected to improve social capital 
(Grieg-Gran et al., 2005) and increase land tenure security (Asquith et al., 2008; 
Engel and Palmer, 2008). 
2.3 Payments for Ecosystem Services 
2.3.1  The Basic Principle of PES  
The basic principle of PES is that those who provide environmental services 
should be rewarded for doing so (Pagiola et al., 2005; Pagiola and Platais, 2005; 
Wunder, 2005; Engel et al., 2008; Kemkes et al., 2010; Muradian et al., 2010). 
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This means that mechanisms are put in place that transfer rewards or payments 
from those who benefit from the ecosystem service to those who manage it. This 
logic can be illustrated in three scenarios which include business as usual 
(scenario A, Figure 2.1), conservation without payments (scenario B, Figure 2.1), 
and conservation with PES payments (scenario C, Figure 2.1) (Pagiola et al., 
2005; Wunder, 2005; Engel et al., 2008; Kemkes et al., 2010; Muradian et al., 
2010).  
 
 
Figure 2.1. The logic of payments for ecosystem services 
Source: Adapted from Pagiola and Platais (2005) 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the basic logic of PES mechanisms. In the first scenario, land 
managers can receive more benefits from the conversion of forest lands into 
cropland or pasture than they could receive from forest conservation. When these 
alternative land uses are not sustainable, they can impose costs on the local and 
regional populations as well as on the global community (Engel et al., 2008).  
Conservation 
without payments 
(B) 
Conservation with 
PES payments 
(C) 
Benefits 
to land 
managers 
Costs to 
service user 
i.e. 
downstream 
population 
and others 
Payment 
(s) 
Reduced water 
services 
Loss of 
biodiversity 
Carbon 
emissions 
Maximum 
payment 
Minimum 
payment 
Business as usual – 
i.e. conversion of 
forest to pasture or 
crop land 
(A) 
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These costs include the loss of benefit of services such as water filtration and 
improved water quality, groundwater recharge and preservation of scenic 
landscapes. Other costs could be carbon sequestration due to soil erosion from 
overgrazed hillsides and runoff of harmful nitrates from cropland to downstream 
catchments as well as the loss of biodiversity and carbon emissions on the global 
community (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; FAO, 2007a; Engel et al., 
2008). 
 
Since the impacts of improved supply of ecosystem services are not often 
reflected in the incomes of  land managers, provision of these services is 
therefore not a key consideration in most of their choices (Coase, 1960). 
Payments by those who benefit from services can make conservation the more 
attractive option for ecosystem managers, thus internalizing what would 
otherwise be an externality (Pagiola and Platais, 2005). In addition, for payments 
offered to induce land managers behaviour change (Engel et al., 2008), they 
must exceed the additional benefit the land managers would receive from 
alternative land uses and must be less than the value of the benefit to ecosystem 
service users for them to be willing and able to pay (Pagiola and Platais, 2005; 
Asquith et al., 2008). As such, the minimum payment has to equal the opportunity 
cost of a land manager (i.e. their benefits given up). For this to be successful, it 
has been shown that schemes that exploit ecosystem managers knowledge 
about their opportunity costs of ecosystem service provision are more efficient 
than top-down regulatory schemes (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010).  
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Paying the ecosystem managers the amount that covers their opportunity costs 
to adopt practices that ensure provision of ecosystem services is critical because, 
in the course of providing services they forego significant benefits from reducing 
the intensity or extent of their agricultural practices at plot or farm level (Kosoy 
and Corbera, 2010). Thus, payments are needed for compensation because 
when service users receive services without compensating providers for their 
provision, they would be “free-riding” at the provider’s expense (Engel et al., 
2008). In this context, farmers would receive fewer benefits from adopting 
practices that generate ecosystem services without payments (Figure 2.1, 
scenario B) than business as usual. PES payments that do not cover land 
managers' opportunity cost may lead to low adoption of conservation practices 
required for the provision of ecosystem services (Ferraro, 2002; Wunder, 2007; 
Engel et al., 2008).  
 
In addition to paying farmers for their opportunity costs, other costs that need to 
be covered are their transaction costs of establishing and maintaining improved 
land use practices (e.g., construction of terraces, preparation of tree nurseries, 
planting and maintenance of trees) (Wunder et al., 2008). Paying to cover 
farmers' opportunity costs and transaction costs are issues that have been 
discussed for other conservation approaches such as command and control 
regulations (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Bulte and Engel, 2006), community-
based natural resource management (CBNRM) (Nelson and Agrawal, 2008) and 
integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) (Barrett and Arcese, 
1995). For instance, research has shown that command-and control approaches 
in developing-countries are often hampered by high transaction costs, weak 
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governance, poor monitoring and enforcement at the local level (Baland and 
Platteau, 1996).  Also, these practices create economic hardship and social 
conflicts related to  distributional issues from the poor who depend on the 
resources (Bulte and Engel, 2006). 
 
In this context, proponents of PES consider that the change of incentives for land 
use will maintain or restore the desired ecosystem service (Pagiola and Platais, 
2007). This conceptualization assumes that decisions on land use and land use 
change are largely based on the net economic benefits that accrue to the 
landholder (Pagiola and Platais, 2005). Consequently, payments by service users 
can make conservation the most attractive option for service providers to adopt 
conservation practices (scenario C, Figure 2.1) (Wunder, 2005; Pagiola and 
Platais, 2007; Engel et al., 2008). In this way, PES can help to bridge the private 
interests of service providers and the public benefits of conservation 
management by funding actions that increase the levels of ecosystem services 
desired by society (Engel et al., 2008; Jack et al., 2008). 
 
Increasingly therefore, PES is promoted as an alternative conservation approach 
to ‘command and control’ and other indirect approaches to natural resources 
management such as ICDPs, CBNRM and sustainable forest management  
(Pearce and Barbier, 2000; MA, 2005a; Wunder, 2005).  Compared to indirect 
conservation approaches like ICDPs that require investments in alternative lines 
of production, the theoretical literature on PES shows that the direct nature of the 
PES mechanism to conservation and incentives makes it both more effective and 
more cost-efficient (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Ferraro and Simpson., 2002; Ferraro 
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and Pattanayak, 2006). PES targets conservation more directly through use of 
economic incentives (Figure 2.2), and as such, PES is viewed as (i) a potential 
means to generate new financing for conservation; (ii) a sustainable approach 
serving mutual self-interest of service users and providers; (iii) an efficient way to 
conserve services whose benefits exceed the cost of providing them, (Ferraro 
and Kiss, 2002; Nkonya et al., 2005; Wunder, 2005; Pagiola and Platais, 2007) 
and (iv) a means to improve rural livelihoods. On the improvement of livelihoods, 
it is argued that where providers of ecosystem services are poor landholders or 
disadvantaged communities, such payments can contribute to poverty alleviation 
(Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Pagiola et al., 2005; Pagiola and Platais, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Comparison of PES to other conservation approaches on the basis 
of the degree to which PES relies on economic incentives and the extent to which 
the conservation of ecosystem services is targeted directly rather than integrated 
into other development approaches 
Source: Wunder (2005: 6) 
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2.3.2  Critique of PES  
Alongside the growing implementation of PES, voices critical of this way of 
managing ecosystem services are increasingly heard (Spash, 2011). They arise 
from debates against the use of market-based instruments for conservation 
whereby the optimists see the instruments as a promising policy option (Kinzig et 
al., 2011), while sceptics see it as a good example of neoliberalization of nature 
(McAfee and Shapiro, 2010). Some critics are concerned with the promotion of 
environmental valuation and market solutions (i.e. economic reasoning that 
rationalizes PES schemes) as core strategies to solve environmental problems 
(Engel et al., 2008; Spash, 2011).  This way of thinking is seen as a strategy of 
undermining or rejecting the utilitarian rationale for conservation that promotes 
nature preservation for the intrinsic value of different entities in nature regardless 
of use and non use values (McCauley, 2006).  
 
 According to Kosoy and Corbera (2010), PES mechanism is commodity 
fetishism as it reduces ecosystem values to a single exchange-value measure 
that obscures the collective relations embodied in producing ecosystem services. 
The same view is shared by Krall and Gowdy (2012) who criticize the practice of 
reducing all the functions of nature to exchange value. This line of critique is 
based on the Polanyi’s (1944, p.73) work who argued that to “allow the market 
mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural 
environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would 
result in the demolition of society.” In all these arguments, fear has been raised 
that commercial conservation may erode culturally rooted not-for-profit 
conservation values (Vogel, 2002; Romero and Andrade, 2004; Wunder, 2006).  
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It has also been argued that market-like conservation tools may prioritize 
efficiency over fairness where the poor landholders sell cheap as they may not 
always be able to negotiate and participate in the PES programs fairly due to lack 
of information, informal land entitlement or unfavourable procedural rule (Landell-
Mills and Porras, 2002; Pascual et al., 2010). As such, PES skeptics fear that the 
mechanism might bring back the fences by decoupling conservation from 
development and that asymmetric power distribution will enable powerful 
conservation consortia to deprive communities of their legitimate land-
development aspirations (Vogel, 2002; Romero and Andrade, 2004; Wunder, 
2006). This is because setting up the price for an ecosystem service is often a 
top-down, expert-led exercise, in which ecosystem service providers may not 
intervene (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010). 
 
2.3.3  PES in Context  
PES remains a multi-faceted term with many diverse definitions coexisting. 
However, a seminal definition by Wunder (2005: 3) views PES as “(1) a voluntary 
transaction where (2) a well-defined ecosystem service (ES)  or (a land-use likely 
to secure that service) (3) is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) ES buyer (4) 
from a (minimum one) ES provider (5) if and only if the ES provider secures ES 
provision (conditionality)”. While this is a seminal and widely used definition of 
PES, very few PES programs in reality achieve these standards (Porras et al., 
2008; Sommerville et al., 2009; Swallow et al., 2009; Muradian et al., 2010). The 
definition has been criticised because the voluntary transaction criterion fails to 
recognise non-voluntary approaches such as taxes or mandatory service charges 
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(Muradian et al., 2010). Also, it has been argued that physical characteristics of 
resources for generating ecosystem services can in some instances determine 
types of payments either voluntary or coerced through taxation (Farley et al., 
2010; Kemkes et al., 2010). For example, services dominated by private good 
characteristics are amenable to voluntary payments, while services with public 
good characteristics such as carbon sequestration are not (Kemkes et al., 2010). 
As such, private sector firms can be reluctant to pay for ecosystem services when 
they believe that the provision of the service is the responsibility of the public 
sector to pay (Koellner et al., 2010). 
 
In addition, the complexity of ecosystems and the services they generate 
suggests that Wunder’s criteria about a well defined ecosystem service may not 
apply to all services (Rørstad et al., 2007). There are many PES programs that 
are paying for watershed related services despite uncertainty about the water 
regulation services provided by forests and other land uses (Porras et al., 2008). 
In addition, in the face of ecosystem complexity, payments for a bundle of loosely 
defined services are likely to maximize societal benefits and reduce transaction 
costs that can increase as services are explicitly defined (Rørstad et al., 2007). 
 
Furthermore, Wunder's definition relies on the Coasean conceptualization of 
markets in which private market negotiations  among social actors are considered 
to lead to an optimal allocation of resources regardless of initial allocations since 
the beneficiary of services will compensate the provider for the externality 
(Coase, 1960).  This conceptualization leads to subdividing PES into PES-core 
programs, PES-like programs and other financial or market based conservation 
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approaches on the basis of the extent to which they fulfil the five criteria stated in 
the definition (see Figure 2.3). PES-core programs as proposed by Wunder 
(2005) requires strict PES set up that the program should firmly comply with the 
five requirements of the definition that are voluntary transaction between a 
minimum one buyer and minimum one seller of a well defined ecosystem service 
and with a strong conditionality attached. However, many of the conservation 
instruments or initiatives referred to as PES in the literature do not comply with all 
of the five requirements and therefore are characterised as "PES like" programs 
(Jack et al., 2008; Zandersen et al., 2009). These programs may not have buyers 
paying voluntarily for the service or other programs may only have a low 
conditionality implemented or have a weak conditionality. Figure 2.3 illustrates 
the gradient between PES-core programs that comply with the five criteria to the 
PES-like programs that meet some of the criteria and in periphery other 
economic incentives such as reforestation subsidies and salaries for nature 
reserve guardians (Wunder, 2008b).  
 
In an attempt to encompass real life PES programs, Sommerville et al. (2009: 2) 
define PES as “approaches that aim to (1) transfer positive incentives to 
environmental service providers that are (2) conditional on the provision of the 
service, where successful implementation is based on a consideration of (1) 
additionality and (2) varying institutional contexts”. In addition, Muradian et al. 
define PES as “a transfer of resources between social actors, which aims to 
create incentives to align individual and/or collective land use decisions with the 
social interest in the management of natural resources” (2010: 1205).  These 
definitions focus on the public good character of most ecosystem services and 
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the resulting externalities internalized within PES. They also include 
governmental payment programs, which frequently represent a Pigouvian 
conceptualization of PES  (Vatn, 2010). This conceptualization emphasises that 
negative externalities should be taxed while positive ones are subsidized (Van 
Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2010).   
PES Core
5 criteria
Theory & some private  PES
“PES-like” Schemes:
Some of 5 criteria
Public agro-environmental 
schemes; community- based 
ecotourism, etc.
Other Economic 
Incentives: 
Any “payment” for any 
“environmental service” by 
“anybody”
ICDPs, park-ranger salaries, 
reforestation subsidies, etc.
Other Economic
Incentives
“PES-like” Schemes
PES Core
 
Figure 2.3.  PES definitions -- between hardcore and periphery  
Source: (Wunder, 2008b) 
 
2.3.4  Implementation of PES Programs  
Globally, there are numerous PES initiatives being implemented at varying 
scales, ranging from local initiatives for conserving watersheds to regional and 
global arrangements for biodiversity and carbon sequestration services (Landell-
Mills and Porras, 2002; Corbera et al., 2007; Wunder et al., 2008). Other 
initiatives are for landscape beauty and for bundles of several ecosystem 
services (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). In their assessment of PES programs 
around the world, Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) identified about 300 programs. 
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Many other programs have been established since then (Wunder et al., 2008; 
Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). With regard to the geographical distribution of 
PES, the review by Schomers and Matzdorf (2013) which compares developing 
and developed countries PES research (in terms of the continents and countries 
where PES case studies and basic research have been conducted), shows that 
geographical distribution of PES studies is inclined to developing countries in 
general and Latin America in particular (Figure 2.4). 
 
Figure 2.4. Geographic distribution of overall PES publications (n=457).  
Source: Schomers and Matzdorf (2013) 
 
Reviews of PES programs in both developing and developed countries show that, 
PES programs can be differentiated as government financed (this may include  
third-parties such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs)) and user-financed 
PES programs, and use-modifying in agro-ecosystems and use-diverting in forest 
ecosystems (Wunder et al., 2008; Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013).  According to 
Wunder et al. (2008: 834), these differences in PES programs reflect  the 
adaptation of the basic PES concept to varying ecological, socioeconomic or 
institutional conditions. The difference between user-financed and government-
financed PES programs is significant (Wunder et al., 2008). In the former, funding 
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comes from the users of the ecosystem services while in the latter it comes from 
a government, also referred to as a third party (Wunder et al., 2008: 835).  
 
User-financed PES programs reflect the Coasean conceptualization of markets 
(Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013) which states that given low to no transaction 
costs and clearly defined and enforceable property rights, no governmental 
authority is needed to overcome the problem of internalizing external effects 
(Coase, 1960). Rather private ‘market negotiations’ among social actors will lead 
to an optimal allocation of resources regardless of initial allocations, because the 
beneficiary of services will compensate the provider for the externality (Coase, 
1960). According to Coase (1960),  governmental intervention will not perform 
better or produce more efficient outcomes than leaving the distribution of 
resources to the market. Government is only required to allocate initial property 
rights and to warrant legal environment where property rights are enforceable. 
 
In contrast, government financed PES programs mirror the Pigouvian philosophy 
of taxing negative and subsidizing positive externalities (Van Hecken and 
Bastiaensen, 2010). According to the classical Pigouvian philosophy, payments 
(i.e. tax or subsidy) should be equal to the marginal net benefit or costs to be 
generated or avoided. As such, environmental pricing begins with a 
predetermined set of standards for quality and then unit taxes (or subsidies) 
sufficient to achieve these standards are imposed (Baumol and Oates, 1971: 51). 
However, the  Pigouvian philosophy in PES is divergent from the classical 
Pigouvian subsidies because the payments in PES are not necessarily linked to a 
commodity assumed to provide a beneficial externality (Van Hecken and 
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Bastiaensen, 2010). Rather, ecosystem services are converted into a tradable 
commodity (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2010) and 
the state acts as a third party on behalf of actual service users or buyers (Engel 
et al., 2008). 
 
The main difference between user-financed and government financed PES 
programs is the directness of transfers whereby in the former, direct users pay 
the service providers while in the latter, buyers are not the direct users. In the 
user-financed PES programs, service users pay landholders for the provision of 
ecosystem services characterized as club goods. Also, the users of such 
ecosystem services exist only at local scales and can be directly identified (Vatn, 
2010). On the other hand, government financed PES programs are focused  on 
the provision of public goods in which the users of the ecosystem service cannot 
be excluded at all or at reasonable costs (Vatn, 2010). Examples of government 
financed PES programs include programs such as the U.S. Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP) (Claassen et al., 2008) and the PSA program in Costa 
Rica (Pagiola, 2008) which are typically large and national-scale initiatives that 
embrace multiple services and political side objectives such as carbon schemes.  
 
When compared to government-financed PES programs, user-financed PES 
programs are considered more efficient both economically and environmentally 
(Engel et al., 2008). They are likely to be efficient because service buyers are 
directly involved and thus are informed about the value of the service (Engel et 
al., 2008). Also, they have clear incentives to ensure the functioning of the 
mechanism. In addition, service users can directly observe whether the service is 
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being delivered, and if needs arise they can re-negotiate (or terminate) the 
agreement (Engel et al., 2008). Wunder et al. (2008) describe user-financed PES 
programs as fully voluntary to  ecosystem service providers and to users who 
enter and exit contracts voluntarily. In contrast, government financed PES 
programs are only voluntary on the providers' side (Wunder et al., 2008). User-
financed PES programs have been described as better targeted, more tailored to 
local conditions and needs, have better monitoring, enforcement, and more 
focused objectives than government financed programs (Wunder et al., 2008). 
Often, user-financed PES programs are small to medium size, which buy just one 
or two services, involve single private-sector buyers, and are more targeted in 
design (Wunder et al., 2008). Examples of user-financed PES programs include 
programs such as the Pimampiro and PROFAFOR in Ecuador which target 
watershed protection and carbon sequestration respectively and Vittel in France 
which target water quality provision (Perrot-Maitre, 2006). 
 
Another category of PES programs is use-modifying in agro-ecosystems (active or 
working agricultural land) and use-diverting in forest ecosystems (use-restricting 
programs) (Wunder, 2007; Zilberman et al., 2008; Wunder and Börner, 2011a). Use-
diverting programs are those programs where lands are diverted from agricultural 
production to other uses, while use-modifying programs are those where lands remain 
in agriculture but production activities are modified to achieve environmental objectives 
(Zilberman et al., 2008). Use-diverting programs aim at “reducing agricultural 
expansion and encouraging cropland retirement and forest conservation”; while 
use modifying programs aim at “changing agricultural technologies and practices” 
(Wunder and Börner, 2011a: 278). In this context, use-diverting PES programs 
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compensate farmers for suspending environmental degrading activities while use-
modifying programs change environmental degrading activities without scaling 
back economic output (Zilberman et al., 2008; Wunder and Börner, 2011a).  
 
Table 2.4 shows the distinction between use-diverting/restricting and use-
modifying programs within the context of forest and agriculture ecosystems 
(Wunder and Börner, 2011a). Conceptually, there is no full overlap between the 
forestry-agriculture and use-restricting - use-modifying PES distinctions (see 
Table 2.3).  
Table 2.3. Comparison between use-diverting and use-modifying PES programs  
Land-diverting/Use-Restricting Working-land/Use-Modifying 
Forest conservation, including 
REDD, biodiversity, water 
Reduced-impact logging-forest 
certification 
 Afforestation and reforestation (AR), 
including CDM 
Agricultural land retirement Agro forestry - silvipasture 
 Improved agriculture(organic, no tillage, 
no burn, etc) 
Source: Wunder and Börner (2011a: 279) 
 
Whether PES payments to farmers are for use-diverting/restricting (i.e. 
conservation of pre-existing environmental services) or for use-modifying 
interventions (i.e. adoption of SLM practices), they are expected to result in the 
provision of ecosystem services and improvement of local economic activities 
such as employment and productivity (MA, 2005b; FAO, 2007b; Zilberman et al., 
2008; Mahdi et al., 2009; Wunder and Börner, 2011a). On this topic, there are 
significant theoretical discussions about the potential of PES programs to achieve 
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poverty reduction and provide ecosystem services in developing countries (MA, 
2005b; FAO, 2007b; Mahdi et al., 2009). Pagiola (2005) presents a framework of 
assessing the effectiveness of a PES program in achieving poverty alleviation 
and conservation objectives (Figure 2.5). In the process of making privately 
unprofitable but socially-desirable practices profitable to landholders (see case 
A), a PES program can experience various types of inefficiencies (Pagiola, 2005). 
These include (1) offering payments that are insufficient to induce adoption of 
socially-desirable land uses, thus causing socially-undesirable land uses to 
remain in use (case B); (2) adopting socially-undesirable land uses, that supply 
environmental services, but at a cost higher than the value of the services (case 
C) and; (3) paying for adoption of practices that would have been adopted 
anyway (case D) (Pagiola, 2005). Figure 2.5 illustrates the circumstances that 
determine the effectiveness of a PES program in the supply of ecosystem 
services and poverty reduction.  
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Figure 2.5. A framework to analyze the efficiency of PES. Land uses according to 
their net private profitability from the perspective of land users (horizontal axis) 
and the net value of the environmental services generated to others (vertical 
axis). At bottom-right, land-use practices are privately profitable but generate 
negative externalities; at top-left, practices are unprofitable to land users but 
generate positive externalities. It is land-use practice in this last quadrant (TOP-
LEFT) that effective PES programs encourage. The 45° diagonal separates 
negative (below) and positive practices (above). 
Source: Adapted from Pagiola (2005) 
With regard to use-diverting and use-modifying PES interventions, there is a 
number of differences in their effectiveness in the provision of ecosystem 
services and achieving poverty reduction. In relation to ecosystem services, use-
diverting PES programs are considered the most effective way to secure large 
amounts of ecosystem services, outperforming use-modifying intervention 
(Wunder and Börner, 2011) as they can lead to the return of native plants, wildlife 
habitats, and prevent erosion or air pollution (Zilberman et al., 2008). For instance, if 
land is diverted away from pasture, it can result in reduced animal waste runoffs 
that pollute local waterways and, when diverted from field crop production to forest, it 
can generate more carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation. In use-
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diverting programs, standing forests represent a huge carbon stock, climate 
regulator and biodiversity reservoir as well as providing water regulation (Wunder 
and Börner, 2011a). As such, it is anticipated that ecosystem service buyers are 
likely to prefer use-diverting programs as an option that delivers more services.  
 
Competition between use-diverting and use-modifying PES programs is not only 
about the quantities of ecosystem services delivered, but also about the 
provisioning costs, technical complexities and spill over effects.  Opportunity 
costs and technological complexities associated with interventions have been 
shown to affect  use-modifying PES interventions more than use-diverting 
intervention (Wunder and Börner, 2011a). For example, the introduction of 
improved cropping techniques in use-modifying PES can privately pay for 
themselves through yield increases (Koohafkan and Stewart, 2008).  However, 
farmers who are risk averse may not adopt complex technologies requiring heavy 
investments, maintenance and training (Mercer, 2004). In many developing 
countries, challenges such as opportunity costs and technological complexity are 
frequently reported to be off-putting to farmers who face constraints to capital, 
labour and know-how, and who lack a supply of new required inputs or markets 
for new outputs (Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007). Consequently, use-diverting 
programs have attracted the interest of many conservation investors as it can be 
much simpler to delimit a forest area as a “no-go zone” or to set aside a marginal 
production area for natural regeneration (Wunder and Börner, 2011a). Use-
diverting solutions have numerically small opportunity costs and few investment 
costs, thus making them low-risk to adopters (Wunder and Börner, 2011a).  
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In addition, transaction costs in use-modifying PES programs are higher than in 
use-diverting programs (Wunder, 2007; Wunder and Börner, 2011a). Often, high 
transaction costs in use-modifying PES are associated with the costs of 
organising service providers in prime agricultural areas often with higher 
population densities than in forest margins. In addition, costs of monitoring 
compliance are higher in these landscapes where remote sensing is less feasible 
and ground monitoring of active implementation of practices such as no-tillage 
farming, terracing, and mulching is necessary (Wunder, 2007). Despite these 
challenges, it has been shown that land tenure in consolidated agricultural areas 
is more secure than in forest frontiers.  
 
In use-modifying interventions, conservationists tend to argue that introduction of 
improved agricultural practices can create positive spill over effects on the 
environment (Davidson et al., 2008). However, if improved agricultural practices 
are very attractive to farmers, they may use PES payments to function as a 
transitory adoption subsidy to actively expand the new more profitable production 
method into new areas, including at the cost of degradation of intact ecosystem 
services that would not have been disturbed (Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 2001). In 
this context, up-scaled adoption may create more negative spill over effects for 
the environment in use-modifying PES programs than in use-diverting programs. 
This suggests that agricultural use-modifying PES programs could become 
victims of their own success, at the cost of reduced environmental efficiency 
(Wunder, 2007). However, negative environmental spill over is not only a concern 
within use-modifying programs; use-diverting programs can also lead to negative 
spill over effects when agricultural production pressures are shifted into other 
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areas (leakage) especially when the program involves agricultural land retirement 
(Wunder, 2007; Jack et al., 2008). As such, both approaches can have negative 
impacts on other non-targeted services. 
 
According to the global survey of PES programs by Landell-Mills and Porras 
(2002), as much as four-fifths of implemented PES programs were use-diverting 
forestry programs (i.e. forest conservation, including REDD, biodiversity, water). 
Only a couple of use-modifying agricultural PES programs were identified apart 
from cases such as retirement of agricultural land and introduction of agro 
forestry. In their review, Porras et al. (2008) showed that most PES programs in 
developing countries are use-diverting programs rather than use-modifying 
programs. Out of 50 examples of watershed PES programs reviewed in the 
tropics, only a handful were purely use-modifying programs (Porras et al., 2008). 
In the Asian review by Huang et al. (2009), the ratio was 2 to 15 while in the 
African review by Ferraro (2009b), there were no use-modifying programs 
identified.  
 
In general, use-modifying PES programs are exclusively associated with 
developed countries agro-environmental schemes, such as those in the United 
Kingdom (Dobbs and Pretty, 2008), and the European Union (Baylis et al., 2008; 
Wunder et al., 2008; Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). The French water bottler, 
Vittel’s watershed scheme which pays for improved dairy farming and reduction 
of animal stocks is a good example of a use-modifying PES program in a 
developed country  (Perrot-Maitre, 2006). Exceptional programs in developing 
countries include examples that incorporate agro-forestry components such as 
37 
 
the Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Approaches to Ecosystem Management 
Project (RISEMP) in Colombia, Costa Rica and Nicaragua (Pagiola et al., 2005) 
and, Profafor in Ecuador (Wunder and Albán, 2008). The majority of PES 
programs in developing countries are implemented for services nested in forest 
ecosystems (i.e. use-restricting PES programs) (FAO, 2007b; Wunder et al., 
2008; Ribaudo et al., 2010).  
 
2.3.5  PES and Livelihoods and Poverty  
The interest in implementing PES in agro-ecosystems in developing countries in 
order to achieve livelihood and environmental impacts is considerable, but as yet 
largely unstudied (FAO, 2007b; Ferraro, 2009b; Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). 
Several global reports have emphasised the potential of agro-ecosystem based 
PES programs for the provision of ecosystem services. For example, the report 
titled the State of Food and Agriculture - Paying Farmers for Environmental 
Services (FAO, 2007b) and the MA (2005b) show that the potential of agro-
ecosystems to enhance the provision of ecosystem services is considerable. In 
addition, reports such as the Water for Food, Water for Life - Comprehensive 
Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture, (Molden, 2007) and 
Livestock’s long shadow: environmental issues and options (Steinfeld et al., 
2006) demonstrate the trend of ecosystem degradation, the consequences of 
continued degradation and potential of PES to sustainably manage ecosystem 
services. These reports suggest that it is important to invest in PES to improve 
land management practices to sustainably enhance the supply of ecosystem 
services and poverty reduction.  
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The potential to enhance the provision of ecosystem services and poverty 
reduction through agricultural change remains widespread (MA, 2005a; FAO, 
2007b; Liniger et al., 2011). Agricultural use modification in Latin America, Asia, 
and Africa is estimated to contribute to the reduction of carbon emissions of over 
39 MtC (megatons of carbon) annually (Niles et al., 2002). Also, the global largest 
water users and land use changes in agriculture are said to improve water quality 
and quantity (Viala, 2008) and enhance biodiversity conservation and landscape 
beauty (FAO, 2007b). The adoption of use-modifying practices such as agro-
forestry farming systems, construction of terraces, afforestation and grass strip 
farming through PES programs in agro-ecosystems are anticipated to contribute 
to poverty reduction (Liniger et al., 2011). In this way, they can bring ‘win–win’ 
impacts by generating profits to land users while generating ecosystem services 
(Wunder, 2008a; Zilberman et al., 2008; Branca et al., 2011; Lopa et al., 2012).  
 
In many developing countries, agricultural lands managed by the poor (i.e. low-
income people) are often located at the margins of biodiversity rich areas and on 
steep slopes in watersheds (Adams et al., 2004; FAO, 2007b; Bulte et al., 2008; 
Branca et al., 2011). For example, Nelson and Chomitz (2007) show that in 
Honduras and Guatemala, about 70% of areas in 77 most sensitive watersheds 
explored were inhabited by the poor. Paying farmers like these to adopt 
sustainable land management (SLM) practices has the potential to enhance the 
provision of ecosystem services and improve their livelihoods (FAO, 2007c; Bulte 
et al., 2008; Corbera et al., 2009; Branca et al., 2011). In Costa Rica, some of the 
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GEF-financed payments under the eco-market programs were implemented in 
areas inhabited by the poor (World Bank, 2000). 
 
However, even if a PES program is implemented in areas with high poverty, it 
does not necessarily follow that the payments will be received solely by the poor 
(Pagiola et al., 2005). Even in a watershed with high poverty rates some land 
users are likely to be better off and, depending on the definition of poverty; there 
might be substantial variation in the levels of poverty among the poor. In addition, 
PES payments are for undertaking altered land use activities; thus payments are 
for the landholder (Wunder, 2005; Engel et al., 2008). As such, distribution and 
ownership patterns of land can greatly influence the impact of PES on poverty 
reduction (Pagiola et al., 2005; Pagiola et al., 2008; Pagiola et al., 2010). 
Transaction costs (Pagiola et al., 2008), land tenure, land holding size (Pagiola et 
al., 2005; Zbinden and Lee, 2005) and access and availability of credit facilities 
(Pagiola et al., 2005) can all influence the ability of farmers to adopt SLM 
practices thus affect the achievement of poverty reduction and environmental 
conservation objectives (Kosoy et al., 2008; Azizi Khalkheili and Zamani, 2009; 
Koellner et al., 2010). These challenges are widely reported for other 
conservation approaches which consider conservation and development 
objectives in developing countries. This suggests that research on the livelihood 
and environmental impacts of PES programs cannot be overemphasised.  
 
While interest in achieving poverty reduction through PES is considerable and 
conservation and poverty reduction objectives in developing countries cannot be 
separated (Djamhuri, 2012), it has been argued that the implied targeting that 
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comes with a focus on poverty reduction can increase transaction costs and 
decrease the level of provision of ecosystem services (Ferraro, 2002; Wunder, 
2005; Ferraro, 2009b). This argument raises a key question as to whether PES 
can achieve both conservation of ecosystem services and help the reduction of 
poverty in developing countries (Adams et al., 2004; Barrett et al., 2005; World 
Bank, 2005).  This is an important question particularly in Africa where the focus 
on poverty alleviation is one particular vital element of existing and proposed 
PWS initiatives (Ferraro, 2009b; Stanton et al., 2010; Bennett et al., 2013). In the 
review of African PWS, Ferraro (2009b) argues that poverty reduction in Africa is 
valuable, or more valuable, than the watershed services that these payments 
target. Whether PWS can have a large impact on poverty alleviation remains to 
be seen. While there is considerable lack of evidence, the appeal of PES 
programs which provide employment and other livelihood benefits may explain 
the African interest in the potential role of PES to restore degraded ecosystems 
(Ruhweza and Masiga, 2005). 
 
2.3.6  Development of PWS Programs in Africa  
In Africa, the number of PWS programs that are focused on poverty alleviation 
alongside the supply of ecosystem services through improved land use (i.e. land 
modifying PES programs) has been increasing. In 2011, six active programs of 
PWS were identified in eastern and southern African countries (Table 2.4) 
(Bennett et al., 2013). As in programs in other developing countries such as the 
RUPES program in Asia established to reward the poor for ecosystem services 
(Rosales, 2003) and the World Bank supported PES programs in Latin America 
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(Scherr et al., 2003), one of the common elements across the diversity of PWS 
programs in Africa is the strong integration of the social component of poverty 
alleviation (Stanton et al., 2010; Bennett et al., 2013). For example, the Working 
for Water (WfW) program employs nearly 30,000 people through funds from the 
South African government’s poverty relief fund as well as water use fees from 
households and foundation support (Turpie et al., 2008; Bennett et al., 2013). 
Table 2.4 shows active PWS programs in Eastern and Southern Africa. 
 
Table 2.4. Active PWS Programs in Eastern and Southern Africa 
 Country Payer 
type 
Payment Co-Benefits Activity 
Lake Naivasha 
Watershed  
Management 
Project 
Kenya Beneficiar
y pays 
Cash, In-
kind 
Biodiversity, 
Landscape 
beauty 
agricultural best 
management practices 
and protection of  riparian 
areas 
Working for 
Water 
South 
Africa 
Public 
good 
payer 
Cash, In-
kind 
Biodiversity, 
Carbon 
sequestration, 
Landscape 
beauty 
Removal of invasive 
plants is the focus of 
efforts.  
Cape Town 
City Council 
South 
Africa 
Beneficiar
y pays 
Cash Biodiversity  
Water Balance 
Programme 
South 
Africa 
Polluter 
pays 
Cash Biodiversity  
Uluguru 
Mountains 
Tanzania Beneficiar
y pays 
Cash, In-
kind 
Carbon se-
questration 
changing land-use 
practices, including 
implementing agro-
forestry and limiting 
erosion, as well as 
riparian rehabilitation 
Uganda 
Breweries/Nati
onal Wetland 
Programme 
Uganda Polluter 
pays 
Cash Biodiversity A brewery pays for 
wetlands protection as a 
pollution filtration strategy 
Source: Adopted from Bennett et al. (2013: 17) 
 
In addition to poverty alleviation goals, PWS programs in Africa are characterised 
by investments to improve the capacity of local communities and institutions by 
identifying, formulating and implementing integrated ecosystem management 
activities at micro-catchment level (Ferraro, 2009b; German et al., 2010; Jindal, 
2011; Bennett et al., 2013). This in many cases involves the establishment of 
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community leadership structures (at micro-catchment level) to co-ordinate the 
implementation of ecosystem management interventions and the provision of in-
depth training to better ensure long-term sustainability of the established micro-
catchment management system (Stanton et al., 2010).  
 
Another common element of PWS programs in Africa is the tendency not to 
monitor the actual change in water quality or quantity (Stanton et al., 2010; 
Bennett et al., 2013). They instead verify and reward the adoption of land 
management options that are likely to deliver the expected ecosystem services 
(Stanton et al., 2010; Lopa et al., 2012). For example, in Kenya’s Lake Naivasha 
basin, a consortium of large-scale horticulture operations, ranchers, and hotel 
owners near the lake are providing farmers with vouchers for agriculture inputs in 
substitute for implementing practices that can decrease farm run-off, which 
damages irrigation systems and harms biodiversity and landscape beauty 
(Nyongesa, 2011; Willy et al., 2012; Bennett et al., 2013). Another example is the 
Equitable Payments for Watershed Services Program in Tanzania where farmers 
are paid for the adoption of SLM practices such as terraces and agro-forestry 
(Branca et al., 2011; Lopa et al., 2012).  
 
These examples illustrate one of the important PES design considerations where  
payments can be for the service itself or for some actions believed to increase 
environmental services when the action can be specified at an appropriate level 
(Gibbons et al., 2011). Payment for service itself is considered effective for 
services that can be measured easily and the cause-and-effect linkages are 
straightforward such as carbon sequestration services. Payments for actions are 
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effective when it is difficult to establish the links between cause and effect in 
service provision (FAO, 2007b; Gibbons et al., 2011). One example of this is 
payments for watershed services which are characterized by complex 
hydrological  links between cause and effect in service provision (FAO, 2007b). 
As such, payments for watershed services are more easily linked to observable 
land-use changes that are associated with changes in the provision of the desired 
service (FAO, 2007b; Gibbons et al., 2011). In general, paying for agricultural 
practices that are likely to result in enhanced service provision can be more cost-
effective when costs of measuring the service or to monitor compliance are high 
(FAO, 2007b). 
 
The development of PWS programs in Africa, however, struggles to secure 
upfront capital for design and implementation, and long-term funding for 
operation (Ferraro, 2009b). This struggle is partly associated with difficulties in 
finding willing and able buyers of ecosystem services (Waage et al., 2006; 
Ferraro, 2009b) and poor institutional and regulatory frameworks which stand in 
the way of compensation for watershed services. For example, four out of ten 
active programs identified in 2010 and three out of five programs developed in 
2010 were no longer in operation as they had been abandoned by 2012 (Bennett 
et al., 2013). According to Turpie et al. (2008), the survivability of the two existing 
PWS programs in South Africa is due to their reliable financing sources (which 
are the government general tax revenues) and a strong program emphasis on 
economic empowerment and poverty alleviation rather than ecosystem services.  
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Lack of information and familiarisation with PES mechanisms constrains demand 
for watershed services even when water scarcity and water quality are important 
issues in many Africa cities (Ferraro, 2009b). Associated with this is the lack of 
capacity to design and implement PWS programs which is considered a critical 
barrier to the development of PWS programs in Africa (Ferraro, 2009b). In 
addition, the development of PWS programs in Africa is constrained by the poor 
financial state of institutions which could potentially be the source of payments for 
services (Ferraro, 2009b). These include large industrial users, hydroelectric 
power suppliers, irrigation water users, municipal water suppliers and general 
tax revenues (Ferraro, 2009b; Bennett et al., 2013).  
 
Furthermore, high transaction costs can hinder the development of PWS 
programs in Africa (Ferraro, 2009b). Due to high population densities in most 
rural agro-ecosystems, PWS programs would have to contract with a large 
number of small landowners or users suggesting that the costs of making and 
enforcing contracts could increase transaction costs (Jack et al., 2008). Also, 
regulatory environments, rates of literacy, judicial systems, little information as 
well as lack of trust and corruption can increase transaction costs (Ferraro, 2009b).  
 
Land tenure has been indicated as an important barrier to PWS development in 
Africa. Most lands are held under customary tenure systems that provide access 
to all recognised members of the community; hence PWS programs could 
frequently have to address multiple sources of formal and informal authorities 
over a given track of land (Bennett et al., 2013). Also, in some societies, 
customary tenure system do not permit land sales particularly to persons outside 
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the community and leasing can be complicated by tenure insecurity and 
increased rental rates (Lastarria-Cornhiel et al., 1999; Agrawal, 2002).  
 
Although PWS has received considerable interest in Africa, the empirical 
evidence of their effectiveness in increasing the production of ecosystem services 
(Wunder, 2007; Jack et al., 2008) and in poverty reduction remains sketchy in 
agro-ecosystem based programs (Wunder, 2008b; Ferraro, 2009b; Schomers 
and Matzdorf, 2013). Studies that have investigated livelihood impacts of PES 
programs have mainly concerned carbon related programs. Some have reported 
positive impacts on the livelihoods of people including a study by Tipper (2002), 
which suggested that the Scolel Te project in Mexico had a positive effect on 
household incomes in the project area. Another study by Wunder and Alban 
(2008) found that the PROFAFOR carbon project in Ecuador had increased 
household incomes in addition to investing in educational and development 
infrastructure in the area. This study however reported that individual carbon 
contracts were signed only with landholders owning at least 50 hectares of land 
to limit transaction costs. As such, it left behind those landholders with less land 
i.e. mainly the poor. In addition, a study on the Humbo project in Ethiopia 
suggested that local communities were benefiting from the project activities, and 
anticipated significant influx of capital into the area in the form of carbon 
payments (Brown et al., 2011).  
 
A study by May et al. (2004) on four carbon projects in Plantar, Peugeot, and 
Bananal in Brazil, and Noel Kempff in Bolivia, concluded that even though these 
projects had generated some development benefits, the top-down approach and 
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slow adoption of appropriate land use systems led to negative livelihood impacts 
in the area. Comparable views have been echoed by Asquith et al. (2002), who 
found that the Noel Kempff project had a mixed effect, with some stakeholders 
benefiting from the program activities while a large proportion of community 
members expressed dissatisfaction with the project due to its negative impact on 
their livelihoods because of the loss of their traditional land (the forest) into the 
park expansion zone. This forest was their main source of cash income from 
rubber exploitation, through hunting and logging (Asquith et al., 2002). 
 
Increasing numbers of scholars have raised alarms about the neoliberalization of 
environmental governance. They show that the outcomes of a number of 
implemented ‘neoliberal conservation’ programs have included elite capture of 
resources that were designed to go to the poor (Robertson, 2004; Kosoy and 
Corbera, 2010; Pascual et al., 2010). This presents a counterpoint to the 
optimistic scenario of PES as a panacea. Some programs are benefiting elites 
because they are structurally skewed against the abilities of local poor (Kosoy 
and Corbera, 2010; Pascual et al., 2010). The only way that a household can 
gain net financial and other benefits is when they have enough assets to 
effectively participate in schemes in addition to favourable program design and 
institutional conditions (Jindal et al., 2008; Wunder, 2008b; Zilberman et al., 
2008).  
 
Many PES systems in the tropics have been open to landowners whose lands 
meet basic criteria. Often, they favour those who control large portions of land 
with title deeds who are likely to be wealthier and well-educated, able to absorb 
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transaction costs and privy to the advertisement of the programme (Miranda et 
al., 2003; Zbinden and Lee, 2005). These issues have been demonstrated in a 
number of studies. For example, land title requirements to subscribe in the Costa 
Rican PES program excluded poorer farmers with customary rights which limit 
the potential for prioritisation of participation of poor individuals within the PES 
scheme (Pagiola et al., 2002). In Zimbabwe, elite capture is widely thought to be 
the primary reason for the collapse of the flagship CAMPFIRE initiatives (Balint 
and Mashinya, 2006; Nelson, 2012). Also, in the Nhambita project, elite capture 
by male-headed and high-income households has been reported whereby the 
poorer households delayed participation until they saw positive program results 
(Hegde, 2010). 
 
These studies show that PES programs have had a mixed effect on local 
populations and that the debate over whether or not they help alleviate poverty 
and provide ecosystem services is far from settled. Indeed, there are concerns 
regarding the extent to which local poor and smallholders are able to participate 
in PES programs (Uchida et al., 2007; Pagiola et al., 2008). Poor households 
may be unable to participate in PES due to insecure tenure, insufficient land to 
set aside for PES activities, high transaction costs, or high upfront investments 
needed to adopt new land use practices (Jindal et al., 2008). Also relevant for 
agro-ecosystem PES programs are the factors that affect small landholders’ 
adoption of new agricultural technologies such as secure tenure, access to 
technical assistance, and availability of savings to meet investment and 
maintenance costs (Chapter 4) (Mercer, 2004). In some PES studies, 
researchers have found that poor households are able to participate (Pagiola et 
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al., 2008), while in others, participation seems to have been limited to relatively 
well-off and elite landowners (Miranda et al., 2003). As such, researchers have 
pointed out a clear need to conduct more investigations into livelihood outcomes 
and impacts of PES programs in addition to their effectiveness or outcomes and 
impacts on the provision of ecosystem services (Engel et al., 2008; Corbera et 
al., 2009). 
 
While concerns regarding impermanence and leakage in conservation programs 
have been expressed widely in conservation literature (Wunder, 2005), 
documentation on actual field experience is limited on agro-ecosystem PES 
programs in developing countries (Jindal, 2006; Wunder and Albán, 2008; Jindal 
et al., 2010). These gaps are disconcerting given the rapid increase in the 
number of PES programs and plans to invest billions of dollars in activities aimed 
at enhancing provision of ecosystem services such as water regulation and 
carbon sequestration services in developing countries (Miles and Kapos, 2008). 
These issues make it vital to evaluate assumptions about what happened to the 
ecosystem services and livelihoods of program participants with PES intervention 
against without PES intervention (detailed review of these and assessment is in 
chapters 5 and 6). 
2.4 Evaluating Payments for Environmental Services 
According to Leeuw and Vaessen, impact evaluation is the assessment of “the 
positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a 
development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended” (Leeuw 
and Vaessen, 2009, p.ix). The enthusiasm for impact evaluation in conservation 
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is linked into weak evidence base concerning the impacts of various interventions 
such as the impacts of protected areas and community forest on environmental 
conservation and poverty reduction (Andam et al., 2008; Ferraro, 2009a; 
Pattanayak et al., 2009; Andam et al., 2010; Pattanayak et al., 2010). Knowledge 
on the performance of market based conservation intervention like PES programs 
on what works and does not work is vital to the public, conservation practitioners 
and policy makers to improve their conservation decisions in the midst of scarce 
conservation funds (Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; Vaessen et al., 2007; 
Margoluis et al., 2009).  
 
In order to capture what works and what does not work, methods from 
development economics, education and public health that are widely attributed to 
the transformation of these fields offer opportunity for conservation field to adopt 
them conducting rigorous impact evaluation of conservation interventions 
(Glewwe and Kremer, 2006; Glewwe et al., 2011). These methods assess 
counterfactual effects of an intervention by determining what would have 
happened in the absence of it (Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; White, 2006; 
Ferraro, 2009a; White, 2009). Approaches that are widely considered rigorous to 
assess counterfactual outcomes or impacts of an intervention include those that 
employ experimental and quasi-experimental research design (Baker, 2000; 
White, 2006; White, 2009; Bamberger et al., 2010). Experimental research design 
relies on data obtained from randomly assigned subjects into treatment and 
control groups and collected before and after intervention (White, 2006; White, 
2009; Khandker et al., 2010). Both treatment and control groups are randomly 
eligible sample units. Control group which did not receive treatment is used as a 
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counterfactual or comparison group for treated since its characteristics are 
assumed to be not systematically different from treated group (White, 2009; 
Khandker et al., 2010). Experimental design is widely regarded as the gold 
standard for intervention evaluation. However, while their design presents strong 
evidence for causality and strong internal validity; often, it is not practical due to 
ethical issues, high implementation costs and weak external validity such that the 
findings cannot be generalized to other settings due to the artificial settings in 
which experiments are implemented  (Vaessen et al., 2007; Margoluis et al., 
2009).  
 
Quasi-experimental research design is the second-best option for conducting 
impact evaluation when randomization of treatment is impossible. It relies on 
observational data from units exposed to intervention and units not exposed to 
intervention (with-without approach) or from data collected before intervention 
and after intervention (before-after approach) (Khandker et al., 2010). Before-
after and with-without quasi-experimental designs are commonly used in the field 
of conservation policy (Ferraro and Simpson., 2002; Pagiola, 2005; Ferraro and 
Pattanayak, 2006; Pattanayak et al., 2009; Khandker et al., 2010; Brown et al., 
2011). However, these methods are considered inadequate due to time trend 
biases for before-after comparison, and selection bias for with-without 
comparison (Margoluis et al., 2009; Khandker et al., 2010). Statistical methods 
such as difference - in - differences estimation or propensity score matching 
techniques are used to create comparison groups that are bias free (Ho et al., 
2007; Margoluis et al., 2009; Austin, 2011). Compared to experimental design, 
quasi-experimental research design is easier to establish and able to generate 
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results with moderately high external validity that permits some generalizability of 
findings (Vaessen et al., 2007; Margoluis et al., 2009). 
 
Frequently, findings in terms of mean differences from studies (i.e. environmental 
impacts) which use rigorous quasi-experimental research design (i.e. with 
appropriate counterfactual) are not significantly higher than might have been 
when inferred from simple comparisons with inappropriate counterfactual group 
such as comparison areas or non-treated groups that are different from treated 
areas or groups (Joppa and Pfaff, 2011). Often, high impacts are reported for 
studies that do not control selection bias caused by non-random factors such as 
those which influence selection of areas where interventions are implemented, or 
group assignment or sign up to participate in programs. For example, treatment 
areas such as protected areas may be located in more remote areas away from 
roads, in higher elevations or on soil types that are marginal for agriculture or 
population centres (Andam et al., 2008; Pfaff et al., 2008; Joppa and Pfaff, 2010; 
Joppa and Pfaff, 2011). Due to these aspects, treatment areas would be 
expected to have lower deforestation rates regardless of the protected area 
intervention itself (Joppa and Pfaff, 2011). 
 
In addition, experimental and quasi-experimental research design encounters 
spill over effects when the direct or indirect effects of the intervention leaks over 
from the treatment group into the control. Also, they can lack compliance from 
intervention implementing agency that might compromise the study due to the 
fear of finding negative impacts or inadequate positive evidence which might 
jeopardise future support for funding (Chen et al., 2009; Prowse and Snilstveit, 
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2010). Furthermore, while experimental and quasi-experimental design can 
rigorously generate evidence of the effectiveness of an intervention, they are less 
able to tell why and how intervention works or does not work and under what 
circumstances in order to inform improvement or revisions (Bamberger et al., 
2010). To address these concerns, quantitative methods need to be combined 
with qualitative methods that are able to explain questions that cannot be 
answered by experimental and quasi-experimental methods.  
 
Evaluation studies that use qualitative evaluation design focus on sampling 
framework and not on how exposed and non-exposed subjects compare 
(Vaessen et al., 2007; Margoluis et al., 2009). Frequently, stratified purposeful 
sampling method is used whereby subjects that vary according to some 
dimensions are sampled within stratified samples to facilitate comparison 
(Margoluis et al., 2009). Another qualitative sampling method is extreme or 
deviant case sampling for the purpose of learning from highly unusual issues of 
interest such as outstanding success and notable failures (Margoluis et al., 
2009). Theory based or operational construct sampling is another qualitative 
sampling method which sample subjects on the basis of their potential 
manifestation of theoretical construct so as to elaborate and examine constructs 
(Margoluis et al., 2009). 
2.5 Synthesis and Conclusions 
This literature review has demonstrated that, ecosystem services including agro-
ecosystems which are directly managed by humans for food, fibre and fuel 
production supply provisioning, regulating and cultural services while at the same 
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time demand supporting services such as water and fertile soils to enable them to 
be productive (MA, 2005a; FAO, 2007a). However, degradation of ecosystem 
services from many of the World’s ecosystems, including agro-ecosystems have 
increased at an alarming rate (MA, 2005a; FAO, 2007b). Also, the literature 
shows that challenges such as knowledge gaps, opportunity costs related to land 
and adoption input costs such as labour and fertilizers or manure impede the 
uptake of SLM practices in developing countries (Liniger et al., 2011).  
 
Payments for ecosystem services programs in agricultural lands are being 
implemented with the hope of rewarding conservation and overcoming the 
barriers to adopting SLM practices by providing financial support and technical 
assistance (Branca et al., 2011)in order to provide ecosystem services such as 
water quality and quantity and to achieve poverty reduction in developing 
countries (FAO, 2007b; FAO, 2007a; Wunder et al., 2008; Branca et al., 2011). 
The literature also shows that the geographical distribution of PES research is 
inclined towards use-diverting PES programs in developing countries and Latin 
America in particular (Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). Use-modifying PES 
programs and thus research on the subject is exclusively associated with 
developed countries’ agro-environmental schemes (Baylis et al., 2008; Dobbs 
and Pretty, 2008; Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013).  
 
The literature further  shows that the majority of existing impact studies rely on 
anecdotal evidence or on information gathered only from participating 
households, which may be biased and thus cause incomplete assessment of 
PES programs (Ferraro and Simpson., 2002; Pagiola, 2005; Ferraro and 
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Pattanayak, 2006; Pattanayak et al., 2009; Brown et al., 2011). Most studies do 
not differentiate impacts of PES programs from the impacts of other development 
components when measuring their impacts in the delivery of ecosystem services 
and poverty reduction (Asquith et al., 2002; Jindal, 2006; Asquith et al., 2008; 
Engel et al., 2008; Wunder and Albán, 2008; Jindal et al., 2010). These gaps are 
disconcerting given the rapid increase in the number of PES programs and plans 
to invest billions of dollars in activities aimed at enhancing provision of ecosystem 
services such as water regulation and carbon sequestration in developing 
countries (Miles and Kapos, 2008). As such, there has been great interest in 
assessing key baseline assumptions about what would have happened to 
ecosystem services and livelihoods of program participants and non-participants 
without PES intervention. 
 
This thesis addresses some of these research gaps through a detailed 
investigation of the Equitable Payments for Watershed Services (EPWS) program 
located in Morogoro region in Tanzania, which pays landholders for adopting 
SLM practices such as construction of terraces, agro forestry and reforestation 
activities to provide water services and poverty alleviation. The research focuses 
on the participation of poor people in the program, determinants of program 
participation, impacts on the livelihoods of the program participants and on non-
participants, and impacts on the provision of ecosystem services with particular 
focus on the additionality effects, leakage effects, permanence of adopted SLM 
activities and cost effectiveness in providing services. The most novel 
contribution of this research is that it presents findings on the impact of a PES 
program which makes conditional payments on a use-modifying agro-ecosystem 
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PES program and which also extends development benefits to landholders in a 
developing country. Research gaps are addressed by integrating qualitative and 
quantitative approaches in a quasi-experimental research design to assess the 
determinants of landholders’ participation in an agro-ecosystem based PES 
program as well as associated livelihood and environment outcomes.  
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 Chapter 3: Research Design,   Methods and Study Site 
3.1 Chapter Outline 
This chapter presents the research design and methodology. It is divided into four 
main sections. In section 3.2, research design is described, which covers the 
explanation of the case study approach used for the research and the rationale 
for the selection of the study sites as well as the evaluation design. Section 3.3 
describes research methods, which include descriptions of the mixed methods 
approach applied in this thesis (3.3.1), data collection methods (3.3.2), research 
phases (3.3.3), household surveys (3.3.4) and the wealth ranking approach 
(3.3.5). The section also covers sampling (3.3.6), interview procedure (3.3.7), 
semi-structured key informant interviews (3.3.8), focus group discussion (3.3.9) 
fieldwork observations (3.3.10) and field experience (3.3.11). Section 3.3.11 
explains the recruitment and management of research assistants, the field 
approach and introduction, language, positionality and reflexivity, and case study 
ethical considerations. Section 3.4 describes the approaches used for the 
analysis of quantitative and qualitative data. Study site and preliminary 
description of the study villages are described in section 3.5. Section 3.6 shows 
how the propensity score matching was implemented and how covariate balance 
for matched data was reached. Analysis in chapter 5 and 6 uses matched dataset 
generated through propensity score matching described in this section. 
 
57 
 
3.2 Research Design 
3.2.1  Case Study Approach 
A case study approach was used in this thesis to ensure an in-depth 
understanding of the potential of PES programs in agro-ecosystems to provide 
ecosystem services and achieve poverty alleviation in developing countries. A 
case study approach allows in-depth empirical investigation of contemporary 
phenomena within their real life context rather than being independent of context 
(Gibbert et al., 2008; Yin, 2008; Creswell, 2009: 55; Gray, 2009). While a case 
study design allows an in-depth study of a phenomenon, it has been criticised 
because of its weak external validity (Birley and Moreland, 1998). Nevertheless, 
the use of multiple sources of evidence enhances the validity of the findings 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006; Gibbert et al., 2008; Yin, 2008). Also, a case study approach 
can be analytically generalized from empirical observation to theory, rather than 
the population generalization (Gibbert et al., 2008; Yin, 2008).  
 
As the key rationale of this study was to illuminate a detailed understanding of the 
potential of PES programs in agro-ecosystems to provide ecosystem services 
and achieve poverty alleviation, the chosen case study (EPWS program) is 
representative of PES in theory, closely following Wunder's (2005), Sommerville 
et al.’s (2009) and Muradian et al.’s (2010: 1205) conceptualization of PES. 
Features of the EPWS program include voluntary transactions between service 
buyers and service users, conditional payments upon verification of implemented 
SLM practice, well defined service or land use practices believed to enhance 
service delivery and other in-kind incentives such as extension services and 
training (Branca et al., 2011; Lopa et al., 2012). Because of its consistency with 
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the theoretical conceptualization of PES, the EPWS program bears the 
characteristics of a paradigmatic case. As such, the EPWS program represents a 
case from which much can be learnt about the determinants of landholders’ 
participation, and livelihood and environmental impacts of an agro-ecosystems 
based PES program in the context of developing countries.  
 
As illustrated in Chapter 2, studies on PES programs implemented in agro-
ecosystems where the provider of ecosystem services receives payments for the 
adoption of land uses and practices that support those services are relatively 
recent in the developing world, particularly in Africa (Tacconi et al., 2010; 
Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013).  As such, this is a critical research area because 
each year, hundreds of millions of dollars are invested in the conservation of 
ecosystem services activities, which also include the objective of poverty 
reduction (Ferraro, 2002; Ferraro and Simpson., 2002; Ferraro and Pattanayak, 
2006; Masiga, 2011). 
 
3.2.2  Selection of the Study Site  
The EPWS program which is an agro-ecosystem based PES program in 
Tanzania was chosen as the case study for this thesis. A number of features 
made Africa and Tanzania in particular, suitable for this study. Firstly, there has 
been little empirical work on agro-ecosystem based PES in Africa and Tanzania 
in particular (Jindal et al., 2008; Ferraro, 2009b). The EPWS program was 
considered an appropriate case study because it promotes the adoption of 
sustainable soil and water conservation practices such as terracing (i.e. bench 
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terraces and fanya juu), agro-forestry, reforestation and afforestation (Branca et 
al., 2011; Lopa and Jindal, 2011). Secondly, as an agro-ecosystem based PES 
program, it has the potential to provide important information about the feasibility 
of agro-ecosystem/use-modifying PES programs in Africa and Tanzania in 
delivering ecosystem services and poverty reduction. Thirdly, the EPWS program 
has raised considerable interest among policy makers and conservation 
organisations in Tanzania for its potential to be up-scaled to other parts of the 
country (Lopa et al., 2012). Fourthly, the findings from this study are particularly 
important because the evaluation of agro-ecosystems based PES programs 
including the EPWS program to date lacks solid empirical evidence particularly at 
the household level. 
3.2.3  Evaluating the Effectiveness of  the EPWS Program  
 This thesis evaluates the effectiveness of the EPWS program on the livelihoods 
of the program participants and on the improvement of the downstream water 
quality and quantity. However, in a non-experimental (observational) study like 
this, the effectiveness of an intervention cannot be simply estimated by 
comparing the outcome of the program participants with those of the non-
participants (with – without) or the outcomes of the program participants after an 
intervention with the outcomes before an intervention (Ferraro, 2009a; 
Pattanayak et al., 2010). This is not an ideal approach because there might be 
other factors or events that are correlated with the outcomes but not caused by 
the program (Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; Sutherland, 2008; Pattanayak et al., 
2009; Chabé-Ferret and Subervie, 2010). This problem is known as a 
counterfactual problem which hinders robust estimation of what would have 
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happened to the livelihoods of the program participants and to water quality and 
quantity if there had been no intervention – a counterfactual condition (Ferraro, 
2009a). Often, the counterfactual problem is caused by the selection and time 
trend biases (Greenstone and Gayer, 2009; Chabé-Ferret and Subervie, 2010). 
Selection bias happens when the program outcomes are measured by comparing 
the practices of program participants to those of non-participants while their 
characteristics such as agricultural practices, social and economic practices are 
different. On the other hand, time trend bias happens when the program impacts 
are measured by comparing the practices of the participants before and after the 
beginning of the program when the practices would have changed even in the 
absence of the program. Time trend bias and selection bias are illustrated in 
Figure 3.1.  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Treatment effects and selection bias 
(Chabé-Ferret and Subervie, 2010: 4) 
 
To ensure methodological rigor, the estimation of the counterfactual is vital 
(White, 2009; Chabé-Ferret and Subervie, 2010: 2). The following quasi-
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experimental cause effect model is used to ensure rigorous evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the EPWS program on the livelihoods of the program participants 
and on the water quantity and quality downstream.   
 
As a voluntary based conservation approach that pays landowners to undertake 
sustainable land management (SLM) practices, the EPWS program is the type of 
initiative that allows livelihood and conservation outcomes to be observed from 
land owners who participated and from those who did not participate in the 
program with reference to the factors (covariates) that determined their 
participation. This idea is the basis of the “causal effect” model to evaluation of an 
intervention (Rubin, 1974; Greenland et al., 1999; Rubin, 2001; White, 2006; Ho 
et al., 2007; White, 2009) whereby the livelihood and conservation outcomes or 
impacts of an intervention like EPWS program can be derived from the 
differences between the potential average outcomes of program participants and 
non-participants. This approach is increasingly promoted as a credible approach 
to evaluate the treatment effects or the outcome of environmental conservation 
programs or intervention (Brundtland, 1987; Jumbe and Angelsen, 2006; Ferraro 
et al., 2007).  
 
The causal effect model holds that the effect of a program such as EPWS 
program can be uncovered if the livelihood and conservation outcomes of 
participants are compared with the outcomes that would have resulted had they 
not participated in the program (Rubin, 2001; Ho et al., 2007). However, it is not 
possible to observe this counterfactual outcome, thus creating an evaluation 
problem (Rubin, 1974; Rubin, 2001; White, 2006; Ho et al., 2007; White, 2009). 
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This problem can be approached through the framework of a potential outcome 
model (POM) which assumes that every element of the target population is 
potentially exposed to a treatment in which the triple                    forms 
the basis of treatment evaluation (Lechner and Miquel, 2001; Flanders, 2006). 
The categorical variable   takes the values   when a landowner is enrolled in the 
program and   otherwise;     measures the outcome (i.e. yields, expenditure, 
income, number of SLM practices and % of land under SLM practices) for 
landowner   in the program and     measures the outcome (i.e. yields, 
expenditure, income, number of SLM practices and % of land under SLM 
practices) when the landowner is not in the program. In addition, each landowner 
has a vector of characteristics, referred to as covariates or exogenous variables 
denoted by   . Given that each landowner is either a participant or a non-
participant, then for each landowner the following triple attributes are 
observed           , in which    is the realized outcome: 
 
           
            
            
 .........................................(6.1) 
 
After the landowner has decided to enrol in the EPWS program, it will be possible 
to estimate the individual gain from the program which is measured by      
            . In this ex-post evaluation of program outcomes, the fundamental 
evaluation problem arises because only one of the potential outcomes is 
observed for each entity   (i.e. yields, expenditure and income, number of SLM 
practices and percentage of land under SLM practices after EPWS participation 
or after non-participation). 
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Following this inherent problem, it will never be possible to estimate individual 
program outcomes with confidence. However, since the population averages      
of the frequency distributions of      and      can be estimated for participants and 
non-participants, one might still hope to be able to assess the population average 
of gains from the program or intervention (Pearce et al., 2003). The average 
causal effect of       , relative to      , is measured by the population 
average of treatment effect (ATE): 
 
                       , ……………… (6.2) 
 
In this equation, the short hand notation          denotes the mean in the 
population of all landowners that participate in the EPWS program       and 
these expectations are with respect to the probability distribution over this 
population of program participants1. The symbol “ ” means “conditional on.” 
 
The average treatment effect on the treated participants (ATT) is defined as: 
 
                              .                    (6.3) 
 
The means defined in equation (6.2) and (6.3) are the most commonly-used 
evaluation parameters (Pearce et al., 2003; Belcher et al., 2005).  However, in 
                                            
1
 Distributions of            refer to the distribution induced by the random sampling from the 
population. 
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the context of a narrowly targeted program, the sub-population of treated units 
(i.e. the average effect of the program on treated - ATT) is of more interest than 
the overall population (Belcher et al., 2005).  
 
While this is the case, the consistent estimation of ATT is threatened by 
complications such as omitted variables, possible correlation between the 
outcomes and treatment and endogenous factors of the treatment variable when 
observational data generated under non-random treatment are used (Zwarteveen 
and Meinzen-Dick, 2001). In this context, the counterfactual mean for the 
program participants −             − is not observed. Given this context, the 
choice of a proper substitute to estimate ATT is vital. Since this is an ex-post 
evaluation study of the outcomes of the EPWS intervention, the mean change in 
livelihood and land use (i.e. average number of SLM practices or the percent of 
land under SLM practices) of non-participants              can be used. 
However, this is not a good idea in a non-experimental study because of the 
chances that the components which determine EPWS participation might also 
have been used to determine the properties of the land enrolled (Rosenbaum, 
2002). Moreover, in a voluntary initiative like EPWS, it might be anticipated that 
those who volunteer differ from the wider eligible population of landowners in 
terms of their expected gains from the program (endogenous selection) 
(Rosenbaum, 2002). Some landowners may perceive greater benefits from 
program participation and for that reason decide to participate. Also, the targeting 
of certain landowners and location may lead to a self-selection bias which is not 
likely to be zero.  
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Given this situation, the basic scheme is to find ways to get rid of selection bias 
or to find ways to account for it to ensure sound outcomes of the study. One way 
would have been through randomly assigning individuals to the program, but in 
an observational study where assignment to treatment is not random, the use of 
a set of identifying assumptions (i.e. assumptions that allow the identification of 
the true causal effect) is vital. These assumptions include: 
 
ASSUMPTION ONE: Unconfoundedness assumption also referred to as the 
Conditional Independence Assumption. Under this assumption, it is assumed that 
given a set of observable covariates/characteristics   which are not affected by 
treatment, potential program outcomes are independent of treatment assignment:  
 
                    ........................................ (6.4) 
 
The symbol “ ” means “independent of.”  
 
In this perspective, selection should be based on observable characteristics and 
all variables that determine treatment assignment and potential outcomes are 
concurrently observed (Sunderlin et al., 2005).  
 
ASSUMPTION TWO: Overlap or Common Support Assumption  
This assumption rules out the likelihood of perfect predictability of   given   : 
 
                 ................................... (6.5) 
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and that the probability of being both participant and non-participant is positive for 
people with the same   values (Nelson, 1997). This means that by combining 
both the unconfoundedness and overlap assumptions, the treatment assignment 
is strongly ignored given a vector of covariates (Nelson and Chomitz, 2004). 
Given this, the population average treatment effect   can be identified by first 
estimating the average treatment effect for a sub-population with covariates    
  . This can be shown as follows: 
 
                                                      
                                                             ………      (6.6) 
                                 
 
The second line in equation (6.6) holds because the treatment is ignored 
conditional on  . Now, to make the last line feasible, one needs to be able to 
estimate the expectations                 for all values of   and   in support 
of these variables. This is where the overlap assumption comes in. If this 
assumption is violated at       , it would be unfeasible to estimate both 
                and                because in those values of   there 
would be either only treated or only control units. 
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Since the interest of the study is to estimate the average effect on the treated, the 
unconfoundedness can be weakened in a different direction (Imbens, 2004; 
Abadie and Imbens, 2005). In this context one needs to assume2: 
 
ASSUMPTION THREE: unconfoundedness for controls 
 
           .............................................. (6.7) 
and the weaker overlap assumption 
 
ASSUMPTION FOUR: Weak Overlap 
              …………………      ......... (6.8) 
 
Finally, to make the model’s representation of outcomes adequate for causal 
analysis, the stable-unit-treatment-value assumption (SUTVA) also known as no-
macro-effect or partial equilibrium assumption has to be satisfied for all members 
of the population (Rubin, 1986). This is a basic assumption of causal effect 
stability that requires  the potential outcomes of individuals to be unaffected by 
potential changes in the treatment exposures of other individuals (Morgan and 
Winship, 2007). SUTVA is a priori assumption which states that when the value 
of   for unit   is exposed to treatment   it should be the same no matter what 
mechanism is used to assign treatment   to unit   and no matter what treatments 
the other units receive (Rubin, 1986). In this context, the propensity score 
                                            
2 Assumption 3 and 4 are sufficient for identification of ATT because the 
moments of the distribution of Yi (1) for the treated are directly estimable (Imbens, 
2004). 
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matching technique is used  (Greenstone and Gayer, 2009; Chabé-Ferret and 
Subervie, 2010) (illustrated in section 3.8).  
  
3.3 Research Methods  
3.3.1  Mixed Method Approach 
While it is possible to control biases through propensity score matching 
technique, it is considered difficult to fully remove them completely and be able to 
explain the outcomes with certainty (Baker, 2000; White, 2008; Garbarino and 
Holland, 2009).  As such, integration of quantitative and qualitative methods 
would allow deeper understanding of the outcomes and impacts. By mixing 
methods, quantitative approaches can assess causality while qualitative methods 
can allow an in-depth study of selected issues to provide critical insights and the 
reasons behind certain results observed in a quantitative analysis (Ashley, 2000; 
Ashley and Hussein, 2000; White, 2008; Garbarino and Holland, 2009).  
 
After using a mixed method approach to evaluate the impact of agricultural 
research in six developing countries, Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004) showed that 
quantitative measures of the direct impacts of new technologies on incomes and 
yields do not tell the whole story. The combination of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods plays an important role in determining whether the poor 
adopt new technologies and whether they receive direct or indirect benefits from 
new technologies. Also, mixed methods approach has been used in this thesis to 
benefit from the synergies of combining qualitative and quantitative methods. The 
usefulness of this approach has been demonstrated by many socio-economic 
69 
 
and poverty researchers (London et al., 2007; Place et al., 2007). For example, 
Place et al. (2007) show that the combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methods can effectively determine mean strength of relationships and strengthen 
the understanding of cause and effect relationships respectively. As such, a 
mixed methods design is used to enrich and clarify the research results by 
employing sequential triangulation of data during the analysis (Creswell, 2009).  
 
In this study, a household questionnaire survey carried out for a sample of 
households in the study villages collected both quantitative and qualitative 
information. In addition, key informant interviews, focus group discussions and 
field observations were used to yield information relevant to the research 
questions and generated both qualitative and quantitative data. The following 
section which details data collection methods illustrates the mixing of the 
quantitative and qualitative methods in this thesis. 
 
3.3.2  Data Collection  
The data used for this study were collected between October, 2010 and June, 
2011 from Kibungo, Lanzi, Nyingwa and Dimilo villages in the case study area in 
three phases. A multi-method strategy as shown above was used. A range of 
methods and techniques were applied in the collection of data to increase their 
validity and reliability for broader understanding of the research question 
(Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Downward and Mearman, 2007; Gray, 2009). 
The use of multiple methods has been highlighted by different researchers 
because it is felt to improve consistency across methods through the process of 
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"triangulation", by looking at the problem from diverse viewpoints (Olsen, 2003; 
Olsen, 2004; Downward and Mearman, 2007; Denzin, 2009; Bryman, 2012). 
Nichols (1991) argues that even when a survey is useful, it is often best used 
together with other complementary methodological tools. This strategy employs 
qualitative and quantitative methods in three phases that are characterised by a 
literature review, household surveys, focus group discussions, key informant 
interviews and observations as detailed in the next sections. 
 
3.3.3  Research Phases  
The first phase of the research involved the use of a qualitative research design 
to support the inductive direction of the thesis (Shuttleworth, 2008).  This phase 
involved a review of literature, observation of farms, focus group discussion, 
semi-structured key informant interviews (Bernard, 2006; Babbie, 2008) with 
CARE-WWF Tanzania officers administering the program, and a focus group 
discussion with 8 participating and non-participating farmers between October 
and November 2010. Material collection in this phase sought to generate 
grounded knowledge on elements such as targeting, eligibility rules, payments, 
and land change management requirements of the EPWS programme, its 
institutional context of implementation and the farmers’ reasons for participating 
and not participating. 
 
In the second phase, household surveys using a structured questionnaire were 
administered to EPWS program participants and non-participants. The 
questionnaire was tested with a small number (N=7) of households and in one 
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focus group meeting with village leaders in November, 2010. The main fieldwork 
was then conducted from March to May 2011 in four villages of Kibungo Juu ward 
namely Kibungo, Lanzi, Nyingwa and Dimilo. The number of households 
surveyed was 233 with 116 program participants and 117 non-participants. 
Household heads were selected from each village using stratified random 
sampling generated through the wealth ranking technique (see section 3.3.5), 
through which households were categorised into poor, middle and rich to ensure 
the representativeness of the sample (Chambers, 1994; White and Pettit, 2004). 
In the third phase, the quantitative findings arising from phase two were explored 
further with 32 semi-structured key informant interviews and 16 focus group 
discussions. The key informant interviews were conducted with CARE Tanzania 
EPWS program officers, village leaders, 8 representatives from EPWS groups in 
each program village and 8 EPWS participating and 8 non-participating 
households. Focus group discussions were used to capture divergent viewpoints 
such as the determinants of participation decisions (Hopkins, 2007). Following 
guidance by Hopkins (2007) and Creswell and Plano Clark (2007), participants 
with experience and knowledge of the phenomenon under investigation were 
selected. Representatives of local organizations and participating and non-
participating households were selected for focus group discussions with separate 
focus group discussions conducted with EPWS participating and non-
participating households in each program village. The size of focus group 
discussions was between 8-10 people. The key informant interviews and focus 
group discussions were conducted in ‘Swahili’, audio recorded and then 
transcribed into English. 
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3.3.4  Household Survey  
Household surveys were conducted in the second phase of the research using a 
structured questionnaire administered to EPWS program participants and non-
participants. This was informed by a quasi-experimental design (see section 3.4) 
to enable the estimation of the counterfactual effect of the program from the 
control and treatment group (Baker, 2000; Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; 
Dunning and Hyde, 2008).  The treatment group was defined as households who 
had implemented SLM practices under EPWS program and whose farms had 
been measured for payment or had already received payments, while the control 
group was composed of households who had not registered their names with 
EPWS program. The treatment group comprised 116 household heads and the 
control group had 117 household heads. These households were selected from a 
stratified random sample generated through a participatory wealth ranking 
exercise (see section 3.3.5). 
 
Household surveys were conducted during the second phase of the research 
process from March to May 2011 in four villages. A mixture of both closed semi-
quantitative and open qualitative questions (Downward and Mearman, 2007; 
Gray, 2009) were used to investigate the determinants of landholders' decision to 
participate in the EPWS program and livelihood and environmental impacts of the 
program (types of data collected for each research objective are shown in 
subsequent chapters). A household was described as people  who live and sleep 
in the same compound, including absentees (Randall et al., 2011).  The heads of 
households were selected for survey using stratified random sampling technique 
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generated through wealth ranking technique to ensure representativeness  
(Chambers, 1994; White and Pettit, 2004).  
 
3.3.5  Wealth Ranking 
According to Van Campenhout (2010), participatory wealth ranking can be a best 
way of generating poverty indicators and profiles that incorporate local 
perspectives on poverty. To perform wealth ranking in this study, Chambers’ 
(1994) steps and advice for maintaining the strength of the wealth ranking 
exercise sensitive to local circumstances and expertise were followed.  In the first 
step, key informants who had lived longest in the community and who knew most 
about the livelihoods of households in the area were selected following 
Mukherjee (1998) and Stocking and Murnaghan (2001).  Village and sub-village 
leaders were selected first and, with their help, two other representatives were 
selected to form a wealth ranking group of 6 – 8 people.  
 
Lists of names of the household heads from each village were collected from 
village records in the second step. The lists were verified with key informants to 
harmonise shared similar names, adding new households and deleting deceased 
individuals. Through a collaborative effort between the researcher and key 
informants, a simple fivefold wealth classification approach was adopted based 
on the five different types of livelihood capital assets (Table 3.1) identified by 
Carney(1998) and Ellis (2000). 
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Table 3.1. The five livelihood capital assets used to characterise wealth in the 
wealth ranking exercise 
Type of capital asset Description 
Natural capital Land, water and biological resources that are utilised 
by people e.g. forest resources 
Physical capital  Assets created by economic production processes e.g. 
buildings, irrigation canals and roads 
Human capital  The labour available to the household including 
education, skills, and health 
Financial capital  Stocks of money to which the household has access 
e.g. saving and access to credit in the form of loans 
Social capital  Community and wider social ties on which households 
can rely 
Source: Ellis (2000: 16) 
 
Based on the key informants’ translation of these criteria of poverty or wealth 
(Mukherjee, 1993; Adams et al. 1997), a number of proxy indicators for each type 
of capital asset were identified by the key informants enabling the classification of 
households into three groups according to wealth level- rich, middle and poor.    
 
Wealth ranking derived from participatory methods is a useful tool in deriving 
poverty indicators and profile poverty or wealth of one particular village 
(Southgate et al., 2010; Zhang and Pagiola, 2011). However, when it comes to 
comparing villages, participatory wealth ranking does not allow comparison 
across villages because criteria used in one village may vary in another village, 
resulting in non-comparable distributions (Place et al., 2007; Southgate et al., 
2010). Due to this limitation, this study used additional wealth grouping method in 
addition to participatory wealth ranking used to classify households into three 
groups – rich, middle and poor to facilitate sampling of the household survey. The 
other method involved calculation of an asset level for each household, based on 
monetary values. This method provided the basis for the division of the entire 
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sample into asset quartiles. The total asset value for each household was based 
on the type and number of assets owned and valued at the average price across 
the full sample (see section 3.5.10.5).  
 
3.3.6  Sampling  
As the level of analysis in this study was the household, a household survey was 
carried out in the four villages of Kibungo, Nyingwa, Lanzi and Dimilo. However, 
defining the household as a unit of analysis is challenging due to the complexity 
and variability of the arrangements that people make to facilitate provision of food 
and/or other essentials for living. In the study villages and Morogoro Region in 
general, the household unit is defined in terms of rights to land, with every village 
household being allocated its own residential plot and farmland by the village 
government (Lyamuya et al., 1994). New households are formed as adult 
children move out of their parents house to marry and start their own families, 
with their own areas of farmland (Lyamuya et al., 1994).  
 
Informed by Baker (2000), participatory wealth ranking was followed by the 
random sampling exercise to select a  representative sample of 233 household 
heads for interviews from EPWS participating (treatment group) and non-
participating (the control group)  households in the study villages (see table 3.2). 
The treatment group was defined as those households who were enrolled in the 
EPWS program while the control group were those who were not enrolled in the 
EPWS program but possessing the same characteristics as the former. The 
sample sizes represented between 16 and 21% of the village households (Table 
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3.2). Stratified sampling was used to ensure representation of all wealth groups 
and all sub-villages as well as both gender groups. For each household in the 
sample, one respondent was interviewed; the person being either the head of the 
household or a spouse of the head of household. The gender distribution of the 
total sample is 65.1% male and 34.9% female respondents, which allowed for 
gender disaggregated analysis. Table 3.2 shows the village study sites and 
sample sizes, while wealth distribution of household survey sample is presented 
in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.2. Village study sites and sample sizes 
Village name Number of 
households 
Households 
sampled 
Percent of 
population  
1.Dimilo 227 48 21 
2.Lanzi 275 55 20 
3.Nyingwa 434 70 16 
4.Kibungo 279 60 21 
Total 1215 233 19 
 
 
Table 3.3. Wealth distribution of household survey sample 
 Village  Poor Middle Rich Total 
Kibungo # of observation 19 35 6 60 
% 31.7 58.3 10.0 100.0 
Nyingwa # of observation 18 45 7 70 
% 25.7 64.3 10.0 100.0 
Dimilo # of observation 22 20 6 48 
% 45.8 41.7 12.5 100.0 
Lanzi # of observation 14 29 12 55 
% 25.5 52.7 21.8 100.0 
 Sample # of observation 72 129 31 233 
% 31.0 55.6 13.4 100.0 
 
In addition to participatory wealth ranking, the classification based on the total 
value of assets of the household was performed to generate grouping of 
households that allowed inter-village comparison. As such, the measurement of 
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asset values helped to overcome limitations that could be experienced from 
participatory wealth ranking method (Zhang and Pagiola, 2011). Table 3.4 shows 
the comparison of the results of the participatory wealth ranking and the assert 
quartile wealth ranking. Both types of wealth grouping were highly significantly 
positively correlated (Spearman: r=0.250, p<0.00; Kendall’s tau_b: r=0.273, 
p<0.00). 
Table 3.4. Comparison PRA wealth grouping and asset quartile groups  
  1 
(poorest) 
2 3 4 
(richest) 
Total (n)  
Wealth group 
by PRA 
Poor 35 15 11 12 72 
Middle 19 34 44 32 129 
High 5 9 3 14 31 
Total 59 58 58 58 233 
Note: The total asset value (ranges) of the asset quartile groups in TSH are as 
follows: 1 < 651,000; 2 = 651,001 - 908,000; 3 = 908,001 – 1,412,000; 4 > 
1,412,001 
3.3.7  Interview Procedure 
Using a semi-structured questionnaire, the interviews were administered directly 
by the research team, without interference from local officials and the use of face 
to face interview methods ensured a high level of completeness and accuracy of 
the data. Meetings with the interviewer every day prior and after household visits 
ensured consistency and the recording of additional notes and observations. The 
completed questionnaires were field checked in the evenings to minimize errors 
and missing data items. Most interviews were carried out outside of people’s 
houses, a setting at which respondents would feel familiar and not be inhibited in 
their responses. The setting furthermore allowed the enumerators to assess the 
characteristics of housing through personal observation without directly asking 
and to note down any other personal observations about the living conditions of 
the particular household.  
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3.3.8  Semi-structured Key Informant Interviews 
During the first and second phases of the research, semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with 31 people. These included 3 EPWS program staff, 4 village 
leaders, 8 representatives from EPWS groups in program villages and 8 EPWS 
participating and 8 non-participating household heads. The purpose of these 
semi-structured interviews was to investigate the drivers of participation in the 
EPWS program and livelihood and environmental impacts of the program. The 
focus was on the explanation and clarification of preliminary analysis of the 
findings and on missing information that could not be captured in the second 
phase of the research. Informed by the survey, interviewees were selected to 
represent a mix of gender and wealth groups. The interviews were conducted in 
‘Swahili’, audio recorded and then transcribed into English.  
3.3.9  Focus Group Discussions  
Sixteen focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted in phase three of the 
research for triangulation purposes and in order to further explain  the findings of 
interest which had arisen from the analysis of the household survey – phase two 
data (Hopkins, 2007). Following the guidance of Hopkins (2007) and Creswell 
and Plano Clark (2007) the participants who had substantial experience and 
knowledge of the topics and who had been identified during the second phase 
were balanced to cover both women and men, and wealth groups to ensure 
representativeness. Separate and mixed FGDs were conducted with 8-10 EPWS 
program participants and non-participants from each program village. The focus 
group discussions were conducted in ‘Swahili’, audio recorded and then 
transcribed in English. 
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3.3.10  Fieldwork Observations  
In all three phases of the research, the overt observation (where everyone knows 
they are being observed) method was used to investigate cross-cutting issues 
that were particularly of relevance to the components of this thesis (Taylor-Powell 
and Steele, 1996; Gray, 2009). Various aspects of the EPWS program 
intervention, and household livelihoods were observed to allow the validation of 
responses from household interviews, key informant interviews and focus group 
discussion and thus contributed significantly to the triangulation process. 
Photographs and field work notes were taken throughout the research period. 
Probing questions such as ‘how’, ‘why’, ‘when’, ‘how much/how many’ were 
asked in a non-intrusive manner to tease out details on issues of particular 
research interest.  
3.3.11  Field Experience  
Permission to conduct research in Kibungo Juu ward was granted by the Ward 
Executive Office of the Kibungo Juu ward, District Administrative Secretary of 
Morogoro rural district, and Regional Administrative Secretary of Morogoro region 
with institutional support from the University of Dar es Salaam. Formal 
introductory meetings were held in each sub-village on entry with leaders and 
community members through the facilitation of the Village Executive Office in 
each village. In these meeting, the role of the researcher was explained in the 
village and people were told that a research student was conducting research on 
environmental and livelihood issues and that the purpose of the research was to 
learn from them about these issues.   
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Throughout the research, the researcher maintained vigilance of the research 
process. Temporary research assistants with a degree qualification were 
employed to assist during the household questionnaire interviews. These 
research assistants were selected after examining their potential to act 
objectively within interview and group situations. Prior to implementing the 
surveys widely and following the pilot in Kibungo village, all field assistants were 
trained and practiced posing the questionnaires to one another. The 
researcher rotated among field assistants as they performed interviews to 
ensure that the assistants asked questions in a consistent manner. Each evening 
the researcher examined questionnaires to ensure that there were no 
inconsistencies, and in the event of discrepancies, the interviewee was followed 
the following day for clarification. 
 
In each village, one local research assistant was hired to direct the research team 
in the village and sub-villages, and to the respondents’ homes. This was 
important because of their considerable local knowledge and to assist in 
introducing the interviewers to households, as they might be less intimidating for 
respondents. The approach to the respondent's house was usually made by the 
local research assistant. It was explained to the respondent that the interviewer 
was a visiting researcher, and would like to talk to them, if possible. Interviews 
were then either conducted inside or outside the home in the absence of the local 
research assistant. The interviewer started by explaining the purpose of the 
research and that the researcher was a student studying these sorts of projects 
and was interested to hear their experience.  
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Kiswahili is the national language in Tanzania and was spoken at the study sites. 
As such, there was no language problem because Kiswahili is the common 
language for the researcher and research assistants as well as the respondents.  
 
Numerous forms of bias can enter into data collection.  The researcher’s main 
concern was the identification of the research with CARE/WWF or the 
government, which could impose biases in the responses.  To avoid this, a car 
was hired and CARE/WWF or government transport was avoided. Also, research 
assistants/interviewers were asked by the researcher to be as clear as possible 
to avoid being associated with the project. As such, respondents were helped to 
understand the purpose of the research in order to gain trust and limit biases.  
However, some individuals would inevitably look upon the interviews with 
suspicion.  Yet this suspicion cannot be solely attributed to the researcher’s 
relationship with CARE/WWF because suspicion of outsiders is common in the 
area.  
 
In addition, respondents sometimes asked questions at the end of the interview 
showing that the distinction between the interviewer and project management 
was not very clear in their minds. In this scenario, people asked the interviewer to 
change things about the project. However, the interviewers were trained to 
reiterate that they were not involved in the project management and, although the 
findings would be available to CARE/WWF, the researcher could not guarantee 
anything would change. This was done purposely to ensure the researchers’ 
presence would not raise unrealistic expectations. 
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In the second phase of the research, people were much more interested in the 
researcher and the research work and they became more comfortable talking due 
to the teams’ engagement with people in some local activities and as they got to 
know the research team. For example, the team inspired students at the Kibungo 
Secondary School by discussing with them the importance of education and how 
to handle challenges and also worked with the community in making bricks for 
the local secondary school and in road clearing.   
 
Another concern was about the researchers’ relationship with CARE/WWF staff. 
However, this did not pose any conflict of interest in the researchers’ critical 
evaluation of their intervention. They made clear to the researcher that they 
wanted the brutal truth and they were open in describing both the successes and 
failures that they perceived in the intervention. As such, the researcher does not 
believe that bias was introduced in the analyses and conclusions due to a desire 
to impress CARE/WWF.  
 
Throughout the research process, strict ethical procedures approved by the 
University of Leeds were followed. Firstly, to address the risk of disclosure, all 
data were stored securely and anonymised in presentation. It was particularly 
important that the researcher never reported to CARE/WWF any information 
directly linked to any individual and that was emphasised to respondents. The 
research assistants were also briefed on these ethical codes. For seeking 
informed consent, the interviewers explained to respondents the purpose of the 
research and what the researcher would do with the information they gave. After 
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this, they were given a choice as to whether or not to be involved. Due to literacy 
issues and sensitivities over using signatures, verbal consent was sought.  
 
Another consideration relates to reward for research participation. The researcher 
felt the presence of poverty and the fact that people gave up time to participate 
warranted something more than gratitude. However, this was considered 
inappropriate because people would want to be interviewed just to receive a gift. 
After a discussion with the research assistants, the team decided to participate in 
some local activities such as inspiring students at the Kibungo Secondary School 
by discussing with them the benefits of education and how to handle challenges 
and responding to questions asked by students. Also, the team worked with the 
community in making bricks for the local secondary school and in road clearing.   
3.4 Data Analysis 
3.4.1  Quantitative Data 
Data entry templates were designed and adapted as interviews were carried out. 
The quantitative data were analysed with Microsoft Excel and IBM SPSS 
Statistics for Windows for basic, descriptive statistics and R for propensity score 
matching.   
 
The analysis of the household data reflects the experimental study design by 
comparing the experimental (EPWS program participants) and the control group 
(Non-EPWS program participants). A propensity score matching technique which 
involves the prediction of the probability of the EPWS program participation was 
performed for chapters five and six (Abadie and Imbens, 2005). The nearest 
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neighbour matching with replacement variant was performed to match the 
treatment group with the control group. Out of 117 members of the control group, 
67 were matched to 116 members of treatment group. The data set was first 
disaggregated and compared for the two groups (EPWS program participants 
and non-EPWS program participants). Subsequently, to investigate the equity 
question, the data was further disaggregated by the four asset wealth groups and 
by gender. The gender analysis used sex of the household head (male = 151, 
female = 81) as grouping variable before matching and (male = 178, female = 54) 
as grouping variable after matching. 
 
Both parametric and non-parametric tests were used. Parametric tests were 
performed for household level variables that passed assumptions of parametric 
test (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test), while non-parametric test was performed for the 
household level variables that could not satisfy the assumptions of parametric 
test.   
 
The data gathered through the household survey was, where appropriate, 
triangulated with results from the qualitative data gathered through personal 
observation, key informant interviews and focus group discussions. 
 
3.4.2  Qualitative Data  
To complement the use of multiple methods, data analysis followed a grounded 
theory approach (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Heath and Cowley, 2004). Themes, 
concepts and ideas based on data collected during the first phase of fieldwork in 
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Kibungo village (Phase 1) were taken forward during further data collection 
phases  in the same village and in Nyingwa, Lanzi and Dimilo villages (Phase 2 
and 3). This approach helped to maintain confidence in research outcomes 
through the constant comparison across types of evidence (Bailey et al., 1999). 
Additionally, this iterative process ensured focussed and relevant research 
development. Data from focus group discussions, key informant interviews and 
observations were manually coded and grouped on similar themes (Neuendorf, 
2002). The themes allowed similarities and differences between data to be easily 
identified and relevant quotes to be easily extracted. Data were constantly 
revisited throughout this process and new connections between data were 
formulated. 
3.5 Study site  
3.5.1  The Uluguru Mountains  –  Location  
The EPWS program was piloted in Kibungo Juu ward which is located in the 
Uluguru Mountains of Morogoro region in Tanzania. Morogoro region is located in 
the Central-Eastern part of Tanzania (URT, 1997). It lies between latitudes 5° 58’ 
and 10’ south of the equator and between longitude 35° 25’ and 38° 30’ east of 
Greenwich. It shares borders with the Arusha, Tanga, Pwani, Lindi, Ruvuma, 
Dodoma and Iringa regions. The Uluguru Mountains in the Morogoro region are 
part of the Eastern Arc Mountain range of East Africa that extends from the Taita 
Hills in South East Kenya to North and South Pare, East and West Usambara, 
Nguu, Nguru, Ukaguru, Rubeho (Usagara), Udzungwa and Mahenge Mountains 
in Tanzania (Burgess et al., 2007). The Uluguru Mountains are about 46km long 
and rise out of the coastal plain at approximately 300m above sea level to a peak 
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of 2,638m above sea level around the Lukwangule plateau and 2634 m above 
sea level a second peak at Kimhandu (Bhatia and Ringia, 1996)(Doggart et al., 
2005). These mountains are situated at 07°00' South and 37°40' East (Lovett and 
Wasser, 1993). The Uluguru Mountains are divided into Uluguru South and 
Uluguru North by the Bunduki gap which is a saddle between the two main 
ridges.  
 
The foothills divide the main Uluguru mountain ranges from the lowland plains 
that reach towards the Mikumi, Selous and the coast (Doggart et al., 2005). 
These Mountains and their foothills are a mosaic of forest, woodland, cultivation 
and grassland.  In both Uluguru North and South Forest Reserves, forest is most 
extensive from 1500 m above sea level (Doggart et al., 2005). Below this altitude, 
submontane and lowland forest exists as fragments in a matrix of agricultural 
land (Doggart et al., 2005).  Woodland is extensive on the drier foothills with 
Brachystegia sp. dominant in the moister areas giving way to Acacia sp. 
woodland in the drier areas (Doggart et al., 2005).  Cultivation ranges from maize 
and cassava at lower altitudes to a mix of vegetables and bananas higher up.  
The Lukwangule Plateau has the most extensive natural grasslands and is 
dominated by the endemic grass Panicum lukwangulense (Doggart et al., 2005).  
Other areas of grassland exist in the lowlands; formerly these areas may have 
been under cultivation and before that forest or woodland (Doggart et al., 2005). 
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3.5.2  The Climate of  the Region  
The climate of Morogoro region and the Mountains is very much influenced by 
the Indian Ocean. In general, the rainfall in the Mountains ranges from 2,000-
4,000 mm per year. The eastern highlands, western highlands and the lowlands 
that are adjacent to the mountains receive rainfall that varies between 890 mm 
and 2,392 mm per annum (Lovett and Po'cs, 1993; Lovett and Fjeldsa, 1995; 
Lovett, 1996). Temperature also changes with altitude, ranging from below 0oC to 
26°C at the higher and lower altitudes, respectively. In Morogoro town, the 
average air temperature is 24°C with the coolest month being July (21°C) and the 
warmest being December at 26°C (Masawe, 1992). 
 
Between 1997 and 2008, the region experienced both the highest and two lowest 
rainfall years on historical record (Paavola, 2008).  In normal years, the Morogoro 
region has the bimodal and unimodal rainfall patterns of northern Tanzania 
(Paavola, 2008). The Vuli are the short rains in the north of the region and they 
start between mid-September and mid-October and continue until December, 
while the long Masika rains start in March and last until May (Paavola, 2008). The 
Msimu rains in the southern part of the region start in November and end in April 
or May (Paavola, 2008).  
 
The region has also experienced declining rainfall trend (Paavola, 2008). Since 
the 1950s, evaporation in the Uluguru mountains has increased four-fold, 
impacting the flow rate of the rivers whose headwaters are from the mountains 
(Paavola, 2008). Records taken in Mgeta sub-catchment showed that the dry 
season and rainy season flows declined by 0.2 m3 s-1 while annual flows declined 
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by 0.1 m3 s-1 over 35 years period. In Kibungo sub-catchment, the dry season 
flows declined by 5 m3 s-1 (annual rate of 0.1 m3 s-1 yr-1) in the last 35 years while 
annual rainy season flows declined by 9 m3 s-1and 16 m3 s-1 over the same 
period (Yanda and Munishi, 2007). 
 
3.5.3  Biodiversity  
High biodiversity richness (species richness, diversity and endemism) is one of the 
strong features of Uluguru Mountains forests (Myers et al., 2000).  According to 
the survey conducted by Doggart et al. (2005), more than 381 plant species were 
recorded in the Mountain forests and their foothills. Also, more than 300 
vertebrate species were recorded in the Mountains forests and their foothills 
(Doggart et al., 2005).  Of these, birds were the most diverse order with 140 
species and amphibians the least diverse with 39 species (Doggart et al., 2005).  
Despite the richness of species in the Ulugurus,  people who use resources from 
the forests have reported declining trend and disappearance of some tree and 
animal species (Hess et al., 2008).  
 
Surveys on the endemism of the species have shown that the Uluguru Mountain 
forests contain at least 135 endemic plant taxa plus hundreds of species shared 
only with other Eastern Arc Mountains (Burgess et al. 2002).  Also, a survey 
conducted by Doggart et al. (2005) recorded 16 endemic and 54 near-endemic 
vertebrates in the Ulugurus. They also reported that Amphibians have the highest 
number of endemic and near-endemic species (24) and bird is the lowest species 
(12) (Doggart et al., 2005).  In another survey, the share of endemic species for 
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birds included; six globally threatened birds including the Uluguru Bush Shrike, 
two globally near- threatened birds including Love Ridge' Sunbird and six other 
forest birds of extremely restricted range (Bhatia and Ringia, 1996). Two shrew 
species and three mammal species were included in the 1994 IUCN Red list of 
threatened animals (Lyamuya et al., 1994).  
 
3.5.4  The Importance of the Uluguru Mountains for Water 
The watershed resources of the Uluguru Mountains are important for the 
livelihoods of the people in the mountains and in the downstream. The mountains 
harbour watersheds that are the main source of water for two of Tanzania’s major 
cities (Hymas, 2001). The Ngerengere and Morogoro Rivers, whose headwaters 
are in Uluguru North, provide water for the regional capital, Morogoro before 
flowing into the Ruvu River (Brouwere et al., 1998; Myers et al., 2000; Yanda and 
Munishi, 2007). The Ruvu River, which drains Uluguru North and South, supplies 
water to Dar es Salaam; the largest and most industrialized city in Tanzania with 
a population of approximately 4.3 million people (URT, 2012). The mountains  
through these rivers supply more than 85% of  water for domestic consumption 
and about 80% of the water needed by industries in Dar es Salaam (Lopa and 
Mwanyoka, 2010; Branca et al., 2011). 
 
The flows and quality of water from the Uluguru Mountains are of significant 
concern to downstream water users. Hydrological analysis conducted between 
1992-2003 in the Ruvu river revealed considerable decline in water quantity and 
quality (Yanda and Munishi, 2007). Decreasing trends of flows have been 
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recorded during the dry season and increasing trends during the rainy seasons 
(Yanda and Munishi, 2007). These trends are indicators of low water storage 
capacity in the catchments and increased surface run off resulting mainly from 
vegetation degradation. 
 
The major concern in water quality from the Uluguru watersheds is decreased 
cleanliness as a result of increased turbidity or sediment loading.  Analysis of 
mean monthly turbidity in the Ruvu River between January 1992  and November 
2002 showed that the water turbidity levels in the Ruvu River increased from 130 
Nephelometric Turbidity Units (NTU) in 1992 to 185 NTU in 2002 (Yanda and 
Munishi, 2007). This increase in turbidity is about 5 NTU per year reflecting an 
increase in sediment loading in the river over the same period. This trend of 
increasing turbidity has been reported as a consequence of forest encroachment 
for agriculture and general vegetation degradation resulting from erosion and 
higher sediment delivery into streams. Projections suggested  an annual increase 
in turbidity levels of 1.5 NTU and 3% over the 20 years post 2002 (Yanda and 
Munishi, 2007). The increase in the turbidity levels in the Ruvu River is identified 
as the reason for the increase in costs for water purification by the Dar es Salaam 
Water Supply Company (DAWASCO) and increase in water shortage in Dar es 
Salaam City (Lopa and Mwanyoka, 2010). Estimates showed that DAWASCO 
spends about US$ 2 million on water treatment annually (Branca et al., 2011). 
These costs are expected to increase with expected increase in turbidity episodes 
under a business as usual situation (Lopa and Mwanyoka, 2010).  
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3.5.5  The Status of the Forests in the Uluguru Mountains   
The status of the forests, woodlands and bush lands in the Uluguru Mountains 
and the Ruvu Basin are a key determinant of downstream water quality and 
quantity (Pócs, 1976; Svendsen et al., 1995; Burgess et al., 2001b; Burgess et 
al., 2002; Yanda and Munishi, 2007). However, the land cover analyses for the 
basin from 1955 to 2000 have shown considerable increase in cultivated land and 
decline of bush lands, woodlands and forests (see Table 3.5) (Yanda and 
Munishi, 2007). The original forest cover in the Uluguru Mountains was estimated 
to be 500km2. However, it declined to around 300 km2 in 1955 and to 230 km2 in 
2001 (see Figure 3.2) (Burgess et al., 2001a; Burgess et al., 2002). The 
remaining forest is exclusively on reserved land gazetted as either national or 
local authority Forest Reserves and small forest patches on village lands 
(Doggart et al., 2005). However, even in these areas, threat of forest decline is 
considered considerable.  
 
Table 3.5. Land use/cover for Ruvu Basin (1995 – 2000) 
Land use/cover 
types 
1995 2000 
Area (h)  % Area (ha) % 
Bush land 293,764 24 217,700 18 
Cultivated Land 87,369 7 173,468 14 
Grassland 302,458 25 493,116 41 
Natural forest 32,402 3 3,833 0 
Permanent swamp 1,334 0 1,071 0 
Urban 1,401 0 961 0 
Water 833 0 912 0 
Woodland 495,526 41 321,388 26 
Total 1,215,087 100 1,215,087 100 
Source: Yanda and Munishi (2007) 
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Figure 3.2. The Forest Cover Change between 1955 and 2000 
Source: Burgess et al. (2001a) 
 
Historically, the Uluguru Mountains forests, woodlands and bush lands have been 
threatened by the expansion of agricultural land and the economic and 
demographic pressures that have driven that expansion (Doggart et al., 2005). 
With respect to demographic pressures, the population in Morogoro region 
increased from 1,753,362 inhabitants in 2002 (URT, 2006) to 2,218,492 
inhabitants (URT, 2012). It is also estimated that about 150,000 people live in 51 
villages bordering the forest reserved areas of the Uluguru Mountains (CARE and 
WWF, 2008). These people depend on the Mountain forest resources for 
resources such as fuel wood and medicinal plants, wild foods and supply of 
materials for building and weaving (Lovett and Po'cs, 1993; Burgess et al., 1998; 
Myers et al., 2000; Hall et al., 2009).  
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Encroachment and extension of agricultural lands into the forests for new 
farmland, unmanaged forest fires and logging for timber, charcoal making, 
building materials and fuel wood collections are reported as significant threats for 
the decline and degradation of habitats and forest area (Svendsen et al., 1995; 
Hymas, 2001; Doggart et al., 2005; Yanda and Munishi, 2007). As land fertility in 
the lowlands is exhausted, people encroach into the forest areas for fertile land. It 
has been reported that in 1955, thickets covered most of the Ruvu basin area 
with a few areas in the northern part of the Uluguru Mountains under mixed 
cropping (Yanda and Munishi, 2007). However, from 1995, more natural 
vegetation cover was converted into sisal estates and mixed crop farmlands 
leading to increased exposure of the land surface to erosion agents and 
increased surface runoff (Yanda and Munishi, 2007).  
 
People collect a variety of products/resources from the forest reserves with 
different impact on the forests (Hymas, 2001; Doggart et al., 2005). While in 
remote areas people collect forest products such as fire wood, food and 
building materials for domestic use, in areas with easy access, they collect 
forest products for both domestic use and commercial purposes (Doggart et al., 
2005). It is in these areas that commercial fuel wood extraction and timber 
harvesting and encroachment by farmers are more frequently found. Hymas 
(2001) and Doggart et al. (2005) report that pole cutting was occurring in all forest 
reserves of the Uluguru mountains for construction of houses. They also reported 
that hunting was taking place in all forest reserves of Ulugurus. People hunt 
mammals such as Cephalophus harveyi (Harvey’s red duiker), Cephalophus 
monticola (blue duiker) and Potamochoerus larvatus (bush pig), and birds for 
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bush meat for local consumption and subsistence. Hunting of some reptile 
species and animal species such as Panthera pardus (leopard), Colobus 
angolensis (Angola pied colobus) and Cercopithecus mitis (blue monkey) for 
skins which the hunters sell to Europeans in Arusha was also reported (Doggart 
et al., 2005). In addition, live collections of birds such as red-faced crimsonwing, 
yellow-fronted serin, Peter’s twinspot, African citril, oriole finch, brown snake 
eagle and Livingstone’s turaco, chameleons and tortoises were carried out for 
zoo and pet trade in Dar es Salaam (Doggart et al., 2005).  
 
Fire has been reported as one of the greatest threats to the forests of the Uluguru 
Mountains (Doggart et al., 2005). Doggart et al. (2005) reported that in all of the 
forest reserves, clear signs of fire damaging the forest habitats were evident and 
were spreading from agricultural lands and woodlands. Also, they report that 
hunters use fire to smoke the hyrax from their trees. 
 
Logging has been reported as a prevalent phenomenon in forest areas with 
easy access, particularly in low land forest reserves (Hymas, 2001; Doggart et al., 
2005). In these areas, more pit sawing was observed. Targeted species included 
Khaya anthotheca, Albizia gummifera and Milicia excels (Doggart et al., 2005). In 
some areas, village elders employed villagers to cut wood and in others forest 
guards were unable or unwilling to tackle the problem of illegal pit sawing 
observed in the forest reserves (Hymas, 2001; Doggart et al., 2005).  
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3.5.6  Agricultural Practices in the Uluguru Mountains   
The main source of livelihoods in the Uluguru Mountains is rain-fed crop farming, 
followed by off-farm income, tree/forest resources, livestock keeping and 
remittances (CARE and WWF, 2007b; CARE and WWF, 2008). Also, small 
stocks such as chickens, goats, pig and rabbit rearing are considered important 
assets for generating income and providing food security (Hartley and Kaare, 
2001). Some of these stocks such as pigs and goats have the advantage of 
providing manure for growing vegetables.  
 
Although agriculture is an important source of livelihoods in the Uluguru 
Mountains, it has been described as unsustainable; and characterised by limited 
capacity to invest in new technologies, inadequate access to credits and limited 
extension services (Yanda and Munishi, 2007; Branca et al., 2011). Most of the 
farming practices are characterized by slash and burn agriculture with very 
limited use of soil conservation measures (Burgess et al., 2002; Yanda and 
Munishi, 2007). Also, some areas are characterised by intensive cultivation and 
encroachment and extension of agricultural lands into marginal lands such as 
hilly and steep slopes which extend to river banks with little or no conservation 
measures (Yanda and Munishi, 2007). For example, some parts of Mgeta sub-
catchment, the main Ruvu sub catchment above Kibungo and the upper parts of 
the Ngerengere sub catchment have been degraded due to such agricultural 
practices (Yanda and Munishi, 2007). 
 
Another feature of agricultural practices in the Uluguru Mountains is increased 
land fragmentation and decreased time of land fallowing. Most households own 
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less than two hectares of land and practice semi-intensive subsistence farming 
using slash-and-burn agricultural technique (CARE and WWF, 2007a). It has 
been shown that the average total size of household’s fields range between 0.25 
to 4 acres for minimum; and 2 to 10 acres for maximum (Hymas, 2001). On 
average, households have between 2.9 and 4.6 fields which are frequently 
distributed across the landscape (Bhatia and Ringia, 1996). In some villages, 
people walk an average of 40 minutes to get to their nearest farms and an 
average of 131 minutes to walk to their furthest farms (Hymas, 2001). Land 
fallowing in some villages of the Uluguru Mountains has been documented 
(CARE and WWF, 2007b). Some 18.92% of households in Nyingwa village, 
34.04% in Lanzi village, 30% in Dimilo village, and 8.33% in Kibungo village had 
part of their land left in fallow (CARE and WWF, 2007b). 
 
Crops grown in the Uluguru mountains are maize, rice, cassava, banana and 
pineapple in fragmented fields (CARE and WWF, 2008). Maize and cassava are 
the main food crops and banana is the main cash crop grown in many villages of 
the Uluguru Mountains (Bhatia and Ringia, 1996; Hymas, 2001). Crops such as 
maize and cassava are food crops with dual purpose of being both for 
subsistence and cash, with the excess being sold (Hymas, 2001). However, the 
lack of markets and accessible roads limit diversification of cash crops. 
Intercropping is practiced by the majority of the farmers in all areas of the Uluguru 
Mountains and include a variety of crops such as maize and rice, maize and 
cassava, maize and beans, cassava and pigeon peas (Bhatia and Ringia, 1996; 
Hymas, 2001). Generally, intercropping is done between fruit trees and annual 
crops and between cereals/tube crops and legumes (Hymas, 2001).  
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Crop yields in some areas of the Uluguru Mountains are not as they used to be in 
the past. In the study conducted by Hymas (2001), farmers commented that their 
best yields were obtained in the 10 to 40 years prior to the study. Average yields 
had declined significantly as people were getting 1 to 12 bags compared to 7 to 
30 bags they used to get in the past (Hymas, 2001). Farmers relate poor yields to 
soil erosion, poor agricultural practices, change in climate resulting in more risky 
farming especially in the short rains, decreased soil fertility  and decreased 
rainfall (Lyamuya et al., 1994; Hymas, 2001).  
 
Poor road infrastructure limits access to many of the remote villages in the 
Uluguru Mountains and services such as agricultural extension services and 
markets. Many villages do not have a main market or accessible roads that are in 
good conditions (Bhatia and Ringia, 1996). Villages with difficult access, 
especially inaccessible roads, lack agricultural and forestry extension services 
(Hymas, 2001). The absence of extension services limits possibilities farmers 
might otherwise have to improve agricultural production and forest 
management. Also, poor roads limit the access to markets and hence the cash 
crops that can be grown (Bhatia and Ringia, 1996).  
 
The income of the majority of the households in the Uluguru Mountains is very 
low. As measured in the 2000/01 Household Budget Survey, the mean rural 
monthly household income in the rural areas of the Morogoro region is almost 
three times less than the mean urban monthly income (i.e. 37,400 Tsh per month 
98 
 
(which equals about $ 1 per day)3. People spend about two thirds of their income 
on food and a third of households suffer from basic needs poverty and 14 percent 
of households are below the food poverty line (NBST, 2002a: 180). To 
supplement their income, young boys and girls in some households work (Hartley 
and Kaare, 2001). In a village like Lanzi, young boys aged between nine and 
fifteen years get employment as porters (carrying banana and timber) (Hartley 
and Kaare, 2001). Also, in other villages like Lukuyu, young girls and boys take 
up waged employment as domestic servants in Morogoro town and other 
neighbouring regions (Hartley and Kaare, 2001). 
 
3.5.7  Land Access and Tenure  
In the Uluguru Mountains, land is the major household’s asset used to grow food 
and cash crops as the main source of livelihoods security (Hartley and Kaare, 
2001). As an asset, some households rent out their land to supplement their food 
requirements through receiving ‘Ngoto’ (a proportion of harvest paid to the 
landowner) from the tenant (Hartley and Kaare, 2001). Also, some households 
and individuals in some villages such as Ng’ungulu and Lukuyu sell their land to 
an emerging land market comprising young men (Hartley and Kaare, 2001). In 
addition to accessing land through renting and purchase, land can also be 
accessed through inheritance through the matrilineal or patrilineal system 
(Englert, 2008). Most of the land involved in selling and patrilineal inheritance, 
had been declared village land under the villagisation program in 1975 (Hartley 
and Kaare, 2001). 
                                            
3
 In 2011, 1$ was 1457 TSH (Tanzanian Shillings) 
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Given the types of land access, the main forms of land tenure in the Uluguru 
Mountains are the village government and customary land user rights (CARE and 
WWF, 2007b; Englert, 2008; Lopa et al., 2012). Of these, the dominant system is 
the village government land user right stated in the 1999 Village Land Act as a 
derivative right on use and occupancy (CARE and WWF, 2007b; Englert, 2008). 
Also, the Act recognizes customary land user right for land allocated to a villager 
or owned by a clan (CARE and WWF, 2007b). Clan lands owned under 
customary user rights are accessed through inheritance (CARE and WWF, 
2007b).  
 
According to Young and Fosbrooke (1960), clan land in the Uluguru mountains 
was structured/acquired through matrilineal descent in terms of lineage. In this 
system, lineage is traced from the original settler of an area and through which, 
identity for a right to live on and work a land was established (Young and 
Fosbrooke, 1960; Van Donge, 1993b). Traditionally, land under matrilineal 
systems was inherited through the sister’s son and the first sister’s first son in 
particular; though this is not a rule and succession may go to no particular son 
(Young and Fosbrooke, 1960; Englert, 2008). In this system, land itself is held by 
the matrilineal clan. However, while this system of clan land ownership was still 
very active in the late 1980’s (Van Donge, 1993b), the situation has grown more 
complex with the traditional system slowly being eroded due to demographic, 
economic and outside pressures (Hymas, 2001; Englert, 2008).   
 
Individualization of land has increased and land inheritance through the father or 
through either parent has become more common (Van Donge, 1993b; Van 
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Donge, 1993a; Lyamuya et al., 1994; Hymas, 2001; Englert, 2008).  According to 
Hartley and Kaare (2001) and Englert (2008, the factors that appear to be 
pushing Waluguru inheritance patterns towards inheritance through the father’s 
line include (1) ‘the role of the village government in allocating land in post-colonial 
Tanzania following Ujamaa; (2) Islamic religious influence; (3) the extent to which 
a settlement has become cosmopolitan and is influenced by commercial factors; 
(4) and the extent to which individuals use the courts, which have tended to be 
arbitrary in their rulings to settle land disputes’. Nevertheless, paternal inheritance 
is not a new phenomenon because in times of need it was always possible to 
inherit land from the father (Young and Fosbrooke, 1960), thus the occurrence of 
inheritance can be either paternal or maternal (Hartley and Kaare, 2001; Hymas, 
2001; Englert, 2008).  
 
Another important aspect of land is the power of decisions over the use of a land 
(i.e. where and what to plant in any piece of household land) which is influenced 
by who controls the land (Hartley and Kaare, 2001; Englert, 2008). For example, 
women are given the upper hand in decision making over a land inherited under 
the matrilineal kinship system (Hartley and Kaare, 2001). Therefore, women have 
considerable economic independence and the ability to use land resources both 
in terms of cash crop farming and off-farm activities. However, this gender 
inequality is mainly attributable to the villages and clans adhering to their 
traditional matrilineal kinship. 
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3.5.8  Conservation Practices in the Uluguru Mountains  
Many conservation initiatives have been used in the Uluguru Mountains 
watersheds. These can be traced back to around 1909  when about 277 km2 of 
the Uluguru South and Uluguru North mountain forests were declared forest 
reserves by the then German colonial government (Doggart et al., 2005; 
Schreckenberg and Luttrell, 2010). Later in the 1940s protection was enhanced 
by the British colonial administration (Temple, 1972; Bhatia and Buckley, 1998). 
During German occupation, conservation approach used involved expelling land 
users who were practicing shifting cultivation, without any relocation assistance 
(Young and Fosbrooke, 1960; Temple, 1972; Lyamuya et al., 1994; Frontier-
Tanzania, 2005). In addition to the creation of protected areas, other approaches 
included tree planting in 1921 so as to prevent erosion and for fuel wood 
harvesting,  laying grasses and weeds to reduce sheet wash, and 1929 Native 
Authority regulations to control the burning of grass or bush on land other than 
the owner’s without permission (Temple, 1972). Other approaches were the 
1930s’ planting of more permanent crops such as coffee to reduce sheet wash, 
use of trash contour ridges, reforestation and improvement in the protection of 
residual forest areas (Temple, 1972).  
 
Between 1936 and 1937, trial plots and experimental ladder or step terraces for 
vegetables and potato growing were established by the German colonial 
government (Temple, 1972). Also, between 1937 and 1943, major conservation 
works were oriented toward education and establishment of demonstration sites 
for soil management (Temple, 1972; Lyamuya et al., 1994). Between 1955 and 
1980 during independence, conservation activities had more or less ceased and, 
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within this period, pressure on the forests increased with timber being taken 
from the more accessible areas of the forest and agricultural lands being 
created by cutting trees that had been planted as well as previously untouched 
forest (Temple, 1972; Lyamuya et al., 1994).  
 
After independence, Tanzanian government inherited the command and control 
approach used during the colonial period for the conservation of Forest Reserves 
in the Uluguru Mountains (Lyamuya et al., 1994). This approach excluded people 
from accessing resources from protected areas and when caught in the forest 
reserves, they were  punished  (Lyamuya et al., 1994). However, this approach 
has been considered difficult to maintain because of high pressure on forest 
reserves associated with population growth and limited government capacity to 
finance the necessary controls (Hutton et al 2005). As such, several other 
conservation interventions have been introduced to manage forest reserves and 
farmlands in the Ulugurus.   
 
One of these interventions is the 1990’s range of experiments implemented by 
assigning specific forest management roles to communities in and around the 
Uluguru Mountains. Such initiatives have become to be known as participatory 
forest management (PFM) approaches (Blomley and Ramadhani, 2005; Blomley 
et al., 2008). These interventions were enhanced by the changes made to the 
1957 protectionist Forest Ordinance by the creation of 1998 Forest Policy, 
National Environmental Policy (1997), Environmental Management Act No. 20 
of 2004 (Vyamana, 2010) and Village Land Act 1999. These changes have 
encouraged the involvement of local communities in forest management 
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through Community Based Forest Management (CBFM) and Joint Forest 
Management (JFM) (Vyamana, 2010).   
 
Along with forest conservation, other conservation interventions in the Uluguru 
Mountains have been focused on farmlands to improve land use practices and 
increase agricultural produce. These include interventions such as awareness 
creation on sustainable agriculture/conservation agriculture, establishment of 
community nurseries, training of trainers, support on livestock and crop 
production, training on the make and use of manure, traditional pesticides, 
beekeeping and agro forestry practices. These interventions have been 
implemented by both Tanzanian government institutions and Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs). Government institutions include Morogoro Municipal 
Council, Morogoro Rural District council and Mvomero District Council, Regional 
Catchment Forest Office (Forest and Beekeeping Division), and Sokoine 
University of Agriculture. NGOs are like the Wildlife Conservation Society of 
Tanzania (WCST), CARE, MVIWATA, Uluguru Mountains Agriculture 
Development Project (UMADEP) and WWF. 
 
For example, the Uluguru Mountain’s Environmental Management and 
Conservation Project (UMEMCP) was an integrated conservation and 
development (ICD) program aimed to enhance forest management and deliver 
livelihood benefits through improved agriculture, agro forestry, small enterprise 
and marketing (Phiill et al., 2005). Another project was the UMADEP focused in 
the Mgeta and Mkuyuni areas of the Ulugurus and operated by the Sokoine 
University of Agriculture (SUA), Morogoro (Hartley and Kaare, 2001). This project 
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supported activities such as saving and credit groups, improvements in livestock 
keeping, assistance to women's groups and improvement of the mountain 
agriculture.  
3.5.9  The EPWS Program 
The Equitable Payment for Water Services (EPWS) program was an agro-
ecosystem based PES program conceived as an innovative market-based 
solution to environmental problems in the Uluguru Mountains. The overall goal of 
the EPWS program was to deliver sustainable natural resource management 
(modifying land use to conserve and improve “watersheds” for reliable flow and 
quality of water) and improved livelihoods of the rural poor with social justice 
and equity (Lopa and Mwanyoka, 2010). One of the objectives of the program 
was to establish long term financial investment for modifying land use practices to 
conserve and improve “watersheds” for reliable flow and quality of water. The 
second objective was to establish a compensation mechanism that recognizes 
the needs and priorities of marginalized and poor people to improve their quality 
of life, hence contributing to poverty reduction (Lopa and Mwanyoka, 2010).  
 
The third objective of EPWS program was to work with the upstream and 
downstream stakeholders to create a win-win scenario where both the upland 
communities (i.e. the stewards of the catchment) and downstream water users 
benefit. The fourth objective was to ensure that program resources are used 
according to the priorities and needs of the poor, local values and knowledge and 
practices are incorporated in the natural resource management practices and that 
woman and marginalized groups directly participate and benefit. The fifth 
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objective was to engage a wide range of national partners in implementation, 
including local NGOs, the private sector and government agencies and 
institutions (Lopa and Mwanyoka, 2010). 
 
The EPWS program was implemented between 2006 and 2012 in the Kibungo 
sub-catchment, within Kibungo Juu Ward (Figure 3.3) located about 85km South-
East of Morogoro town. This sub-catchment is one of the three highly degraded 
sub catchments of the Ruvu basin (Yanda and Munishi, 2007). The Kibungo sub 
catchment drains a bigger part of the basin and contributes more flow into the 
basin (Yanda and Munishi, 2007). However, this basin is relatively more 
degraded due to unsustainable agricultural practices characterised by shifting 
cultivation, slash and burn agriculture, cultivation of non-cover annual crops and 
encroachment into steep slopes and river banks (Lyamuya et al., 1994; Yanda 
and Munishi, 2007). These practices degrade downstream water flow because of 
limited conservation measures in the basin. Also, due to land scarcity, the area is 
characterised by extensive land fragmentation which involves ownership of more 
than one small piece of land in different locations (Lyamuya et al., 1994; Yanda 
and Munishi, 2007).  
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Figure 3.3. (a) The Eastern Arc Mountain (b) The Uluguru Mountains showing the 
location of the EPWS program. (c) Kibungu sub-catchment in the Uluguru 
Mountains, showing the location of villages and small streams and the location of 
the focal villages and individual farmers’ fields under project interventions (inset). 
Source: adopted from Lopa et al.(2012) 
 
Prior to the EPWS program, some farmers had implemented conservation 
practices as a result of the Uluguru Mountains’ great history of soil and water 
Ulugur
u 
Mount
ains 
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conservation practices since colonial rule (Young and Fosbrooke, 1960). They 
implemented conventional and traditional soil and water conservation measures 
such as terraces (terasi za Bw. Kilaka), stone bunds in areas with abundant 
stones, vertiver grasses which provide materials for thatching and soil erosion 
control, contour bunds by planting pine apples and trash lines (use of sticks and 
dry grasses). Other practices included planting of Minyaweza (Albizia spp.) trees, 
planting of sugarcane along riverbanks,  land fallowing (3-4 years-Lugonela) and 
the use of bamboo & Mikangazi trees (Khaya spp.) (CARE and WWF, 2007b; 
Nsenga, 2008). Also, farmers in Kibungo ward practised mixed cropping in the 
same field by growing crops such as maize, paddy rice, trees, and cassava in 
order to diversify the risk of crop failures (Figure 3.4) (CARE and WWF, 2007b). 
 
Figure 3.4. A farm with a number of SLM conservation practices 
 
3.5.9.1 Implementation of the EPWS Program 
The buyers of the water services generated through the EPWS program were the 
Dar es Salaam Water and Sewage Company (DAWASCO) and Coca Cola 
Kwanza Ltd while the service providers were the upstream farmers of the 
Kibungo Juu ward  villages namely Lukenge, Kibungo, Lanzi, Dimilo and Nyingwa 
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(Table 3.6) (CARE and WWF, 2007b; Lopa et al., 2012). In these villages, 1,215 
households were expected to participate in the program and change their 
agricultural practices to implement SLM practices on over 2,240 ha of farmland 
(Branca et al., 2011).  
Table 3.6. Demography of the Villages Implementing EPWS in Kibungo Juu 
Ward, Morogoro Rural District 
Village name Male Female Total 
number of 
individuals 
Number of 
households 
1.Dimilo 428 481 909 227 
2.Lanzi 512 589 1101 275 
3.Nyingwa 781 953 1734 434 
4.Kibungo 515 601 1116 279 
Total 2236 2624 4860 1215 
Source: (CARE and WWF, 2007b) 
These villages cover an area of 35,804 ha of which nearly half falls within the 
land used by the villages and the rest in reserved forest land under village 
governance (CARE and WWF, 2007b; CARE/WWF, 2007). Land tenure system 
is dual, which includes village government and the customary land user rights 
(CARE and WWF, 2007b; CARE/WWF, 2007; Lopa et al., 2012). The dominant 
system is the village government land user right (CARE and WWF, 2007b). Land 
under customary user rights is accessed by clan members through inheritance 
and by non-clan members through renting or sale. Access to land by women is 
through their husbands (CARE and WWF, 2007b). However, in case a husband 
is deceased, women with no children tend to go back to their parents, while those 
with children continue to use a deceased husband’s land to take care of their 
children (CARE and WWF, 2007b). On average, households in Kibungo ward 
have 2.2 plots of land (St. Dev. 0.8) which averages 2.9 acres (St. Dev. 1.6) 
(Table 3.7). Most of the land is used as cropland with only few forest lands (Table 
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3.7). The majority of these are mixed croplands (Table 3.7). It has also been 
reported that when first acquired, 11% of the plots in the ward were forestland, 
76% were inherited and 15% were purchased. However, these numbers differ 
from village to village. For example, the share of forest converted land in Nyingwa 
is quite larger (21%) than other villages (CARE and WWF, 2007b). Of those who 
inherited the land, 39% held a customary right on the land and 53% have no title 
(Table 3.3) (CARE and WWF, 2007b). Table 3.7 indicates the land tenure 
system, ownership and access in the study area. 
Table 3.7. Land tenure system, ownership and access for the study villages 
    Nyingwa Lanzi Dimilo Kibungo  
Average land holding 
(acres)    2.8 3.1 2.8 - 
Kind of Land (%) 
  
Crop land 97.3 97.02 98 97.96 
Forest  2.7 2.08 2 2.04 
Legal Title Ownership 
(%) 
  
  
  
Sales 2.7 14.5 20 144.29 
Customary 
rights 45.95 66.67 42 26.53 
Village 
ownership 2.7 10.42 4 0 
None 48.65 8.33 38 59.18 
Source: CARE and WWF (2007b)   
 
CARE international and WWF Tanzania implemented the EPWS program as 
program intermediaries between service providers (the farmers in the villages of 
Lukenge, Kibungo, Lanzi, Dimilo and Nyingwa) and service buyers (DAWASCO 
and Coca Cola Kwanza Ltd) (Lopa and Mwanyoka, 2010; Lopa and Jindal, 2011). 
As intermediaries, these organisations facilitated the establishment of a business 
case approach for the program to assist negotiations between service providers 
and buyers (WWF, 2006). In establishing a business case, several studies were 
conducted between 2005 and 2007. These included  (1) legal and policy 
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assessment for PES in Tanzania (CARE and WWF, 2007a), (2) social and 
livelihoods assessment of villages surrounding the Uluguru mountains (CARE 
and WWF, 2008) and (3) hydrologic and land use/cover change analysis for the 
Ruvu river (Uluguru) watersheds (Yanda and Munishi, 2007).  Also, during this 
phase, the intermediaries facilitated several educational programs for farmers in 
the Kibungo Juu ward on the concept of PES and its benefits to the environment 
and their livelihoods, through village meetings and workshops. 
After establishment of the business case, a memorandum of understanding 
(MoU) between the service providers and service buyers was signed in 2008. 
The MoU stipulated roles and obligations of all parties. The service providers 
were to ensure the implementation of SLM practices and, in return, the service 
users were to provide payments to the service providers for the implementation of 
the service producing SLM practices. Service buyers, DAWASCO and Coca Cola 
Kwanza Ltd committed to pay US$ 100,000 and US$ 200,000 respectively to the 
service providers over four years. The implementation of EPWS started in 2008 
with internal and external training including local workshops, study tours, 
extension services and provision of farm materials, manure and seeds (Lopa and 
Mwanyoka, 2010).  
 
The sustainable land management practices implemented under the EPWS 
program included agro-forestry, reforestation, bench terraces, grass strips, fanya 
juu, and riparian restoration. The selection of conservation practices was based 
on the nature of the areas’ terrain (slope gradient) determined in percentages. 
The landscape terrain was categorized into three slope gradient classes, namely 
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low risk slope gradient (0-15%), medium risk slope gradient (from 15-35 %) and 
high risk slope gradient (above 35%). Bench terraces and fanya juu and fanya 
chini terraces were constructed on 35 % and above steep slopes (TerrAfrica, 
2007). Bench terraces were developed on steep slopes after the construction of 
cross-slope barriers whereby erosion (water and tillage) progressively caused 
beds to level (Figure 3.5). A bench terrace is defined by a flat or slightly backward 
or forward-sloping bed. The design of the benches is usually calculated by a 
formula that relates their size and spacing to the slope.  
 
Figure 3.5. The construction of bench terraces in progress as found in Kibungo 
village. The left plate shows farmers taking measurements and the right plate 
shows the constructed bench terraces. 
 
Fanya juu (‘do upwards’ in Kiswahili) terraces were made by digging ditches and 
trenches along the contour and throwing the soil uphill to form an embankment 
(Figure 3.6). A small ledge or ‘beam’ is left between the ditch and the bund to 
prevent soil from sliding back. They are constructed to harvest and conserve 
rainfall and sometimes are laterally graded to safely discharge excess runoff. The 
embankments (risers) are stabilised with fodder grasses. After some time, Fanya 
juu terraces develop into bench terraces.  
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Figure 3.6. Fanya juu terraces in Lanzi  
 
Fanya chini terraces (‘do downwards’ in English) are constructed by piling soil or 
throwing excavated soil below a contour trench to conserve soil and divert water 
(Figure 3.7). Fanya chini involves less labour than Fanya juu, but do not lead to 
the formation of a bench terrace as quickly as fanya juu does. In both fanya juu 
and fanya chini, grass bands or strips are applied on the slope gradients. Fanya 
chini terraces are implemented on fields with slopes of between 15-35%, which 
are mostly used for settlement accompanied by home gardens and paddy fields. 
Grass bands are used with fodder grasses such as Miscanthus sinensis 
(elephant grasses), tripsacum andersonii (Guatemala) and pennisetum 
purpureum (napier grass), which provide pasture for goats kept by farmers. 
Vertiver grasses are used for thatch roofing and handcrafts. In areas where grass 
strips are used, different grass species are planted in strips along the contour 
lines. The strips are spaced at suitable intervals to decrease surface runoff 
velocity and to retain eroded sediments. Grass strips are established on gentle 
slopes of less than 15%. Besides reducing soil erosion, grass strips provide 
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fodder for livestock and improve fertility when appropriate grass species are 
planted. 
 
Figure 3.7. fanya chini terrace in Kibungo village 
 
Tree nurseries were established to supply trees for agro-forestry and 
afforestation projects in the study villages (Figure 3.8). Agro-forestry is 
implemented in areas with slopes ranging from 0% to 15% where perennial trees 
are deliberately integrated with landholders’ home gardens where the majority of 
farmer’s plant different annual and perennials crops such as spice trees 
(cinnamon), banana and bread fruit trees. Trees provide timber, fuel wood, fruits 
and some trees can provide fodder for livestock and improve soil fertility. 
Together with grasses in rows, trees planted in macro contour-lines help to 
reduce the speed of surface runoff and retain sediments carried by surface 
runoff. Afforestation is implemented on lands with slopes above 35% considered 
not suitable for cultivation or grazing purposes. When growing crops, farmers are 
encouraged to use cover crops and mulching to improve soil moisture and 
productivity. In addition, the program emphasises the management of riparian 
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zones by planting trees to reduce surface run-off and soil erosion. These 
measures are believed to contribute to the conservation of watershed services 
and to support improvements of livelihoods for the stewards in terms of 
increasing farm yields to ensure food security and increased cash incomes. 
Figure 3.8 shows a tree nursery in Kibungo Village 
 
Figure 3.8. A tree nursery in Kibungo Village 
 
3.5.9.2 Payment Arrangements and Modalities 
Channelling PES payments to farmers in return for the provision of services is 
intended to motivate more local farmers to engage effectively in improved land 
use practices. The EPWS payments are provided to individual farm owners on the 
basis of land size and technology applied. As different farmers apply 
different practices such as bench terraces, fanya juu/chini, agro-forestry, 
reforestation, grass stripping and riparian restoration, the payments for these 
technologies are determined by their labour inputs and opportunity costs (for loss 
of production).  
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To ensure successful payments and fairness, all converted farms with improved 
practices were measured and mapped using GPS and GIS applications to verify 
land sizes and method/s applied. Farmers were involved during GPS 
measurement and they signed the data collection tool to show they agreed. 
Payments for the adoption of various SLM practices were differentiated according 
to their establishment costs and opportunity costs. The “opportunity cost was 
calculated in consultation with community members and was related to 
agricultural income for main crops linked to area removed from production for 
each technology. This was agreed to be USD 128 per ha” (Lopa et al., 2012: 41). 
Also, “communities were consulted to obtain the local Labour Day market price, 
which was USD1.2 per day. This was then multiplied by the number of labour 
days required for respective action” (Lopa et al., 2012: 41). Table 3.8 and Table 
3.9 present labour and opportunity costs used to determine the compensation 
amounts. 
 
Table 3.8. Adoption costs of sustainable land management practices in Kibungo 
Sub-Catchment over the 4-year pilot EPWS implementation period (2008 – 2011) 
Technology  Land 
removed 
from 
productive 
use in 1st 
year (%) 
Loss 
associated 
from 
removing 
land from 
productive 
use (USD ha-1 
) 
Labour  
(days ha-
1) 
Labour 
costs 
(USD ha-
1) 
Total 
costs 
(USD 
ha-1) 
Bench 
terrace 
100 128 140 168 296 
Fanya juu 20 26 104 124 151 
Reforestation 100 128 50 60 188 
Agro-forestry  17 22 9 11 33 
Source: Lopa et al. (2012) 
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Table 3.9. The EPWS establishment costs, maintenance costs and opportunity 
costs for the adoption of SLM practices in Kibungo Sub-Catchment piloted 
between 2008 and 2011 
 Establishment 
Costs in  
Year 1 
Maintenance 
costs 
Year 1-4 
Opportunity 
costs 
Year 1-4 
Total 
costs 
over 
 4 Years  
 US$/ha US$/ha/year US$/ha/year US$/ha 
Afforestation, 
reforestation 
87 76 756 3,415 
Kilaka terraces (with 
agro-forestry and grass 
strips) 
334 192 1,058 5,334 
Pineapple contours 
(with agro-forestry and 
grass strips) 
58 116 176 1,226 
Fanya Juu terraces 
(with grass strips) 
320 38 44 648 
Riparian restoration, 
sugar cane planting, 
tree planting 
8 40 58 400 
Source: CARE and WWF 2008  
In their agreements with CARE/WWF, the village authorities of Kibungo Juu ward 
are required to ensure the implementation and maintenance of introduced SLM 
measures. In return, CARE/WWF makes payments to farmers on behalf of 
DAWASCO for the work done by the farmers (Figure 3.9) (Lopa and Mwanyoka, 
2010) 
 
Figure 3.9. EPWS transaction structure linking sellers to buyers via CARE/WWF 
Source: Adapted from Lopa et al.(2012) 
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Agreement under which DAWASCO agree to pay CARE for the purpose of PES 
PES contract setting out the conditions under which payments will be given 
Village authorities pass payments to individuals who meet the conditions of the PES 
contract 
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For future management and up-scaling of EPWS practices, the intermediary 
organisation, CARE-WWF facilitated the establishment of an Intermediary Group 
(IG) that includes representatives of service sellers (project implementing village 
members), service buyers (DAWASCO and Coca Cola Kwanza Ltd), government 
agencies and community based organizations to take the lead in the EPWS 
program and to scale it up to cover other catchments in the Uluguru Mountains 
when the role of CARE-WWF Tanzania in the pilot project comes to an end.  
 
3.5.10  Livelihood Patterns in the Case study Villages  
This section provides the profile of the study villages. It includes a description of 
the social and economic activities undertaken by the households in the study 
villages.  
3.5.10.1 Land Ownership  
A study conducted by CARE and WWF (2007b) shows that the nature of land 
tenure system in Nyingwa, Dimilo, Lanzi and Kibungo villages is dual; the village 
government and the customary land user rights. Of these the dominant land 
tenure system in the area is the village government (council) land user right in 
which the village council is the allocating authority. While the villagers only have a 
derivative right to use and occupancy, once they have been allocated land and 
developed it, the customary land user right operates (CARE and WWF, 2007b). A 
land with customary user rights can be accessed by clan members through 
inheritance and by non-clan members through renting or sale. In addition, the 
report also shows that the land is increasingly becoming a major constraint to 
agricultural production and food security where the available agricultural land per 
household has been declining due to increase in population. Most households 
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own small plots with no possibilities of increasing production through land 
expansion.  
 
The findings of this study that focused on Kibungo, Nyingwa, Lanzi and Dimilo 
villages  show that at the household level, landholding amounts to 3 acres with 
large variance (St. Dev. 1.4), whereby more than half (66.1%) of households 
owned between 1 and 3 acres. Also, 14.2% owned less than 1 acre while 19.7% 
of all households owned farms larger than 3 acres and only 4.5% owned between 
5 and 6 acres of land. The comparison of land distribution between the four 
villages shows that households in Lanzi and Nyingwa villages (3.3 acres and 3 
acres respectively) are comparatively richer in land ownership than Dimilo and 
Kibungo villages (2.3 and 2.7 acres respectively) (see Table 3.10). Almost all the 
land is cropland, and there are just few plots with forest on it. 
 
Table 3.10. Land ownership in the study villages 
 Kibungo Nyingwa Dimilo Lanzi Total 
Minimum 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.25 
Maxmum 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.50 6.50 
Mean 2.70 3.00 2.30 3.30 3.00 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.40 1.30 1.30 1.40 1.40 
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Figure 3.10. Type of land ownership within and across villages in the study 
villages 
 
With respect to the method of land acquisition in the study villages, 54.9% of 
households purchased their land or were allocated by the village and 45.1% 
households inherited the land. The comparison of land ownership within the study 
villages shows that most households in Kibungo village own inherited land while 
for Nyingwa, Dimilo and Lanzi most households own private land. This same 
trend is exhibited across study village comparison (Figure 3.10). Further 
information about land acquisition shows that the majority of households (97% 
and 98%) use their land for crop production activities while only few (2% and 3%) 
use their land for forest activities. Land titles are important information about land 
in the study villages. Interviews with the village leader showed that about 75% of 
households have customary right of ownership while 25% have village ownership 
rights. The interviews  and focus group discussions further revealed that SLM 
practices (i.e. terracing) were being implemented on private lands – mostly home 
gardens. 
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3.5.10.2 Housing Condition  
  During the wealth ranking exercise, villagers identified types of bricks (burned or 
not burned) and other materials used for housing; and this was used as one of 
the household indicators of wealth. Iron sheets for roofing and brick walls are 
considered to indicate relative wealth compared to houses constructed from mud 
and grass materials for roofing. Across study villages, rich people were identified 
by houses with burned bricks combined with iron sheets and mud flooring. Middle 
income people used the same materials but unburned mud bricks while the poor 
relied on the old-fashioned poles and mud wall construction with grass roofing. 
Table 3.11 shows the different materials for walls, roofing and flooring used in the 
study villages. Dimilo village had slightly lower occurrence of iron sheets for 
roofing and Kibungo village had the highest. Kibungo and Nyingwa villages had 
the highest number of respondents with houses that were made from mud bricks 
while Dimilo and Lanzi villages had the highest number of respondents with 
houses that were made from poles.  
 
Table 3.11. Housing materials used by study village and for the entire sample 
   Kibungo Nyingwa Dimilo Lanzi Total 
Type of walls           
Stone with plaster 1.7  0.0 2.1 1.8 1.3 
Stones and mud 13.6 5.7 6.3 3.6 7.3 
Burnt bricks with plaster 1.7 7.1 2.1 3.6 3.9 
Burnt bricks 1.7  0.0  0.0 3.6 1.3 
Mud bricks with plaster 8.5 8.6  0.0 9.1 6.9 
Mud bricks 61.0 54.3 27.1 38.2 46.6 
Poles and mud 11.9 24.3 62.5 40.0 32.8 
Type of roof           
Thatch/Leaves 47.5 54.3 61.7 60.0 61.6 
Metal sheets 52.5 45.7 38.3 40.0 38.4 
Type of floor           
Cement 10.5 7.5 4.2 18.2 9.3 
Mud\dust 89.5 92.5 95.8 81.8 89.9 
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The building material used was not significantly different between female or male 
household heads (Table 3.12). More female heads of households (53.8%) lived in 
brick houses than did male heads of households (42.8%). Also, more male 
household heads (36.2%) lived in houses made from poles and mud than did 
female household heads (26.3%). As for roofing, 63.3% of female and 61.8% 
male heads of households had thatched houses. Also, 38.8% female and 38.2% 
of male heads of households used iron sheets as roofing material for their 
houses. Almost 11.7% more female heads of households lived in houses with 
cement floor as compared to 9.3%heads of households.  
 
Table 3.12. Housing material by gender of household head 
 
Household Head 
 Female Male 
Type of walls     
Stone with plaster 1.3 1.3 
Stones and mud 6.3 7.9 
Burnt bricks with plaster 5.0 3.3 
Burnt bricks 1.3 1.3 
Mud bricks with plaster 6.3 7.2 
Mud bricks 53.8 42.8 
Poles and mud 26.3 36.2 
Type of roof     
Thatch/Leaves 61.3 61.8 
Metal sheets 38.8 38.2 
Type of floor     
Cement 11.7 9.3 
Mud\dust 88.3 90.7 
 
3.5.10.3 Education and Social Services  
With regard to the educational level, 25.3% and 63.9% of household heads were 
educated at standard four and standard seven level of education respectively. 
Fewer males headed households had between standard 1 and 4 (22.4%) level of 
education compared to female head of households (30.9%). Also, more males 
had the level of education between form one to form six (Figure 3.11).  
122 
 
  
Figure 3.11. Differences in education between male and female headed 
household 
 
Only Kibungo village had fewer household heads with standard four to standard 
seven level of education (Figure 3.12). Other villages had more than 65% heads 
of households with standard four to standard seven level of education. The 
percentage of households with no formal education was highest in Kibungo and 
Dimilo villages with 3.3% and 6.3% respectively. 
 
Figure 3.12. Education of HH head by study village 
 
The comparison between education and wealth group across study villages 
showed that of the poor wealth group none had post standard seven level of 
education while there was 9.4% of middle and 15.%% of higher wealth group who 
had post standard seven level of education (Figure 3.13). The social services and 
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infrastructure provided at communal level influence as part of the social capital 
the livelihoods of individual households. In all study villages, there was similar 
with some slight variations in the social services situation. Kibungo and Lanzi 
villages were relatively well serviced due to their road access compare to 
Nyingwa and Dimilo villages which were remote with poor road access. None of 
the villages had electricity. Although no village had piped water, water was not 
considered to be the main problem in the villages. The main source of water in 
almost all study villages was natural springs (65.7%) and river/streams (25.8%). 
In all villages, water was everyday available (96%) from these sources.  Also, the 
walking distance to the water source was less than ten minutes (75.4%).  
 
The main source of energy for cooking in almost all households in the study 
villages was firewood (96%). Firewood was either collected from nearby forests 
or purchased. Charcoal was produced for sale and served as a source of income 
rather than household energy. Mobile phone communication was accessible in all 
villages. Usually, those villagers who could not afford to buy a mobile phone 
purchased phone services from some better off villagers (mostly younger men) 
who owned mobile phones. 
 
 
Figure 3.13. Education of HH head by wealth 
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In all four villages, the situation of health services varied slightly between the 
villages but was generally described as poor by the villagers. On average, many 
households take more than sixty minutes to get to health facilities in the village. 
Only households in Kibungo (78.3%) and Nyingwa (57.1%) villages recorded to 
take less than sixty minutes to health facility compared to Dimilo (6.3%) and 
Lanzi (34.6%) villages. Taking natural medicines from the forest or referring to 
traditional healers was common in all four villages.  
 
3.5.10.4 Sources of Livelihood  
The main source of household livelihoods in the study villages is agriculture 
combined with small scale businesses and small livestock keeping. Only 
teachers, health facility workers, village and ward executive officers and 
extension offices had formal employment. For people with smaller land holdings 
or without land, daily labour to other villagers with more income and larger farms 
was an important source of income. Traditionally, farming was the main source of 
livelihoods named by study village respondents (Figure 3.14). They also identified 
sells of crops as their main source of cash income (93.5%) followed by the sale of 
livestock such as chicken and goats (55.4%) and business (8.2%). While these 
sources were identified as the village’s main source of cash income, deeper 
inquiry with the focus group discussions revealed that yields from the fields 
cultivated was too low to make a living due to unfavourable agricultural conditions 
(i.e. infertile soils and the lack of land, inputs, tools and extension services). They 
also revealed the existence of reliance on other sources of livelihoods, 
particularly forest resources such as timber and poles that some households 
harvest illegally in forest reserves.  
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Figure 3.14. Household Sources of cash Income 
 
Business income (8.2%), pensions and remittances (3.4%) and salary/wage 
(1.3%) played the most important role as non-farm sources of household income 
(Figure 3.14). 12.9% of respondents indicated other casual earnings such as 
beer brewing, house-building and charcoal burning as source of income. Timber 
and charcoal making were used by some households as their important source of 
cash income but barely mentioned as they were illegal activities that most 
respondents would not openly admit to conduct. 
 
3.5.10.5 Household Asset Wealth  
 The wealth distribution across villages (measured in asset wealth) is shown in 
Table 3.13 below. Comparatively, Nyingwa village has the highest percentage of 
richer households (55.7%), followed by Lanzi village (54.5%) and Kibungo village 
(50.0%). Dimilo is the village that has the highest percentage of poorer 
households (44.7%), followed by Kibungo village. 
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Table 3.13. Relative wealth in the study villages (% of households in asset 
groups) 
 Kibungo Nyingwa Dimilo Lanzi All 
1.00 (poorer) 15 11 21 11 58 
25.0% 15.7% 45.8% 20.0% 25.0% 
2.00 15 20 9 14 58 
25.0% 28.6% 18.8% 25.5% 25.0% 
3.00 17 22 6 13 58 
28.3% 31.4% 12.5% 23.6% 25.0% 
4.00 (richer) 13 17 11 17 58 
21.7% 24.3% 22.9% 30.9% 25.0% 
Total 60 70 48 55 233 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
The full list of assets owned by the households and the frequency is shown in 
Table 3.15. The assets were grouped into four asset categories: land assets, 
non-productive assets, productive assets and livestock assets. Table 3.14 shows 
the mean value of assets in TSH for the four categories disaggregated by wealth 
group. Wealth group 4 (richer) had the highest mean values for all four asst 
categories.  
 
Table 3.14. Value of assets in TSH by household, mean values 
Assets  Low wealth assets group High wealth assets group 
    1 (poorer) 2 3 4 (richer) 
Land assets Mean             277,414     500,862     743,103    1,137,931  
Median              220,000     525,000     800,000    1,200,000  
 
Non Productive 
assets 
 
Mean 
             
 103,88  
    
137,238  
  
  152,907  
     
 188,416  
Median                95,550     135,250     143,700       185,750  
 
Productive 
assets 
 
Mean 
                
23,776  
      
28,526  
    
  63,060  
    
  184,707  
Median                15,000       20,500       24,000         33,250  
 
Livestock assets 
 
Mean 
 
48,974  
 
111,940  
  
190,552  
      
351,931  
Median                40,000      67,000     149,000       285,500  
 
Total value of 
Assets 
 
Mean 
                    
454,048  
        
778,566  
     
1,149,622  
       1,862,984  
Median              370,550     747,750  1,116,700    1,704,500  
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Table 3.15. Assets owned by the sample households 
 Asset N Percent Average owned 
Chicken 163 70.26 12 
Goat 137 59.05 5 
Pig 73 31.47 3 
Sheep 10 4.31 3 
Machete 173 74.57 1 
Hand hoe 204 87.93 2 
Axes 132 56.90 1 
Sickle 158 68.10 2 
Mobile phone 117 50.43 1 
Chairs 184 79.31 3 
Tables 198 85.34 2 
Beds 227 97.84 2 
Mosquito net 162 69.83 2 
Iron charcoal 77 33.19 1 
Radio 132 56.90 1 
Motorcycle 5 2.16 1 
Bicycle 14 6.03 1 
Sewing machine 9 3.88 1 
Buckets 231 99.57 3 
Beehives 7 3.02 3 
Spade 145 62.50 1 
Cooking port 232 100.00 3 
Flour milling 
machine 
5 
2.16 
1 
Generator 7 3.02 1 
TV 9 3.88 1 
 
3.5.10.6 Gender and Relative Wealth  
The sample included 34.9% female and 65.1% male heads of household (Table 
3.16). Village wise, Kibungo village (41.7%) had largest representation of female 
headed households and Lanzi village the smallest (30.9%) (Table 3.16). While, 
more female (96.3%) than male household heads (85.4%) had achieve standard 
one to seven, more males (9.9%) than female household heads (3.7%) had gone 
beyond standard seven to between form  one and six and attended training after 
standard seven (Table 3.16). 
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Table 3.16. Respondents, heads of households, education, study villages and 
asset quartile by gender 
 Male (%) Female (%) 
Heads of households 65.1 34.9 
Education  Std 1-7 85.4 96.3 
Form 1-6 and 
training after 
standard 7 
9.9 3.7 
Gender of 
household head 
between and 
within villages ( ) 
Kibungo 23.2 (58.3) 30.9 (41.7) 
Nyingwa 31.1 (67.1) 28.4 (32.9) 
Dimilo 20.5 (66) 19.8 (64) 
Lanzi 25.2 (69.1) 21 (30.9) 
Gender of 
household head 
by asset quartile 
group 
1 (poorer) 53.4 46.6 
2 65.5 34.5 
3 62.1 37.9 
4 (richer) 79.3 20.7 
 
The majority of male headed households were in the highest asset category. The 
asset nets in Figure 3.15 below (mean values in TSH in Table 3.17) show that 
male headed households had on average larger asset wealth than female 
headed households. 
 
Figure 3.15. Asset nets (mean values in TSH) by gender of household head. 
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Table 3.17. Asset categories, mean values and standard deviation (SD) in TSH, 
by gender of household head 
 Male (SD) Female (SD) 
Livestock assets  171,632 
(199,140)  
 183,709 (213,686)  
Productive assets  83,307 (242,565)   59,561 (190,588)  
Non-Productive assets  151,535 (57,740)   134,567 (60,781)  
Land assets  731,059 
(391,522)  
 541,358 (371,129)  
 
3.6 The Propensity Score Matching and the Implementation 
Propensity score matching (PSM) is a statistical matching technique that 
attempts to estimate the effect of a treatment, policy, or program by accounting 
for the covariates that predict receiving the treatment (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008; Austin, 2011; Peikes et al., 2012). In this study, PSM technique was used 
to construct a statistical comparison group based on balancing scores b(X) of the 
probability for an individual to participate in a treatment given his/her observable 
covariates  unaffected by the program, such that the conditional distribution of X 
given b(X) is independent of assignment into treatment (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983; Rosenbaum, 2002; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). This probability or 
propensity score is then used to match EPWS program participants to non-EPWS 
participants. The average treatment effect of the program is then calculated as 
the mean difference in outcomes across the two groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983; Rosenbaum, 2002). This counterfactual condition establishes what would 
have happened to livelihoods of participants if there had been no EPWS program 
intervention. As described in section 3.2.3, being an observational quasi-
experimental evaluation study, the validity of PSM depends on (a) conditional 
independence (namely, that unobserved factors do not affect participation) and 
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(b) the presence of sizable common support or overlap in propensity scores 
across the EPWS participants and non-EPWS participants to reduce selection 
bias (Rosenbaum, 2002). Figure 3.16 summarises the steps followed in PSM. 
 
Figure 3.16. Propensity score matching implementation steps. 
Source: Adopted from (Rosenbaum, 2002) page. 2 
 
The choice of the model to be used for estimation of propensity score and the 
variables to be included in the model are two important choices that need to be 
made when using PSM (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Rosenbaum, 2002).  In this 
study, the logit model of program participation was used to estimate probabilities 
or propensity scores. Any discrete choice model can be used for estimating 
propensity scores because logit and probit models yield similar results when 
estimating the probability of participation vs. non participation in binary treatment 
cases (Rosenbaum, 2002). In the general framework of the probability model we 
have: Prob(EPWS participation) = Prob(D=1) =F[relevant effects, parameters]. In 
this case, the probability of participation in EPWS is a cumulative distribution 
function F evaluated as a function of a set (X) of explanatory variables that 
include household socio-economic characteristics, and a vector β of unknown 
parameters. The probability of participation model can be written as: 
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            …6.9 
As emphasised by Smith and Todd (1983), the choice of variables used for 
building up the propensity score model were based on sound knowledge of 
previous research and those unaffected by participation or anticipation of it 
(Rosenbaum, 2002; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The variables included in the 
propensity score estimation model are household head’s gender, age and 
education, household family size, farm size of the household and household’s 
past land use. To make sure the bias in PSM program estimates is low; the same 
survey instrument was administered to participants and non-participants from the 
same geographical area facing the same economic incentives (i.e. that might be 
drive choices such as program participation) to ensure that the observed 
characteristics entering the logit model of participation are measured similarly 
across the two groups (Heckman et al., 1999; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; 
Ravallion, 2007; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).  
 
Nearest neighbour (NN) matching with replacement estimator (i.e. an untreated 
individual was used more than once as a match) was used to trade-off bias and 
variance (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). By allowing 
replacement, the average quality of matching was increased and the bias 
decreased (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). This approach was vital in this study 
because, the propensity score distribution in the data between the treatment and 
the control group was slightly different. This could reduce the number of distinct 
non-participants used to construct the counterfactual outcome and increase the 
variance of the estimator (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Dehejia and Wahba, 
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2002). Matching with replacement allowed the reduction of bias, by producing 
matches of higher quality than that could have be achieved with matching without 
replacement, given the lower number of control observations (Dehejia and 
Wahba, 2002; Scales, 2015).  
 
 Visual analysis of histograms (Figures 3.17 and 3.18) showing density 
distribution of the propensity score in the two groups was used to check the 
overlap and the region of common support assumption (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008). This ensured that any combination of characteristics observed in the 
treatment group can also be observed among the control group (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig, 2008). In NN matching with replacement, only the closest neighbour 
from control group is used to match treatment individuals. Control individuals that 
fall outside the region of common support were discarded as bad matches 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The region of common support before NN 
matching with replacement is shown in Figure 3.17 while Figure 3.18 shows the 
region after NN matching with replacement.  
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Figure 3.17. Region of common support before NN matching 
 
 
Figure 3.18. Region of common support after NN matching with replacement 
 
The quality of matching in terms of characteristics of the treatment and control 
group before and after matching is presented in Table 3.18 and 3.19 respectively. 
They also show observable socio-economic characteristics used for matching 
that had the potential to influence participation or selection into the EPWS 
program (Ravallion, 2007; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Before matching, the 
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sample shows that the heads of participating households are younger than non-
participants and that they have more years of schooling. The participating 
households also have more members and land. Indeed, the Mann-Whitney U test 
shows significant difference between the treated and control group (Table 3.18). 
After matching (Table 3.19), treatment and control groups are similar in terms of 
propensity scores because Mann-Whitney U test shows no significant difference 
between the two groups.  
 
Table 3.18. Comparison of pre-matched samples of EPWS program participants 
and non-participants 
Names of Variables Treatment 
Condition 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Mean 
Difference 
t-test  
Gender of household 
head1 
Yes 0.72 0.45 0.04 0.14 
  
2.31 * 
  No 0.58 0.49 0.05 
Age of household 
head 
Yes 43.7 13.26 1.23 -7.99 
  
-4.17** 
  No 51.7 15.89 1.49 
Household size  Yes 2.53 0.93 0.09 0.52 
  
3.74** 
  No 2.01 1.17 0.11 
Years of schooling of 
the household head 
Yes 6.49 1.61 0.15 0.94 
  
3.90** 
  No 5.55 2.06 0.19 
Farm size (acres) Yes 3.55 1.44 0.13 1.08 
  
6.12** 
  No 2.47 1.26 0.12 
Past land use 
(conservation 
practices)1 
Yes 0.54 0.5 0.05 0.16 
  
2.45* 
  No 0.38 0.49 0.05 
Yes = Treated (EPWS program participants) and No = Control (EPWS program non-participants)
 
1
Indicates a dummy variable, coded as 1=statement true for respondent, and 0= statement false 
for respondent; the mean for these variables is therefore a percentage of respondents. Gender of 
household head: 1 if male and 0 if female; Past land use: 1 if implemented conservation practice 
in the past before EPWS program and 0 otherwise. The last column shows t-statistics, where 
single, and double asterisks (*) indicate that the means of the groups significantly differ from each 
other at the 5%, and 1% levels of probability, respectively. 
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Table 3.19. Comparison of matched samples of EPWS program participants and 
non-participants   
Names of Variables Treatment 
Condition 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
Mean 
Difference 
t-test and 
significance 
Gender of household 
head1 
Yes 0.74 0.44 0.04 -0.05 -0.93 
No 0.79 0.41 0.04 
Age of household 
head 
Yes 44.67 12.92 1.20 1.87 1.14 
No 42.80 12.13 1.13 
Household size  Yes 2.66 1.13 0.10 -0.05 -0.35 
No 2.72 1.13 0.10 
Years of schooling of 
the household head 
Yes 6.92 2.12 0.19 0.03 0.09 
No 6.90 2.11 0.19 
Farm size (acres) Yes 3.52 1.43 0.13 0.13 0.73 
No 3.39 1.23 0.11 
Past land use 
(conservation 
practices)1 
Yes 0.55 0.49 0.05 -0.01 -0.13 
No 0.56 0.49 0.05 
Yes = Treated (EPWS program participants) and No = Control (EPWS program non-participants)
 
1
Indicates a dummy variable, coded as 1=statement true for respondent, and 0= statement false 
for respondent; the mean for these variables is therefore a percentage of respondents. Gender of 
household head: 1 if male and 0 if female; Past land use: 1 if implemented conservation practice 
in the past before EPWS program and 0 otherwise;  
3.7 Conclusions  
This chapter has justified the use of a case study approach and described the 
selection of the case study. It also describes the study site and the EPWS 
program. The methodological approaches to the evaluation of the EPWS 
program, data collection methods, field experience and data analysis methods 
have been explained. Having described how the various data were collected and 
analysed, the following chapters (Chapters 4–6) present the findings from this 
study. In each of the result chapters, specific materials and methods are 
explained.  
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 Chapter 4: Farmer Participation in the Equitable Payments for 
Watershed Services in Morogoro, Tanzania  
4.1 Chapter Outline 
This chapter examines participation in the EPWS program and the determinants 
of farmers' decision to participate in the program. The chapter uses mixed 
methods with logistic regression method to investigate factors that determine 
farmers’ decision to participate in the program in order to shed light on the factors 
that will determine participation in an agricultural based PES program. Results 
highlight that eligible poor households participate in the EPWS program and their 
participation is not limited to simpler practices but they also construct terraces. 
Also, farm size, farmers’ access to information, participation in the design phase 
of the program and the change in farm management required by the program 
significantly determine farmer participation in the EPWS program. The results 
highlight the need to carefully design PES schemes in developing countries that 
take into consideration farm size, access to information, and other obstacles that 
constrain the participation of the poor.  
4.2 Introduction  
The development of PES programs on agricultural lands is receiving increasingly 
serious attention in developing countries (Branca et al., 2011; FAO, 2007b; 
Ribaudo et al., 2010). However, whilst there has been some proliferation of 
research on PES in developing countries, there remains a gap in empirical 
evaluations that assess the participation of poor households and factors that 
determine participation decision in PES programs implemented on agricultural 
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land to address conservation and development objectives in developing 
countries. The development of PES interventions in developing countries faces 
significant challenges because of weak institutions, missing markets (Muller and 
Albers, 2004; Rios and Pagiola, 2009), high incidence of poverty, insecure land 
tenure, demand side limitations and supply side dynamics (Ferraro, 2009; 
Wunder, 2007). This suggests that farmers in agricultural land based PES 
programs could face complex decisions on whether to adopt land uses promoted 
by them, taking into account the key hallmarks of PES – the voluntary 
transactions and conditional payments (Wunder, 2005,  p.3).  
 
This chapter seeks to narrow the above gap by empirically evaluating 
participation of the poor households and the determinants of farmers’ decision to 
participate in the EPWS program which is one of PES programs implemented on 
agricultural land to achieve conservation and development goals in developing 
countries. Most of the existing studies focus on China (Ferraro, 2009; Grosjean 
and Kontoleon, 2009; Uchida et al., 2007) and Latin America (Echavarría, 2002; 
Pagiola, 2008; Pagiola et al., 2005; Pagiola et al., 2007; Pagiola et al., 2010; 
Wunder and Albán, 2008), particularly on forest based PES programs financed 
by governments and international organisations.  
 
Most PES programs in developing countries are expected to contribute to poverty 
reduction by making payments to poor land users (Pagiola et al., 2008; Pagiola et 
al., 2010). Determining whether poorer households are participating is thus vital, 
if PES programs are to add to poverty reduction objectives. Also, since a PES 
program can only generate benefits to those households that participate and 
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supply the desired services (Pagiola et al., 2008; Pagiola et al., 2010), 
understanding of the factors that determine participation in the program is critical. 
Pagiola et al. (2005) categorise factors that can determine a farmers’ decision to 
participate in a PES program into factors that affect eligibility to participate; 
factors that affect a households’ desire to participate; and factors that affect their 
ability to participate. These categories form a logical sequence which suggests 
that the ability to participate becomes an issue for households that are eligible to 
participate (Pagiola and Platais, 2005).  
 
Participation requires households that are eligible to participate to adopt land 
uses promoted by the program. Adopting these new land uses can be 
straightforward or complex depending on whether the program calls for retaining 
existing land uses or switching to new practices (Pagiola et al., 2007). The 
literature on program participation, technology adoption and adoption of agro-
forestry practices provide useful insights into the factors likely to determine PES 
program participation decision (Pattanayak et al., 2003; Pagiola et al., 2008; 
Pagiola et al., 2010). This literature indicates that factors influencing households’ 
participation decisions can be grouped into farmer and farm characteristics, 
program factors, and the institutional context of the program (Brotherton, 1989; 
Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007; Kosoy et al., 2008; Pagiola et al., 2007; Wauters 
et al., 2010; Wilson, 1997; Yiridoe et al., 2010; Zbinden and Lee, 2005). First, 
farm and farmer characteristics include age and education of a household head, 
which often determine the ability to obtain and process information and 
implement knowledge intensive conservation practices (Azizi Khalkheili and 
Zamani, 2009; Kosoy et al., 2008;  Mullan and Kontoleon, 2009). Other farm and 
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farmer characteristics include land tenure (Schuck et al., 2002), labour availability 
(Zbinden and Lee, 2005), access to information (Mullan and Kontoleon, 2009), 
opportunity cost of land and expected impacts on the household income 
(Wunder, 2006).  
 
Second, program factors include program targeting (Mullan and Kontoleon, 2009; 
Wünscher et al., 2008), conditionality (Kosoy et al., 2008), size of incentives, 
information flow, participatory nature of program design (Biggs and Farrington, 
1991) and expected changes in farm management introduced by the program 
(Brotherton, 1989;  Mullan and Kontoleon, 2009; Pagiola et al., 2005;  Wünscher 
et al., 2008). Third, factors related to the wider institutional context include tenure 
systems in the area of project implementation ( Pagiola et al., 2007; Pagiola et 
al., 2008), access and availability of credit to finance conservation practices 
(Miranda et al., 2003), and social and cultural values such as the importance of 
non-timber products to households, which may influence the land owners 
willingness to participate in conservation programs (Corbera et al., 2009; Kosoy 
et al., 2008).  
 
This chapter uses both quantitative and qualitative methods to explore the 
participation of poor households in the EPWS program and how farm and farmer 
characteristics, program factors and institutional contexts determine farmers’ 
decisions to participate in the program. This mixed method approach helps to 
counteract a naïve rational choice view that farmers consider only costs and 
benefits when deciding whether or not to participate in a program (Kosoy et al. 
2008). The research focuses on the Equitable Payments for Watershed Services 
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(EPWS) program piloted in the Kibungo Juu ward in Morogoro, Tanzania as a 
case study (illustrated in chapter 3). The next section describes the material and 
methods used for the chapter.  
4.3 Material and Methods 
This chapter follows the generic descriptions of methods described in Chapter 3. 
For the purpose of achieving the specific chapter objective in examining the 
participation of poor households in the EPWS program and factors that determine 
participation decision, key informant interviews, focus group discussions and 
household survey were used in the collection of qualitative and quantitative data. 
The collection and analysis of the quantitative data was informed by the 
assumptions of the neo-classical production theories (Horowitz, 1970; Rahm and 
Huffman, 1984). These theories operate on the assumption that a farmer (i.e. an 
individual or a household) is a profit maximizing entity that chooses an optimal 
resource allocation over a period of time, given the available resources (land, 
labour, capital) and subject to natural and institutional constraints (Zbinden and 
Lee, 2005). As such, adoption of agro-environmental technologies or program 
participation takes a binary decision whereby a farmer enters the program if the 
utility of doing so exceeds the utility of not doing. Consequently, a binary logistic 
regression model is used to assess decisions of this type on the basis of a set of 
explanatory variables (Ayuk, 1997; Adesina et al., 2000; Adesina and Chianu, 
2002; Thangata and Alavalapati, 2003). 
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Based on previous research on the economics of technology adoption, forestry 
and farm program participation, the utility of participation is a function of two 
vectors Z and X,  
  
 
     
 
         
 
      
 
  
where p denotes participation (1 if yes; 0 if no), and V stands for a vector of 
unobservable parameters. Vector V is broken down into Z and X vectors. Vector 
Z represents economic attributes associated with the program, while X denotes 
socioeconomic attributes of the individual farmer (decision maker). While, 
attributes of Z are endogenous to the decision to participate, X attributes are 
typically exogenous. To put it more formally, 
Participation:           
    
   
Non-participation:              
    
   
The probability of participation can be derived from the above utility function and 
a specific probability model can be developed. The probability of participation 
         is a cumulative distribution function of F evaluated as a function of a 
set (X) of explanatory variables and vector   of unobservable parameters. The 
logistic cumulative distribution function is the basis for the logit regression 
model(s) used in this research, where the probability of participation can be 
modeled as 
             
 
    
    
     
   
………………………………… (1) 
                 
where J is the number of choices. Greene (2000) shows that the multinomial 
case (J > 1) is just an extension of the binomial case (J = 0, 1). The actual 
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estimation form of the model is given after the logit transformation of the 
probability of participation and takes the following form: 
    
   
     
        …………………………………………… (2) 
In this chapter, a binary logistic regression model is used to model the 
determinants of a farmer’s decision to participate in the EPWS program. Based 
on the illustrated framework, a farmer in the study area would choose EPWS 
program participation or non-participation subject to farm and ownership (i.e. 
farmer) characteristics, the program factors, and factors associated with the 
institutional context of the program (Brotherton, 1989; Ayuk, 1997; Wilson, 1997b; 
Lise, 2000; Thangata and Alavalapati, 2003; Zbinden and Lee, 2005; Kosoy et 
al., 2008; Mullan and Kontoleon, 2009; Yiridoe et al., 2010).  
 
Explanatory variables used in the logistic regression equation are shown in Table 
4.1. One of the variables considered to influence technology adoption or program 
participation decision is the gender (gender) of a household head (Adesina and 
Chianu, 2002; Thangata and Alavalapati, 2003). The role of women in most 
household farming and food activities is considered greater than that of men; yet, 
women are seen to have difficulty obtaining labour needed for land preparation 
activities  due to inability to hire and finance external labour sources (Doss and 
Morris, 2000). The adoptions of SLM practices such as the construction of 
terraces are considered physically demanding as they require more labour. As 
such, the participation of women is hypothesised to be negative. 
 
Another factor that can influence program participation decision or technology 
adoption is the age (age) of a household head which is considered a proxy for 
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experience (Zbinden and Lee, 2005; Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007). The age of a 
household head can be negatively linked to technology adoption because of bad 
experiences with past technologies, thus more risk averse and weak old age 
(Adesina and Chianu, 2002; Thangata and Alavalapati, 2003; Zbinden and Lee, 
2005). Younger household heads are considered to be more risk takers, 
ambitious and energetic to try new technologies (Thangata and Alavalapati, 
2003). In this study, younger household heads are expected to respond more 
positively to the adoption of SLM practices.  
 
Years of the household head education (educ) are expected to be positively 
associated with the ability to obtain and process information and to successfully 
implement knowledge intensive conservation and agricultural technologies 
(Zbinden and Lee, 2005; Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007). This suggests that, 
household heads with low formal education are less likely to participate in or 
adopt SLM practices.  
 
Household income can also influence technology adoption or program 
participation decision, because adopting new land use practices may prove 
difficult, if households cannot finance the necessary investment costs (Knowler 
and Bradshaw, 2007; Pagiola et al., 2008). As some practices in the EPWS 
program such as the construction of terraces and tree planting have some costs 
associated with them like manure and labour costs, the level of household assets 
as proxy for income (income) is hypothesised to have positive influence on the 
program participation decision.  
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Another factor hypothesised to influence technology adoption or program 
participation decision is the condition of household labour (Zbinden and Lee, 
2005; Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007). Perceived short and long-term labour 
demands to implement technology can encourage or discourage technology 
adoption or program participation decision. In the EPWS program, the adoption of 
SLM practices such as the construction of terraces are labour intensive in the 
short term (Branca et al., 2009). Consequently, large household labour is 
hypothesised to positively influence participation whereby; the family size 
(hhsize) variable is included in this study as the number of household members 
aged between 16 and 60 years.  Household members aged below 16 are 
considered school going age. 
 
Farm size managed by the farmer has been hypothesised to influence program 
participation or technology adoption decision (Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007). 
Specifically, farmers with larger land holding have been found to flexibly engage 
in new activities including innovative agricultural technologies (Lasley and Nolan, 
1981; Nowak, 1987; Ayuk, 1997; Yiridoe et al., 2010). Also, larger farms are 
associated with greater wealth and increased availability of capital to make 
investment in conservation more feasible (Ur-Rehman and Chisholm, 2007). In 
this study, household farm size (fsize) is expected to be positively associated with 
EPWS program participation.  
 
In communities with various types of land ownership (landown), land tenure is a 
critical determinant of program participation in cases where a program requires 
long-term investment such as terracing and tree planting (Sureshwaran et al., 
1996; Pattanayak et al., 2003; Zbinden and Lee, 2005; Knowler and Bradshaw, 
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2007). Farmers tend to invest more on privately owned land than on rented or 
clan lands (Norris and Batie, 1987).  Consequently, the study expects that 
farmers who own private land will participate more in the EPWS program than 
those with rented or clan lands.  
 
Access to information (info) has been found to influence technology adoption and 
program participation decision (Wilson, 1997a; Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007). 
According to the findings by Adesina et al., (2000) and  Adesina and Chianu 
(2002) in Cameroon and Nigeria respectively, participation and adoption of soil 
and water conservation practices were higher to the farmers who had contact 
with change agents and access to information than their counterparts. In this 
study, participation in the EPWS program is hypothesised to be higher for the 
farmers who considered the program to be participatory (participatory) and had 
access to information and extension support before the program (infor).   
 
Another factor that can influence technology adoption or program participation 
decision is the past experiences with conservation practices (Knowler and 
Bradshaw, 2007). In particular, farmers with past conservation experiences 
(exluse) and those with land use practices similar to new practices advocated by 
an intervention (changeinfm) were more willing to participate than those who did 
not have past experiences (Wilson, 1997a; Pattanayak et al., 2003). In this study, 
more participation in the EPWS is expected among farmers who have 
implemented some conservation practices in the past and those with similar land 
use practices promoted by EPWS program.  
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On the basis of the hypothesised determinants of participation, the general form 
of the binary logistic regression equation is written as:   
                                                        
                                                     
           
 Where: 
      -is the dependent variable – participation. 
     -is the constant. 
     -are the coefficients of each explanatory variable. 
      -represents errors due to unobservable variables. 
Table 4.1 shows the explanatory variables used in the logistic regression 
equation. 
 
Table 4.1. The explanatory variables used in the logistic regression equation  
Variable Name  Description  Expected 
Sign 
gender Gender of household head: 1 if male; 0 if 
female  
- 
age  Age of the household head  - 
educ Years of schooling of the household head + 
hhsize Number of working people in the household  
aged between 14 – 64 years old 
+ 
fsize A farm size of the household  + 
landown Household land tenure: 1 if own private land; 0 
otherwise (i.e. rented). 
+ 
memberships Number of affiliations that the household has  + 
exluse Past land use: 1 if implemented conservation 
practice in the past; 0 otherwise  
+ 
participatory Inclusiveness of the program in terms of 
participatory nature of the program  in the 
design phase  1 and 0 otherwise  
+ 
changeifm Change in farm management required (1= 
difficult, 0=otherwise) 
 
info  Access to information and support i.e. EPWS 
extension services: 1 if yes; 0 if otherwise 
+ 
 
Data for this chapter were collected through household surveys from 233 
household heads, which included 116 program participants and 117 non-
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participants. These households were selected from a stratified random sample 
generated through a participatory wealth ranking exercise (see section 3.2.5). In 
addition to household surveys, qualitative methods were used to further explore 
the determinants of a farmer’s decision to participate in the EPWS program. 
These tasks were performed for triangulation and explanation of the determinants 
of program participation. For this purpose, data were collected from focus group 
discussions and semi-structured key informant interviews. Focus group 
discussions included 8 program participants and 8 non-participants while semi-
structured key informant interviews included 3 EPWS program staff, 4 village 
leaders, 8 representatives from EPWS groups in each program village and 8 
EPWS participating and 8 non-participating household heads. Data from focus 
group discussions and semi-structured key informant interviews were manually 
coded and grouped to generate themes and relevant quotes to support themes 
and quantitative data (Neuendorf, 2002).  
4.4 Results 
Respondents included 65% males and 35% females and their average age was 
48 years. Almost 70% of the respondents had 7 or more years of education while 
the remaining 30% had not completed primary school. The wealth ranking 
exercise identified 55.4% of respondents as middle income, 31.3% as poor and 
13.3% as rich. Males made up 80% of the rich, 62.8% of the middle income, and 
63% of the poor. The respondents’ average harvest included 197kg of maize, 
111kg of beans, 50kg of groundnuts, 74 boxes of bananas and 45 boxes of 
cassava. Irrigation was practiced by 41.6% of farmers: of them, 74% used 
traditional furrow, 22.7% used buckets and 3.1% used a combination of the two.  
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The main occupation of nearly all respondents (95.7%) was farming, the rest 
were self-employed (3%) or wage employees (1.3%). The most commonly grown 
crops included cardamom, rice, maize, beans, groundnuts, cinnamon, sugarcane, 
bananas, cassava, sweet potatoes, tomatoes, cabbages, and pineapple. The 
average farm size was 3 acres: the largest among the respondents was 6.5 acres 
and the smallest less than an acre. Over half of the households (54.1%) owned 
private land, 42% cultivated lineage land and 3.9% rented or shared crop lands. 
Most farms (65.3%) were on moderately hilly or flat terrain, 20% were on hilly 
terrain and 14.7% were on flat terrain. Most farms had dark brown silt soils locally 
known as fifisi (85.2%) and the rest had either red soil (12.1%), clay soil - 
kikododo (1.3%) or grey soil - fibwefibwe (1.3%). Over three quarters (78.1%) of 
the farmers used soil quality to determine land use, while the rest (21.9%) did so 
on the basis of road access. The farmers’ average walking time from their 
cultivation to the nearest service road was 60 minutes.  
 
Two thirds (66.2%) of the farmers were aware of the availability of extension 
services in their villages and 55.1% had received assistance from them. Over half 
(56.1%) of the farmers indicated that the availability of extension officers had 
improved a little or a lot with the EPWS, while for 38.8% it had remained the 
same. Conservation practices had also become more common after the EPWS. 
Over half (52.2%) of the farmers had planted trees on their farms before EPWS, 
while after its implementation 75.4% had planted trees. Agro-forestry practices 
spread from 46.7% of farmers before EPWS to 53.3% afterwards. In addition, 
after EPWS 37.3% constructed bench terraces, 33.5% of the farmers piled soil up 
(fanya juu) and 42.5% reforested.  
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The characteristics of the EPWS program participants and non-participants are 
summarised in Table 4.2. The heads of EPWS participating households were 
younger than those of non-participating households. They also had received 
more education than the non-participating heads of households. The EPWS 
participating households were also larger, with more members contributing to 
farm work. Finally, the EPWS participating households had larger farms and 
more sources of income.  
 
Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics for the characteristics of participants and non-
participants 
Name of the 
Variable 
  
(1) Participating  
(n=116) 
(2)Not-
Participating 
(n=117) 
(3) Differences in 
mean (1)-(2) t-
statistics in 
parenthesis 
Male headed households (%) 72 (0.45) 58 (0.50) 14.3(2.3) * 
Average age of the household head 
(years) 
43.72 (13.26) 51.72 (15.89) -7.99 (-4.17)** 
Years of schooling of the household head 
(mean) 
6.49 (1.61) 5.55 (2.06) 0.94(3.9) ** 
Household members aged 15-64 (mean) 3 (0.93) 2 (1.17) 1 (3.7)**  
Number of household members (mean) 5 (2) 4 (2) 1 (3.8)**  
Acres of land owned by household (mean) 3.55 (1.44) 2.46 (1.27) 1.08 (6.12)** 
Farmers with private land ownership (%) 61 (0.49) 49 (0.50) 12(1.9)  
Number of household memberships 3.9 (2.84) 2.0 (2.44) 1.9(5.3)** 
Farmers with conservation experience 
before EPWS scheme (%) 
54 (0.50) 38 (0.49) 16 (2.4)* 
Inclusiveness of the program in terms of 
participatory nature of the program in the 
design phase (%) 
53 (0.50) 56 (0.50) -3 (-0.3) 
Change in farm management in EPWS 
(%) 
58 (0.49) 14 (0.35) 44(7.9)** 
Access to information and support (%)  84 (0.37) 24 (0.43) 60(11.3)** 
    
Notes. Total sample size = 233 respondents. Standard deviations are in brackets for columns (1) 
and (2). Column (3) shows differences in mean between participants (1) and non participants (2) 
as t-statistics in brackets where single, and double asterisks (*) indicate that the means of the 
groups significantly differ from each other at the 5%, and 1% levels of probability, respectively.  
 
The characteristics of the EPWS program participants are summarized in Table 
4.3. The table presents the similarities and differences of the program 
participants according to low wealth groups (poorer=1, poor=2) and high wealth 
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groups (rich=3 and richer=4). The poorer are older than the richer. Also, the 
poorer have significantly less land and working labour available to them. Although 
differences in educational levels are minimal amongst the wealth groups, high 
wealth groups have more years of schooling on average than the low wealth 
groups. Access to information and technical assistance appears to be lower in 
the low wealth groups than in high wealth groups.  
 
Table 4.3. Characteristics of the EPWS program participants according to asset 
wealth groups 
Name of the Variable  Low wealth assets 
group 
High wealth assets 
group 
1(poorer) 2 3 4(richer) 
Distribution of participating households (%) 13(11.2) 29(25.0) 32(27.6) 42(36.2) 
Number of male household head (%) 9(10.7) 20(23.8) 24(28.6) 31(36.9) 
Number of female household head (%) 4(12.5) 9(28.1) 8(25.0) 11(34.4) 
Mean age of the household head (s.dev.) 49.8(14.9) 41.5(12.5) 41.3(10.4) 45.3(14.7) 
Average number of years of schooling of the 
household head/respondent (s.dev.) 
6(2.4) 6(1.6) 7(1.3) 7(1.5) 
Average number of household members 
aged 15-64 (s.dev.) 
2 (1) 3 (1) 3(1) 3(1) 
Average number of acres of land owned by 
household (s.dev.) 
1.6(0.48) 2.4(0.66) 4(1.04) 4.6(1.07) 
Proportion of households with private land 
ownership (%) 
7(9.9) 19(26.8) 18(25.4) 27(38.0) 
Average  number of household 
memberships (s.dev) 
1.5(1.6) 3.8(2.6) 4(3.2) 4.5(2.6) 
Conservation experience before EPWS 
scheme (% of Yes) 
10(15.9) 14(22.2) 9(14.3) 30(47.6) 
Inclusiveness of the program in terms of 
participatory nature of the program  in the 
design phase (% of Yes) 
7(11.3) 12(19.4) 19(30.6) 24(38.7) 
Change in farm management required (% of 
Yes) 
5(7.5) 19(28.4) 16(23.9) 27(40.3) 
Access to information and support (% of 
Yes) 
11(11.30 23(23.7) 24(24.2) 39(40.2) 
 
Figure 4:1 displays the proportion of the EPWS program participants who 
implemented various SLM practices according to the wealth groups. Examination 
of the presented SLM practices indicates that poor households participate in the 
EPWS program and that they account for a substantial share of the practices.  
However, the proportion of the richer with terraces, grass strips, trash lines, 
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afforestation, contour bunds, riparian reforestation and agro-forestry is higher 
than that of other households. The high proportion of the poorer and poor with 
terraces suggests that poorer and poor households are not limited to adopting 
technically simpler and less difficult practices.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. The implementation of SLM practices according to the wealth groups 
of EPWS participants. A household can take part in more than one SLM practices. 
 
To investigate the factors that determine participation decisions in the EPWS 
program, an econometric analysis of participation was performed. The 
determinants of participation are reported in Table 4.4. The size of farm, access 
to information (EPWS extension officer), participatory nature of the program in 
the design phase, and the magnitude of required changes in farm management 
are all positive and significant determinants of farmer participation in the EPWS 
program. Other positive variables, which are not significant, include education of 
the head of household, household head’s social affiliations, household labour, 
past conservation experience and type of land ownership. Variables that were 
negative but not significant determinants of participation in the EPWS program 
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include gender of the household head, the importance of non-timber forest 
products and the age of household head.  
 
Table 4.4. The logistic regression results for the determinants of participation in 
the EPWS program 
Variable Estimated  
Coefficients 
S.E t-Ratio Marginal 
effects 
Odds 
ratio 
Gender of the household head -0.15 0.52 -0.29 0.78 0.86 
Age of the household head -0.02 0.02 -1.00 0.30 0.98 
Years of schooling of the 
household head 
0.01 0.12 0.08 0.96 1.01 
Household members aged 15-64 0.15 0.2 0.75 0.45 1.16 
Acres of land owned by household 0.38 0.17 2.24* 0.03 1.46 
Land ownership type 0.33 0.48 0.69 0.49 1.39 
Number of household 
memberships 
0.05 0.16 0.31 0.75 1.05 
Conservation experience before 
EPWS scheme 
0.48 0.42 1.14 0.26 1.61 
Inclusiveness of the program in 
terms of participatory nature of the 
program  in the design phase 
0.12 0.48 0.25 0.80 0.89 
Change in farm management  1.76 0.46 1.65* 0.10 2.14 
Access to information and support  1.45 0.48 3.02** 0.03 4.28 
Constant -3.82 1.43 -2.67* 0.01 0.02 
Nagelkerke R2                       0.67 
Likelihood Ratio Test X2                      13.955 (8df) 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test                   0.83 
Proportion of observation correctly predicted as participants %        86.2 
Proportion of observations correctly predicted as non-participants %      80.3 
Overall percentage correctly classified (%)                     83.3 
Total number of observations                       233 
*Significant at = 0.05%. 
**Significant at = 0.01%. 
 
Farm size is a positive and significant determinant of farmer participation in the 
EPWS program (Table 4.4). Key informant interviews and focus group 
discussions confirmed that farmers who have large land holdings adopt SLM 
practices such as terraces and agro-forestry more than small land holders. 
Moreover, they are considered to be more flexible, wealthier and able to handle 
risk of crop failure by dividing up farms for use for different purposes unlike 
smaller land holding farmers. The concern of most of the non-participants was 
that the construction of terraces leaves the soil infertile and unproductive as the 
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fertile top soil is buried beneath unfertile rocky soil. A farmer stated in an 
interview that, “if I construct terraces … my children will die of food shortage; as 
without manure I will not be able to harvest anything” (male farmer, program non-
participant, Lanzi village – interview statement, 2011). 
 
Farmers’ access to information is another positive and significant determinant of 
farmer participation in the EPWS program (Table 4.4). Focus group discussions 
illustrated that the public meetings conducted by the EPWS officers in each 
program village provided information that was used to make participation 
decisions. Information about the EPWS program was also disseminated by the 
CARE staff stationed in program villages to provide technical assistance. 
Information was also spread and obtained from farmer to farmer interactions: 
information on experienced harvest improvements was often obtained from 
neighbours and it was considered an important reason for adopting the SLM 
practices of the EPWS program. For example, a farmer explained that “I did not 
join the EPWS program from the beginning because I did not believe what the 
EPWS experts were telling us; but when I witnessed what my brother was 
harvesting from his small terraced farm, I was convinced that constructing 
terraces was a deal. I immediately hired terrace construction experts and asked 
the CARE experts to provide advice to construct terraces in my three acre farm” 
(male farmer, program participant, Lanzi village – interview statement, 2011). 
 
Information was also received by farmers during local training workshops. 
Workshops aimed to create awareness and develop practical skills amongst 
farmers for adopting and implementing project measures. According to the EPWS 
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program officer, nearly 700 farmers were trained between July 2009 and June 
2010 on sustainable land management practices, including the construction and 
use of “fanya juu” and bench terraces, tree nursery establishment and 
management, tree planting methods and field management, grass strip farming 
techniques, practices to improve soil moisture and production, and animal 
husbandry for income generation and manure production. 
 
The participation of farmers in the design phase of the EPWS program is a 
positive determinant of participation (Table 4.4). Key informant interviews and 
focus group discussions suggest that the design phase involved consultative 
(functional) participation in the context of research and village meetings in which 
the EPWS programs’ SLM practices were marketed to farmers. However, the 
consultation did not determine programme content. As a result of this, one farmer 
stated that “if the program was collaborative and our opinions were sought and 
considered in the design of the program, we would prefer to start the EPWS 
program by keeping livestock for manure, followed by construction of bench 
terraces and fanya juu” (male farmer, program participant, Nyingwa village – 
interview statement, 2011). However, the response to this was that, “while the 
participation of farmers in the design phase was not high, their ideas and needs 
have been incorporated in the program implementation as they arise, although 
not all of their needs are taken in the program given the resource limitations” 
(EPWS program officer – interview statement, 2011).  
 
Another positive and significant determinant of farmer participation in the EPWS 
program is the magnitude of required change in farm management (Table 4.4). 
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Key informant interviews and focus group discussions highlighted that the 
adoption of agro-forestry measures and reforestation wes easier than the 
construction of bench terraces and “fanya juu”. The main constraint for the 
adoption of terraces is the high cost of labour needed for their construction and a 
lack of manure that would reduce harvests, as newly constructed terraces can 
take up to four years to regain fertility. Nevertheless, in the focus group 
discussions and key informant interviews, it was explained that, through 
membership of farmer groups established through the EPWS program, work 
collaborations were established in which the program participants agree to help 
one another in implementing SLM practices such as the construction of terraces, 
which need more labour. A key informant explained that “membership in the 
farmer groups is the most important mechanism which has increased our ability to 
work together particularly in the construction of terraces through labour 
exchanges” (female farmer group leader – interview statement, 2011). In 
addition, a farmer explained that “the construction of these terraces was 
possible because of the help I received from my fellow farmer group members 
as we rotate from one member to another to encourage one another and 
aggregate weak individual power to many which means more power” (female 
farmer, program participant, Nyingwa village – interview statement, 2011). 
 
The temporary crop yield decline was considered to endanger food security. A 
farmer stated that “we have shortage of food now because our harvests were 
very little due to the lack of manure” (female farmer, program participant, Dimilo 
village – interview statement, 2011). Also, it was stated that “most people don’t 
have land beyond two acres, so if we plant many trees and construct terraces 
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which take years to bear fruit, then staple food production will be affected” (village 
leader, Dimilo village – interview statement, 2011). In addition, construction of 
terraces, and adoption of agro-forestry or reforestation is limited by customary 
land tenure systems which do not allow construction of permanent structures on 
customarily owned land.  
4.5 Discussion  
The findings of this study extend the limited empirical evidence relating to the 
investigation of poor household participation in agro-ecosystem PES programs 
and factors that affect farmers’ decision to participate in these programs in 
developing countries. The analysis of the findings demonstrates that eligible poor 
households participate in the EPWS program and their participation in different 
LSM practices is relatively low in some practices compared to relatively rich 
households but neither shut out nor restricted to the simpler and cheaper forms of 
SLM practices. The factors that affect program participation are farm size, access 
to information, landholder participation in the program design and the magnitude 
of change in farm management required by the program. Many of the 
determinants are consistent with the factors in other studies that have 
investigated participation or adoption of agricultural conservation technologies. 
 
Firstly, farm size is often reported to influence the adoption of soil and water 
conservation measures such as bench terraces, “fanya juu” and stone terraces 
(Santos et al., 2006). The common explanation for this finding is that larger farms 
can offer farmers more flexibility in decision making, greater access to 
discretionary resources, and more ability to deal with risks and more opportunity 
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to try new practices than it is possible for farmers with small farms (Amsalu and 
De Graaff, 2007). Farmers with large farms often invest more in conservation 
measures to increase farm income and wealth than those with small farms 
(Woldeamlak, 2007). Farmers with small farms lag behind in the adoption of 
terraces. In Ethiopia, Amsalu and De Graaff (2007) reported that the loss of land 
fertility due to terracing and temporal decline of yields discouraged small farmers 
from adopting stone terraces.  Tenge et al. (2005) reported a similar finding from 
the West Usambara Mountains – the adoption of major soil and water 
conservation measures was lower among farmers with small farms than among 
farmers with larger land. 
 
Secondly, access to information significantly influenced participation decisions in 
the EPWS program. This is not surprising because previous studies have long 
recognized the importance of information availability and access in the adoption 
and diffusion of innovation (Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007). It has been shown 
that information about conservation programs helps the farmer to confirm or 
dismiss their positive or negative views or prior expectations about a programme 
(Frondel et al. 2012).  Indeed, information is crucial for land owners before they 
can make decisions about opting in or opting out of agricultural conservation 
program. This shows that channels or sources of information such as other 
farmers, media, meetings and extension officers need to be considered and 
improved to ensure the success of conservation practices (Knowler and 
Bradshaw, 2007). The choice of information channel is crucial because some 
channels can be significantly limited by the ability of potential adopters to access 
the available information and understand the message communicated to them 
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(Napier, 1991).  Some channels are more effective than others. In this study, 
farmer to farmer communication was important in influencing adoption of 
sustainable land management practices such as bench terraces, “fanya juu”, 
agro-forestry and high value crops. This suggests that positive farmer-to-farmer 
communication has the potential to increase adoption of programme practices 
even after the program ends. 
 
Thirdly, the study findings show that farmers are more willing to participate when 
the program is participatory. In the case of the EPWS program, participation 
levels could have been higher, if the views of the farmers on the importance of 
the availability of manure had been heeded in the design of the programme. As 
several other studies have reported, using a participatory approach in the 
implementation of conservation projects is invaluable. For example, in a case 
study on the Peruvian Andes, Posthumus (2005) shows that a participatory 
conservation programme has a significant positive influence on the adoption 
decision compared to a top-down conservation programme. Pretty and Shah 
(1997) similarly report that the use of a participatory approach encourages an 
amalgamation of farmers’ knowledge with scientific knowledge while 
strengthening local capacities to experiment and innovate. In general, a 
participatory approach is a necessary precondition for effective implementation of 
sustainable land management practices. 
 
Fourthly, we find that the magnitude of change in farm management required by 
the programme significantly influenced farmer participation in the EPWS 
program. It has previously been reported that conservation technologies, which 
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are easy to adopt for a particular farming system are more likely to be adopted 
than the difficult ones (Napier, 1991). It has also been reported that farmers are 
less likely to participate when a program requires substantial changes in farm 
management (Wilson and Hart, 2001). Similar findings have been reported by 
Shiferaw and Holden (2000) in Ethiopia, Lapar and Pandey (1999) in the 
Philippines and Kerr and Sanghi (1992) in India. Lack of resources and high 
labour demand often constrain conservation practices such as construction of 
terraces and agro-forestry (Napier, 1991). 
 
Fifthly, the findings suggest that the acceptance of terraces in the EPWS program 
with PES incentives is novel. Construction of terraces introduced without 
incentives by the Uluguru Land Usage Scheme was violently resisted in the case 
study area in the 1950s (Carswell, 2006; Young and Fosbrooke, 1960). A PES 
approach has potential to encourage the adoption of agricultural pro-
environmental behaviours such as construction of terraces and other 
conservation measures. However, customary land tenure poses a considerable 
challenge to agricultural land based PES programs in Morogoro and elsewhere in 
Tanzania because it restricts the right to create permanent structures and 
improvements on clan land. That is, the adoption of sustainable land 
management practices on the basis of PES incentives may not be compatible 
with the customary land tenure rules. 
 
Finally, although one of the main intentions of EPWS programs is to achieve 
equity, the findings show that farmers who have more land are more likely to 
participate than those with less land. This is not surprising because the payments 
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made under PES programs are payments to farmers for undertaking land use 
changes required by the program (Wunder, 2008b). Land ownership and 
distribution are critical to whether the programme can achieve its poverty 
reduction and equity objectives (Wunder, 2008b). The size of land holdings will 
influence farmers’ decision to participate in agricultural land based PES 
programs. This will be a critical factor for targeting of PES contracts: targeting 
them to fewer farmers with big farms makes more economic sense than targeting 
many small farms. This could make a PES program efficient while reducing 
administrative costs. The implication of this is that equity goals may conflict with 
the efficiency and environmental goals of a PES program. As such, this will in 
turn force policymakers to choose an optimal balance among multiple goals. 
4.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter, the findings demonstrate that farm size, access to information, 
participation of farmers in the design phase and the change in farm management 
required by the program significantly influence the decisions to participate in the 
EPWS program. Given the widespread problem of watershed degradation in 
developing countries, these findings point to the urgent need for the 
establishment of PES programs on agricultural lands to maintain and improve the 
quality and quantity of water resources in developing countries. 
 
The most important findings are that poor households who are landholders are 
able to participate in the EPWS program and are implementing practices such as 
construction of terraces and agro forestry. Also, farmer groups formed in 
association with the EPWS program have encouraged more work collaborations 
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among members thus facilitating construction of terraces. Ideally, the formation 
of farmer groups along with the implementation of SLM practices through PES is 
vital to facilitate work collaborations in a more effective way.  
 
Furthermore, the study suggests that the effective design and implementation of 
PES programs in agricultural systems require a thorough understanding of 
resource manager characteristics, features of the PES program and the 
institutional context within which the PES program is implemented. This is vital to 
enhance the participation of poor farmers who may not be able to participate 
unless necessary measures are taken to enable their participation. These can be 
very context specific such as when the supply of manure is a key obstacle 
preventing construction of terraces on land needed for continuous food 
production. This would require rigorous assessment of farmers’ preferences from 
the local perspective during the design of PES programs. Also, full participation of 
farmers /land managers in both program design and implementation could ensure 
that factors crucial for participation of more disadvantaged farmers do not 
become unnecessarily compromised. 
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 Chapter 5: The Livelihood Outcomes of the EPWS Programme 
5.1 Chapter Outline 
In fulfilment of objective two of this thesis, this chapter investigated the direct and 
indirect financial and non financial livelihood outcomes of the EPWS program. To 
achieve this objective, a quasi-experimental mixed methods research design with 
propensity score matching was used. Propensity score matching technique was 
used to establish counterfactual effects of the program in terms of examining 
what would have happened to the program participants, if they had not  
participated in the program. Result shows that program participants, including 
women and the poor, have not been made worse in terms of the impact of the 
program on their indirect financial and non-financial livelihoods including 
household’s average number of cash income, share of cash income from 
different sources and average cash income as a result of their participation in the 
EPWS program. The results clearly indicate the potential of PES schemes to 
generate win-win outcomes in agro-ecosystems, but they also call for attention to 
equity in the design of PES programs implemented on agro-ecosystems. All 
chapter results are presented in section 5.4 comprising both direct and indirect 
financial and non-financial livelihood impacts of the EPWS program as well as 
gender and wealth distribution of outcomes. Section 5.5 presents the discussion 
of the findings and section 5.6 provides the chapter conclusions.  
 
5.2 Introduction 
Primarily, PES programs are designed to enhance the supply of ecosystem 
services. However, in developing countries, there is also a considerable interest 
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to achieve poverty alleviation objectives (Pagiola et al., 2005; Wunder, 2008b; 
Zilberman et al., 2008). According to Ferraro (2009b), poverty alleviation and 
equitable wealth distribution are important components of the existing and 
planned PES programs in sub-Saharan Africa.  For example, in the South African 
Working for Water program, poverty alleviation and provision of services are 
treated equally as joint products or co-benefits (Turpie et al., 2008; Ferraro, 
2009b). In Tanzania, the EPWS program has considerable emphasis on fair and 
equitable distribution of benefits accruing from the sale of ecosystem services to 
downstream users (Lopa et al., 2012).  
 
PES programs can affect livelihoods both directly and indirectly, and financially 
and non-financially. The most obvious impact is through a direct financial 
payment to program participants for adopting specified land use practices 
(Pagiola et al., 2005; Molnar et al., 2008). PES programs can also increase land 
tenure security (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005) and the value of marginal land owned by 
poor farmers who may find it attractive to plant trees because of their lands’ low 
opportunity cost (Pagiola et al., 2005).  
 
PES programs can also affect disadvantaged farmers by providing training and 
technical support (Tacconi et al., 2010), increasing labour demand and the 
availability of and access to natural resources (e.g. non-timber products) (Pagiola 
et al., 2005; Tacconi et al., 2010), as well as by affecting social and cultural 
aspects of a community (e.g. social networks) (Caplow et al., 2011). PES 
programs can also change internal and external relationships and institutions 
(Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Pagiola et al., 2005).  
164 
 
PES programs can also impact indirectly on the livelihood of non-participants, 
such as those depending on agricultural employment, non-timber forest products 
such as fodder, medicinal plants and fuel wood and hire of idle land (Pagiola et 
al., 2005). Employment impacts will depend on the difference in labour demand 
between the land use promoted by a PES program and the prevailing land uses 
(Engel et al., 2008; Zilberman et al., 2008). Land use restricting PES programs 
can have negative impacts on employment while land modifying programs may 
have positive impacts (Engel et al., 2008), depending on the extent of change in 
local labour demand and the existence of other sources of employment 
(Zilberman et al., 2008). For example, the Costa Rican PSA program mostly 
seeks to conserve forests, which is not labour intensive (Pagiola and Platais, 
2007).  
 
A PES program can affect the livelihoods of the poor farmers through the 
promoted land use changes which can alter the availability and access to goods 
such as non-timber products (Kerr, 2002). When implemented on private lands, a 
PES program can only affect access to non-timber products depending on the 
previous status of the land in terms of access (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; 
Pagiola et al., 2005). The implementation of a PES program on community land 
is of particular concern because these lands are often used by disadvantaged 
people for the collection of non-timber products such as fodder, fuel wood and 
other products (Kerr, 2002). In addition, while the enrolment of community land 
may limit collection of products such as non-timber products, the resulting 
payments may not necessarily be distributed in the same proportions as the lost 
benefits by the poor (Alix et al., 2003; Pagiola et al., 2005). 
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Other indirect effects of a PES program on livelihoods may include an increase in 
food prices if a program results in the reduction of agricultural production as a 
result of switching land from agriculture to forestry (Pagiola et al., 2005). This 
would however depend on the size and productivity of enrolled land because 
enrolment of the most productive agricultural land may mean enrolment of land 
with high opportunity costs and with consequences on food availability and 
access. However, depending on the size and productivity of enrolled land, if a 
PES program promotes sustainable land use for agriculture, the pressure on food 
prices are likely to be reduced (Tacconi et al., 2010). PES programs can also 
affect the livelihoods of the poor when they curtail availability of and access to 
land in the context of insecure land tenure (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). In 
particular, this could happen, if, by increasing the value of marginal land, it 
increases the incentives for powerful groups to take control of land or when 
powerful NGOs and external institutions block future aspirations of land 
managers to develop their land (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002).  
 
The livelihood impacts of PES programs on the upstream participants and non-
participants have been examined in several studies (Landell-Mills and Porras, 
2002; Miranda et al., 2003; Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Pagiola et al., 2005; Neef 
and Thomas, 2009; Cole, 2010; Tacconi et al., 2010; Tacconi et al., 2011).  In 
these studies, the sustainable livelihood approach has been used to examine 
livelihood impacts. This has broadened  impact evaluation from a narrow 
consideration of income contribution to a wider appreciation of how programs 
interact with a wider set of livelihood assets (natural, human, financial, social and 
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physical), activities and entitlements  (Chambers and Conway, 1992; Scoones, 
1998; Ellis and Freeman, 2005)  that are dynamic and subject to continuous 
management and modification (Scoones, 1998; Ellis and Freeman, 2005; Sallu et 
al., 2010). 
 
While there are studies that have investigated livelihood impacts of PES 
programs, the majority of these are on use-diverting forestry programs (i.e. forest 
conservation, including REDD, biodiversity, water) (Landell-Mills and Porras, 
2002; FAO, 2007b; Porras et al., 2008; Wunder et al., 2008; Ribaudo et al., 2010; 
Wunder and Börner, 2011a; Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013) rather than on use-
modifying programs. In addition, the majority of these studies lack a rigorous 
impact evaluation framework (Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; Pattanayak et al., 
2010). Often, the non-random nature of program design and implementation 
makes it difficult to disentangle the effects of a program (i.e. conservation impacts 
such as the change in land use) from the effects of other policy measures and 
broader economic trends when evaluating their impacts (Ferraro and Simpson., 
2002; Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; Wunder, 2007; Margoluis et al., 2009; 
Djamhuri, 2012). Due to this, the aim of this chapter is to employ a rigorous 
cause - effect impact evaluation approach to evaluate the livelihood impacts of an 
agro-ecosystem based PES program using the EPWS program as a case study. 
This study is vital because the interest in implementing PES on agro-ecosystems 
in developing countries to achieve poverty reduction and supply of ecosystem 
services is considerable, but they are as yet largely unstudied (FAO, 2007b; 
Ferraro, 2009b; Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). 
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5.3 Material and Methods 
For this chapter a mixed method quasi-experimental research design with 
propensity score matching (described in chapter 3) was used to examine the 
direct and indirect financial and non-financial livelihood impacts of the EPWS 
program as well as its distribution of outcomes. A household survey 
questionnaire, which combined both closed and open ended questions was used 
to collect data on the livelihood assets of EPWS program participants and non-
participants. The questionnaires were administered to 233 household heads 
comprising 116 program participants and 117 non-participants. These 
households were selected from a stratified random sample generated through a 
participatory wealth ranking exercise (see section 3.3.5). 
 
The questionnaire covered the potential outcomes of the EPWS program in 
terms of changes in human asset variables (i.e. the amount of training attended 
by members of a household), social asset variables (i.e. the number of 
memberships and affiliations of trust), and financial asset variables (i.e. the 
number of livestock and crop harvests, non-agricultural salaries and 
remittances). In addition to a household questionnaire, focus group discussions 
and key informant interviews were conducted for triangulation purposes. Focus 
group discussions were performed with 8 groups of program participants and 8 
groups of non-participants while semi-structured key informant interviews were 
undertaken with 3 EPWS program staff, 4 village leaders, 8 representatives from 
EPWS groups in each program village and 8 EPWS participating and 8 non-
participating household heads. Key informant interviews conducted with the 
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EPWS program officer were used to collect data on the program participants and 
amounts of payments.  
 
After matching treatment group with control group, a simple difference approach 
(Baker, 2000; White, 2006) was applied to estimate the impact of the EPWS 
program on the livelihoods of program participants. The impacts were analyzed 
using independent t-test for parametric data and Kruskal Wallis Test and Mann-
Whitney U test for non-parametric data performed on SPSS for windows. 
Qualitative data from focus group discussions, key informant interviews and 
participant observations were manually coded (Neuendorf, 2002) and relevant 
quotes were extracted to support themes and quantitative data. 
5.4 Results  
5.4.1  Direct and Indirect Financial and Non-financial Benefits  
5.4.1.1 Direct and Indirect Financial Benefits  
The direct benefit that the EPWS program participants receive is cash payments 
for the adoption of SLM practices. The EPWS program’s key informant explained 
that the average payment received by the program participants was US$11 
(ranging between US$8-US$48). This was paid to the first group of program 
participants in 2011. In addition to cash payments, the findings show significant 
positive changes in the average annual cash income (P<0.01) amongst the 
program participants, whereby income from the sales of crops was significantly 
higher for program participants when compared to non-participating households 
(Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1). There was no significant difference in average annual 
expenditure and in the number of sources of household cash income for the 
program participants when compared to non-participants. 
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Table 5.1. Average household income and number of income sources of EPWS 
program participants (116) and non-participants (116) in 2011 
    Mean Std. 
Deviatio
n 
Std. Error 
Mean 
t-Test Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
Average annual cash 
income (TSh) 
1 100,655     76,551          7,107  1.69*    16,689      9,869 
0   83,966      73,747      6,847     
Average annual 
expenditure (TSh) 
1 473,683    308,036        28,600     1.52    61,006   40,033  
0 412,677    301,699    28,012     
Sources of income 1 1.98 0.71 0.07 1.50 0.14 0.09 
0 1.84 0.69 0.06    
Note: 1 = Program participants and 0= Non-participants. Analysis refers to statistical independent 
samples t-test for differences in means **P<0.01, *P<0.05.Sources of income include sales of 
crops, sales of livestock, sales of vegetables, business income, wage/salaries, cash remittances 
and other casual cash earnings. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Average household cash income by sources for program participating 
households when compared to non- participating households.  
Analysis refers to statistical independent samples t-test for differences in means **P<0.01, 
*P<0.05. 
 
The EPWS payments contributed to about 20% of a program participating 
household’s average annual cash income (Table 5.1). These payments are, 
therefore considered as an important source of households’ cash income.  A key 
informant for example explained that: “the payment I received is a large amount 
of cash that I can get at once” (female farmer, program participant, Lanzi village – 
interview statement, 2011). Another key informant explained that: “the money I 
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received helped me to buy two chickens which are my important source of meat 
and quick source of money to solve urgent problems such as attending to 
sickness or children’s school needs” (male farmer, program participant, Nyingwa 
village – interview statement, 2011). During group discussions with project 
participants, it was explained that the EPWS payments had been used to improve 
houses, purchase food, livestock (e.g. chicken and goat for milk and manure), 
clothes, radios, furniture, to pay school fees and to purchase better seeds. 
 
The findings also show that participating in EPWS program improves cash 
income from crop yields, wage or salary, timber and business income. The crops 
that had significant increase amongst the program participants, were beans 
(P<0.05), tomatoes (P<0.05), and cabbage (P<0.01) (Figure 5.2). With regard to 
the positive change in yields (Figure 5.2), key informants and FGD participants 
explained that the yields had increased because of the introduction of improved 
agricultural practices such as ploughing, intercropping of maize with cover crops 
such as beans and groundnuts, agro-forestry (i.e. bananas and trees), use of 
improved seeds and application of animal manure. Yields also increased due to 
specialization in high value crops such as beans, bananas, tomatoes and 
cabbage (for cabbage see Figure 5.4). Household interviews also show that 69% 
of participants and 21% of non-participants have established and used compost 
manure in their gardens.  
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Figure 5.2. Outcome of EPWS program on average crop yields among the 
program participants compared to non-participants in 2011 (difference = 
participants outcomes – non-participants outcomes). 
Note: 1: Analysis refers to statistical independent samples t-test for differences in means of two 
different groups of samples. **P<0.01, *P<0.05. 
 
The average amount of livestock amongst the program participants is also high 
compared to non-participants. The program participants have, on average, more 
chickens (P<0.01) and goats (P<0.05) than non-participants (Figure 5.3). Key 
informants and focus group participants explained that the participants have been 
taught and encouraged to construct livestock sheds (see Figure 5.5). By 2011, 35 
livestock sheds had been constructed and most of the program participants had 
moved their goats from the forest to constructed sheds. In addition, some 
program participants have purchased goats, pigs and chickens using received 
PES payments.  
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Figure 5.3. Outcome of the EPWS program in livestock keeping amongst program 
participants (difference = participants outcomes – non-participants outcomes). 
Note: Analysis refers to statistical independent samples t-test for differences in means of two 
different groups of samples. **P<0.01, *P<0.05. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Cabbage farm in Lanzi village 
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Figure 5.5. Newly constructed goat shed in Kibungo village 
 
Key informants and participants in group discussions also explained that, in 
addition to the EPWS program payments, there are people who have increased 
their cash income from daily and monthly casual and business employment 
generated by PES activities. Ownership of consumer durables such as 
machetes (P<0.05), hoes (P<0.01), radios (P<0.05), mobile phone (P<0.01), 
and spades (P<0.01) is also higher amongst program participants (Figure 
5.6).   
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Figure 5.6. EPWS participant’s ownership of consumer durables when compared 
to non-participants (difference = participants outcomes – non-participants outcomes). 
Note: Analysis refers to statistical independent samples t-test for differences in means of two 
different groups of samples. **P<0.01, *P<0.05. 
 
There are three to five people in each village who are employed to take care of 
tree nurseries established by CARE Tanzania (see Figure 5.7 and 5.8) as part of 
EPWS program and they receive an annual salary of about US$441. In addition, 
31.7% of participants and 20.7% of non-participants have one or two household 
members working casually for cash income as a result of the EPWS program. 
They work on the construction of terraces and excavation of banana and tree pits 
for richer households. The average income for a casual labourer is about US$1.8 
per day or US$25.7 for 14 days of work constructing an acre of terraces or 
excavating an acre of banana pits.   
* 
** 
** 
* 
** 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
18 
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
o
f 
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s 
175 
 
 
Figure 5.7. Tree nursery in Kibungo Village (2011) 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Tree nursery in Lanzi village (2011) 
According to interviewed key informants and focus group discussions, the 
construction of terraces and tree planting has not only contributed to increased 
productivity of lands, it has also increased the likelihood of a land owner farming 
more of their land, and has increased the value of arable land involved in the 
program. A farmer tells that “….according to our custom, anyone can go to any 
landholder with idle land and borrow it either without paying or in return for an 
agreed share of the harvest. The program has now motivated those who used to 
lease their idle land to plant trees in order to be paid money and as a way of 
176 
 
generating assets for future sale of trees or timber” (male farmer, program 
participant, Nyingwa village – interview statement, 2011).  
According to the key informant interviews and focus group discussions, the 
average price of land before the construction of terraces, ranged between US$74 
and US$216 per acre in hilly terrain and between US$248 and US$496 on flat 
terrain (Village leaders). However, after terracing, the average price of arable 
land increased to about US$2,168 per acre in hilly terrain (Village leaders). Whilst 
very beneficial for the land owner, this reduced availability of land and increase in 
land value has reduced access to land among the landless and those with small 
land holdings. Increases in the average rental price of land were noted between 
2008 and 2011, shifting from nothing in 2008 to between US$1.8 and US$3 per 
acre per year in 2011 (Village leaders).  
The findings also show that EPWS participants have enhanced their ability to 
meet household food needs more than amongst non-participants. The 
proportions of participants exchanging labour for food, reducing the number of 
meals eaten in a day, limiting meal sizes, skipping an entire day without eating, 
purchasing food on credit and experiencing difficulty satisfying household food 
needs was lower than amongst non-participants (Figure 5.9). 
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Figure 5.9. Household food needs of EPWS program participants compared to 
non-participants in 2011 
Note: 1: Analysis refers to statistical independent samples t-test for differences in means of two 
different groups of samples. **P<0.01, *P<0.05. 
 
 
5.4.1.2 Indirect Non-financial Outcomes 
The EPWS program has also affected livelihoods through indirect non-financial 
outcomes. These are improved access to information on SLM, established and 
strengthened institutions within the community, improved reciprocity and trust in 
the community, and extension of internal and external networks. The participants 
again benefited more from training (P<0.01) (Table 5.2) and extension services. 
86% of participants received assistance from EPWS extension staff and the ward 
agricultural extension officers compared to 16% of non-participants receiving 
such support.  The availability and access to extension services was higher for 
program participants, with some but lesser influence on non-participants; 83% of 
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participants and 27% of non-participants acknowledge an increase while only 
15% participants and 67% of non-participants consider their availability and 
access have remained the same.  
 
Table 5.2. Household members who have received training amongst EPWS 
program participants and non-participants after 2008 
 Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Program participants  2.1 2.59 .24 ** 
Non-participants  .61 1.43 .13 
Note: Analysis refers to statistical independent samples t-test for differences in means of two 
different groups of samples. **P<0.01, *P<0.05. 
 
The availability of environmental and agricultural information was higher for 
program participants. This increase was claimed by 91% of participants and 42% 
of non-participants while only 10% of participants and 55% of non-participants 
regard it to have remained the same. The key informants and those in group 
discussions explained that the increase in the availability of environmental and 
agricultural capacity, skills and knowledge amongst participants was caused by 
their interaction with the program extension officers, as well as participation in 
dissemination workshops and study tours. They also benefited from EPWS 
program trained (5 - 8 in each village) para-professionals who serve as local 
extension contacts. Moreover, the key informants and those in group discussions 
explained that the availability of environmental information was increased by 
dissemination carried out in four primary schools and one secondary school 
through environmental education both in theory and in practice. It was explained 
that “over 10,000 trees have been planted in the program village school and 
students have taken home trees from the schools managed tree nurseries 
established through the EPWS program” (EPWS program officer – interview 
statement, 2011). 
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The EPWS program has also strengthened and created new institutions, 
improved relationships of trust in the community and has expanded internal and 
external networks. For example, in addition to formal EPWS contract 
requirements, farmer groups have established additional group rules to guide 
their operation to achieve collective obligations. These new rules enable farmer 
groups to sanction a defaulter by eviction from the group or by fines.  A farmer 
group member in Nyingwa village explains that: “if a member of our group fails to 
attend group work for more than two days, s/he will be required to return any 
group tool and pay a fine of USD12” (female farmer group leader – interview 
statement, 2011). 
 
The program participants also demonstrate significant positive change in the 
number of memberships (P<0.05) (Table 5.3). In focus group discussions, it was 
explained that memberships and interactions through EPWS program works 
increase the ability of people to work together and that relationships of trust 
facilitate reciprocal financial assistance. Memberships help to build more work 
collaborations whereby gathering or participating in the EPWS program meeting 
provide opportunities for discussions about their work and this often leads to 
agreements to help each other (e.g. in constructing terraces where more labour is 
needed). In this context, memberships facilitate exchange of ideas and 
collaborations. With regard to gender related changes, there is a significant 
change for males (P<0.05) (Table 5.3). In the focus group discussions, it was 
explained that the significant positive change for males is associated with 
household distribution of labour whereby women are engaged in household or 
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home based activities more than males who are often engaged with external 
activities which include participating in meetings. 
 
Table 5.3. Household membership in various groups amongst EPWS program 
participants and non-participants  
  Are you involved 
in the EPWS 
program? 
Mean Std. 
Deviatio
n 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Memberships
1 
 
(number) 
male & 
female 
Program 
participants 
3.30 2.59 0.24 ** 
Non-participants 2.44 2.36 0.21 
 
Memberships
1
 
(number) 
 
Male  Program 
participants 
2.11 1.96 0.18 ** 
Non-participants 1.43 1.61 0.14 
Female  Program 
participants 
1.18 1.55 0.14 NS 
Non-participants 1.00 1.32 0.12 
Membership in 
SACCOS 
(number) 
Men  Program 
participants 
0.25 0.51 0.04 * 
Non-participants 0.17 0.37 0.03 
Female  Program 
participants 
0.25 0.43 0.04 * 
Non-participants 0.18 0.40 0.04 
Note: 1: Analysis refers to statistical independent samples t-test for differences in means of two 
different groups of samples. **P<0.01, *P<0.05. 
1
Memberships include forest management, 
religious based organization, committee of school, membership in Savings and Credit Co-
operative (SACCOS), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO), village government and EPWS 
village group and ward network group. 
 
The relationships of trust amongst the EPWS program participants have changed 
significantly (P<0.1) compared to non-participants (Table 5.3). Trust was defined 
by FGD participants as the ability and willingness to give and receive assistance 
from people beyond immediate household (relatives or friends) in case of food 
and money shortages. With respect to various aspects of relations of trust, the 
findings show that 67% of participants and 44% of non-participants provide family 
help to a friend, 58% of participants and 49% of non-participants borrowed 
money from a friend, and 62% of participants and 40% of non-participants lent 
money to a friend or relative. FGDs and key informants considered participants’ 
involvement in various EPWS group activities as the main aspect that increased 
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trust among them, since many were implemented through farmer groups 
(examples include groups for tree planting, terrace construction groups, high 
value crop growing and livestock rearing groups). As a result, participants are 
more connected than non-participants, and the EPWS has contributed to 
increased trust among participants more than among non-participants. 
 
It was also explained in the focus group discussions that their trust in outsiders 
has increased as a result of the EPWS program. The villagers had been fearful of 
outsiders, locally called “chinja chinja” translated as ‘killers’ based on stories of 
mysterious human deaths and disappearance in the late 1890s and early 1900s 
during German colonial rule. According to the key informant, this fear had 
manifested itself in the 1970s as resistance to the Red Cross blood donation 
program (male farmer, program participant, Nyingwa village – interview 
statement, 2011). Expanded networks to national and international researchers, 
CARE and WWF organizations and associated program staff, extension staff, 
DAWASCO and Coca Cola Kwanza Ltd as well as other external organizations 
and actors facilitated through the EPWS, were explained as the key contributing 
factors for increased trust in outsiders. It was further explained that “as more 
people have been joining and attending CARE training, and as no bad news has 
been reported about them, and as their livelihood has been improving …  we 
think it is worth joining and benefiting as they are” (male farmer, program non-
participant, Nyingwa village – interview statement, 2011).  
 
Although local trust in outsiders has improved the participants of focus group 
discussions and key informant interviews are concerned about the fate of their 
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efforts – particularly they are sceptical about conservation intentions (i.e. about 
land confiscation and relocation). A key informant explained that “we are worried 
that this program has been secretly sent to the village by the government to 
promote tree planting which will become the property of the government” (male 
farmer, program participant, Kibungo village – interview statement, 2011). In 
addition, some program participants and non-participants are anxious about the 
concept of PES. Frequently, focus group discussion participants and key 
informants asked “how can someone give you trees for free and also pay you 
money for planting them in your own farm?”  (male farmer, program non-
participant, Dimilo village – interview statement, 2011). 
 
5.4.2  Distribution of EPWS Program Outcomes 
This section explores the distributional outcomes of the EPWS program in terms 
of the distribution of benefits. It examines distribution of program outcomes 
among the participants to more carefully understand how the program affected 
the most vulnerable households such as the poor and women.  
 
5.4.2.1 Distribution of Outcomes According to the Household’s Wealth 
Quartile  
While the average number of household sources of cash income for program 
participants when compared to non-participants in 1st and 2nd quartiles is more 
than two and one respectively, no statistically significant difference was observed 
among the groups following the Kruskal Wallis Test (Figure 5.10). Compared to 
the well-off households in the 3rd and 4th wealth quartiles, many households in 2nd 
quartile had more than one sources of cash income. This suggests that the poor 
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were not made worse in terms of their household’s average number of cash 
income as a result of their participation in the EPWS program. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10. Wealth wise distribution of the number of household sources of cash 
income for program participating households when compared to non-participants 
(participants –non-participants) 
 
Although there is positive change in the cash income for program participating 
households when compared to non-participants, no statistically significant 
differences are observed among the quartiles following the Kruskal Wallis Test 
(Figure 5.11). In all four wealth quintiles, household cash income was higher 
among the program participants and more difference is observed in 2nd and 3rd 
quartile compared to 1st quartile and 4th with richer households (Figure 5.11).  
 
Figure 5.11. Wealth wise distribution of the cash income for program participating 
households when compared to non-participants 
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Only wage or salary was statistically different (Kruskal Wallis at p<.05 level of 
significance) among wealth quartiles when average cash income from different 
sources for program participants was distributed in percentiles (Figure 5.12). 
However, compared to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd quartiles, the 4th quartile had high 
share of cash income from different sources such as from the sale of crops 
(33.6%), sales of livestock (33.6%), business income (37.5%) and remittances 
(47.6%). The share of cash income from different sources for the 1st wealth 
quartile ranged from 24.7% for other casual earnings such as and 17.4% for 
business income.   
 
Figure 5.12.  Distribution of average cash income from different sources for 
program participating households by wealth quartile. 
 
Distribution of the EPWS program participating households in different affiliations 
according to wealth quartile is shown in Figure 5.13. In these affiliations, 
significant differences are observed in the 3rd quartile for households that are 
members in the school committee (Kruskal Wallis at p<.01 level of significance) 
and in village court (Kruskal Wallis at p<.01 level of significance), and in the 4th 
quartile for those who are members to the EPWS network group (Kruskal Wallis 
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at p<.01 level of significance). Unlike the 1st and 2nd quartiles, the better off in the 
3rd and 4th quartiles are dominant in all affiliations as shown in Figure 5.13.  
 
Figure 5.13. Memberships of EPWS participant’s in various groups by the 
households level of wealth. 
 
5.4.2.2 Distribution of Outcomes According to the Gender of the Household  
Both females and males had more than two sources of household cash income 
(5.14). Compared to non-EPWS program participating households, fewer 
program participating male and female heads of households had less than one 
source of household cash income. However, many female headed households 
had three sources of household cash income compared to male headed 
households (Figure 5.14). These differences are statistically significant as 
revealed by Mann-Whitney U test at p<.01 level of significance. This suggests 
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that EPWS program did not decrease participant’s household sources of cash 
income for those with more than two sources. 
 
Figure 5.14. Gender wise distribution of the number of household sources of cash 
income for program participating households when compared to non-participants 
(change = participants – non-participants). 
 
The household cash income of EPWS program participating households is high 
for both male and female headed households when compared to non 
participating households (Figure 5.15). However, while the difference for male 
headed households is greater than for female headed households, the difference 
is not statistically significant.  
 
 
Figure 5.15. Gender wise distribution of the household cash income for program 
participating households when compared to non-participants (change = average 
cash income for participants – average cash income for non-participants). 
 
-15 
-10 
-5 
0 
5 
10 
15 
Female Male 
%
 o
f 
ch
an
ge
 f
o
r 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
 
Number of household sources of cash income 
1 2 3 
 -    
 2,000.00  
 4,000.00  
 6,000.00  
 8,000.00  
 10,000.00  
 12,000.00  
 14,000.00  
 16,000.00  
Female Male 
A
ve
ra
ge
 c
h
an
ge
 in
 c
as
h
 
in
co
m
e
 
187 
 
Sales of livestock and business income are the only sources of cash income that 
are statistically different (Mann-Whitney U test at p<.05 level of significance) 
between male and female headed households (Figure 5.16). Nevertheless, male 
headed households constitute large share of the cash income from different 
sources as presented in Figure 5.16 compared to female headed households. 
 
Figure 5.16. Distribution of various sources of cash income for program 
participating households by gender  
 
Distribution of the EPWS program participating households in different affiliations 
according to the gender of household head is shown in Figure 5.17. In these 
affiliations, statistically significant differences are observed in male headed 
households based on memberships in SACCOS (Mann-Whitney U test at p<.01 
level of significance) and in village government (Mann-Whitney U test at p<.05 
level of significance). In both affiliations that households are associated, male 
headed households are more dominant than female headed households. 
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Figure 5.17. Memberships of EPWS participant’s in various groups by gender of 
the household head.  
5.5 Discussion 
5.5.1  Direct and Indirect Financial and Non-financial Benefits  
The objective of this chapter was to investigate the livelihood impacts of the 
EPWS program. The findings have shown the direct and indirect financial and 
non financial livelihood impacts of the EPWS program as well as the distribution 
of outcomes.  The main mechanism through which a PES program is assumed to 
directly affect the livelihoods of the participants is through PES payments 
(Pagiola et al., 2005). This study has shown that EPWS payments to program 
participants accounted for about 20% of the annual household cash income on 
average.  Generally, PES payments vary in their relative contribution to the 
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income of program participants. In Latin America, the payments were up to 30% 
of annual household income (Kosoy et al., 2008), over 10% in Costa Rica 
(Wunder, 2008b), and about 16% in the Virlilla watershed in Costa Rica (Miranda 
et al., 2003). The important difference between these payments and the EPWS 
payments is that they are from forest based programs rather than from agro 
ecosystem based PES program which involves the adoption of SLM practices.  
 
While a firm conclusion about the impact of PES program on  livelihoods should 
not be based on the proportion of household income, it contributes alone  
(Zilberman et al., 2008), recipients of EPWS payments consider the payments to 
be an important source of income, paid in a lump sum that assisted them in 
catering for household needs that require large investment such as education, 
clothes, house improvements and farm tools. In general, these payments are 
important source of household cash income because, as demonstrated in these 
findings and in other PES livelihood impact studies conducted in rural areas in 
other developing countries, cash income opportunities are largely limited 
(Miranda et al., 2003; Kosoy et al., 2008; Zilberman et al., 2008).  
 
In addition to the PES payments, other livelihood impacts of the EPWS program 
are indirect financial and non-financial impacts. The indirect financial impacts of 
the EPWS program included the increase in land value, employment 
opportunities, livestock keeping and crop production, and households’ ability to 
meet food needs. Indirect livelihood impacts of the EPWS program are 
associated with the nature of the program as land modifying and activity creating 
(Zilberman et al., 2008). The program has resulted in the increase in the value of 
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land following the construction of terraces (i.e. bench terraces, fanya juu and 
fanya chini) and tree planting (i.e. agro forestry and reforestation).  
 
Whilst the increase in the value of land is beneficial to land owners, to the 
landless poor and smaller landholders it is a misfortune. The once idle, 
uncultivated and marginal lands are now put into use by landowners as a result of 
promised benefits from PES payments and as savings for future generations 
(Cole, 2010; Lopa et al., 2012). As a consequence, the landless and small 
landowners have suffered from increases in agricultural land rent and reduced 
access to land. This has also been reported by German et al. (2010) in the 
Bushenyi District in Uganda where access to land among the landless was 
reduced as a result of the expansion of forest carbon sequestration in the Trees 
for Global Benefits Programme.  
 
Furthermore, while the outcomes for the program participants are clearly positive, 
the chapter findings have also shown that the EPWS program has indirectly 
benefited both the program participating and non-participating households 
through wealth creation from crop yields and livestock keeping, and employment 
from daily and monthly casual labour and small business opportunities. This 
again is an impact which is associated with the nature of the EPWS program in 
which agricultural production activities are modified to achieve environmental 
objectives unlike the land diversion programs whereby land is diverted from 
agriculture to forest (Zilberman et al., 2008). These findings suggest that the 
application of PES on active agricultural land has higher potential to increase the 
demand for labour and production of crops than land diversion PES payments 
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that reduce labour demand and land for growing crops (Zilberman et al., 2008). 
This also suggests that the potential for poor participants to benefit from PES 
programs, such as EPWS, which promote the adoption of SLM practices such as 
terraces (i.e. bench terraces, fanya juu and fanya chini) and tree planting (i.e. 
agro forestry), is higher than in land diversion programs that focus on 
afforestation, reforestation and forest protection (Wunder et al., 2008; Zilberman 
et al., 2008).  
 
Investment in SLM practices is one way through which the EPWS program has 
enhanced natural and financial capital assets of the participating households. 
This is in principle a key pillar of a PES program which consequently affects 
physical, human and social assets as indirect non-financial impacts of the 
program.  
 
Capacity building within EPWS is one of the key factors affecting human capital 
among participants, delivered through internal and external training. These 
training improved access to information and implementation of SLM practices, 
strengthened local institutions, improving reciprocity and trust among the program 
participants, and extended internal and external networks, as well as increasing 
options for participants to diversify their income sources. The significance of 
improvement in human capital in the community suggests the existence of more 
benefits from the program to the community. This justifies the necessity of PES 
programs to invest in human capital, particularly in the development of 
transferable skills and capacities.  
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Capacity building through various forms of training such as local workshops and 
study tours is a significant aspect of a PES program. The importance of this is 
justified by the study findings that illustrate that wretched understanding of the 
PES concept was detrimental and raised scepticism and delayed enrolment in 
the program. The fear of land confiscation and relocation, and uncertainty about 
the ownership of trees signified the problem of poor understanding of the concept 
of PES in the EPWS program. This finding echoes the findings of Robertson and 
Wunder (2005) in the Los Negros River Watershed where the farmers distrusted 
the local PES initiative.  
 
While cash transfer of payments is a widespread way to reward participants in 
PES programs (Wunder, 2005; Engel et al., 2008; Sommerville et al., 2009; 
Wunder, 2015), the findings from this study suggest that this approach is 
somehow problematic to some farmers given the finding that some interpreted 
cash payments as covert attempts to buy their land or forest. These findings 
highlight the need to familiarize participants and non-participants with the 
rationale and functioning of PES programs and to consider all forms of rewarding 
participants. 
 
On the question of social capital, the findings suggest that the EPWS program 
has helped to expand and strengthen social relationships and networks, increase 
trust and reciprocity among community members and other social actors, and 
empower women and the poor. These outcomes are perhaps the result of the 
EPWS programs’ choice to work on strengthening the capacity of existing local 
level institutions (Lopa et al., 2012). This approach has also been used by other 
193 
 
PES projects (Tacconi et al., 2010) with considerable positive outcomes, such as 
an enhanced sense of cohesion in communities and expansion of farmer 
networks beyond the community. In general, it can be argued that enhanced 
social capital  helps to reduce household vulnerability and enhance the welfare of 
the poor both in terms of empowerment and poverty alleviation (Pagiola et al., 
2005; Wunder, 2008b). Also, strong social capital can help to reduce the initial 
investment costs of the PES programs by allowing farmers to work in groups 
(Tacconi et al., 2010). 
 
5.5.2  Distribution of EPWS Program Outcomes 
Following the attractiveness of PES in developing countries, in contexts where 
poverty alleviation is often a desired co-benefit of conservation interventions, 
concerns about the distribution of outcomes have become more significant 
(Pagiola et al., 2005). This means that many questions about the effectiveness 
and efficiency of PES in achieving desired outcomes must be considered 
alongside poverty and, more generally, equity question. Therefore, with regard to 
poverty and equity questions, this study finds that the poor and women have not 
been made worse in terms of their households' average sources of cash income, 
share of cash income from different sources and average cash income as a result 
of their participation in the EPWS program.  
 
The analysis of the findings indicates that program participating households in the 
low wealth category (1st and 2nd wealth quartile) have not been affected 
negatively in terms of their sources of cash income, household share of income, 
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average cash income and their affiliations or memberships. They have additional 
sources of cash income (Figure 5.10) when compared to non-participating 
households in the same quartiles and the participating richer households. The 
finding suggests that their sources of cash income are more diversified than their 
richer counterpart, implying that EPWS program could be the reason for providing 
additional income sources for poor land users, thereby helping to improve their 
livelihoods (Pagiola et al., 2005). Improved access to different sources of cash 
income is likely to be good for the poor program participating household’s 
welfare, including food security.  
 
The findings have also indicated that participation of the poor in the EPWS 
program has had no negative effect on household’s cash income just like other 
wealth groups. The positive cash income can potentially be explained by 
improved efficiency in agricultural production induced by the increase of inputs, 
access to information and technical assistance from EPWS staffs and 
paraprofessionals, leading to increased average revenue of crop yields for 
program participating households. The share of the cash income for the poor 
from other sources such as the sale of livestock, timber, business income, wage 
or salary, remittances and other casual earnings was also positive.  
 
As far as women are concerned, there is no indication that their welfare 
deteriorated as a result of their participation in the EPWS program. However, 
while female sources of cash income are more diversified than their male 
counterparts, average cash income for male headed households is higher than 
for female headed households. Also, the share of cash income from all sources 
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identified in the study (Figure 5.15) are higher for male headed households 
compared to female headed households. Furthermore, male headed households 
are dominant in all affiliations with significant differences in their SACCOS and 
village government memberships. In a similar assessment of PES program in 
rural Mexico, only 20% of women were full members in ejidos, communal land 
tenure organizations through which agreements are implemented (García-Amado 
et al., 2011).   
 
These findings are not surprising because measuring gender where land 
ownership is culturally assigned to a male member of the household is 
challenging as statistics tend to be skewed. However, a positive impact of the 
program is that women participated in the program and their welfare was not 
degraded. This is despite the fact that land engaged mostly for program activities 
was non clan land mostly owned by males and not the clan owned land mostly 
under women through matrilineal system (Englert, 2008). Individualization of land 
has increased and land inheritance through the male members of households 
has become more common in the Uluguru Mountains (Van Donge, 1993b; Van 
Donge, 1993a; Lyamuya et al., 1994; Hymas, 2001; Englert, 2008).  
5.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter, the direct and indirect livelihood impacts of the EPWS program on 
participants and non-participants have been examined. The findings have shown 
direct financial and indirect financial and non-financial livelihood impacts of the 
EPWS program. Also, with regard to poverty and equity questions, the study finds 
that the poor and women have not been made worse in terms of their 
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household’s average number of cash income, share of cash income from 
different sources and average cash income as a result of their participation in the 
EPWS program.  
 
While the cash payments to participants in return for the adoption of SLM 
practices are important, it appears that the majority of the program participants 
consider other forms of incentives such as training, supply of manure and 
improved seeds as more important. This does not however undermine the 
importance of direct cash payments to households as they enabled farmers to 
make investments that would not have been possible otherwise. Equally, indirect 
financial and non-financial benefits of the EPWS program suggest the importance 
of agricultural based PES programs in the improvement of rural livelihoods and 
poverty alleviation in addition to achieving environmental goals. 
 
The indirect financial benefits of the EPWS program which included increased 
crop yields, increased value of land, and increased employment opportunities are 
essential in alleviating rural poverty. Combined with strengthened institutions, 
increased trust, expanded internal and external networks and increased 
knowledge of farmers and capacity in farming, leadership and business, the 
impacts could be substantial. All of these are transferable assets which can 
underpin activities outside the PES program and thus offer potential to enhance 
rural development. Increased value of land translated to higher land rents and 
reduced availability of land however, which adversely affected the access of land 
to landless and land-poor households. This clearly requires greater attention 
during the design of PES programs.  
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The findings have also highlighted the importance of indirect financial and non-
financial benefits to farmers compared to cash payments. This would not be the 
same in a situation where the focus of PES programs is on forests, in which 
financial incentives are the key motivation for participation of land owners. 
Overall, the study highlights the need for more research on the potential for and 
implications of PES programs in agricultural systems in other developing 
countries, particularly in agro-forestry and inter-cropping systems, to fully 
understand their ability to deliver both on ecological and livelihood improvements. 
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 Chapter 6: The Effectiveness of the EPWS Program to Increase 
Water Quantity and Quality Supply Downstream. 
6.1 Chapter Outline 
This chapter evaluated the effectiveness of the EPWS program in terms of its 
additionality, leakage effects, permanence of SLM practices and cost 
effectiveness in the supply of water ecosystem services. Mixed methods quasi-
experimental design with propensity score matching method was used to 
establish the counterfactual effect of the program from the data collected from 
both program participants and non-participants. The findings suggest that the 
program has had additionality effects, positive leakages and promising 
sustainability of adopted SLM practices as well as positive measures for cost 
effectiveness. On additionality, the findings show that, the land under agro-
forestry and reforestation practices increased by 6.92% amongst program 
participants. Also, more program participants use organic fertilizer, practice 
integrated pest management and plant woodlots. In addition, the program has 
also resulted in positive leakages such as decreased incidences of forest fire, 
forest encroachment and illegal logging. On sustainability, the findings show that 
once established, SLM practices are privately more profitable to farmers and so 
are likely to be retained. 
 
 
6.2 Introduction   
In agro-ecosystems, payments for ecosystem service transfer positive incentives 
to farmers conditional to the supply of well-defined ecosystem services (Wunder, 
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2005; Wunder, 2007). These incentives are expected to change conservation 
behavior of farmers in a way that will sustain and increase the supply of 
ecosystem services compared to what would have happened without an 
intervention (Wunder and Börner, 2011a). In Tanzania, the EPWS program has 
promoted sustainable land management practices such as terracing, agro-
forestry, afforestation and the sharing of associated technical knowledge to 
farmers in four villages of Kibungo Sub-catchment in the Uluguru Mountains. The 
aim is to reduce the use of farming techniques that cause nutrient mining, soil 
erosion, accelerated turbidity levels and thus reduce water treatment costs for 
water companies downstream (Lopa and Mwanyoka, 2010; Lopa et al., 2012).  
 
However, the effectiveness of EPWS program to improve water quality and 
quantity has not been rigorously examined. Existing studies on EPWS program 
have reported its development, initial impacts, operationalization and payment 
mechanism (Branca et al., 2011; Lopa et al., 2012). Also, compared to well 
established agro-ecosystem PES programs in developed countries such as the 
American and European agro-environmental schemes (Kleijn and Sutherland, 
2003; Primdahl et al., 2003), there is less understanding of the effectiveness of 
agro-ecosystem PES programs in supplying ecosystem services in developing 
countries (Ferraro, 2009b; Branca et al., 2011; Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013).   
 
Contributing to this knowledge gap, this chapter examines the effectiveness of 
the EPWS program intervention activities in affecting individual behaviours that 
improve water quality and quantity to downstream users. It examines the program 
additionality, leakage, its sustainability or permanence in providing the services, 
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and cost effectiveness. These are significant concerns about the effectiveness of 
PES programs as described by scholars like Ferraro and Pattanayak (2006), 
Wunder (2007), Jack et al.(2008),  Wunder et al. (2008) and Ferraro (2009a). 
These attributes are further discussed in the next section. 
 
6.3 The Effectiveness of PES Programs to Deliver Ecosystem 
Services  
In PES programs, payments to service providers are thought to change their 
behaviours in ways that will enhance the supply of ecosystem services compared 
to what would have occurred in the absence of an intervention (Ferraro and 
Pattanayak, 2006; Ferraro, 2009a; Ferraro and Hanauer, 2014). This condition is 
identified as additionality - a determination of whether PES program intervention 
actually results in outcomes - i.e. land use and behavioural changes that are 
additional to what would have happened in the absence of the intervention or 
compared to baseline (Sierra and Russman, 2006; García-Amado et al., 2011) 
(Wunder, 2007; Engel and Palmer, 2008). Where funds for PES are limited, lack 
of additionality would be inefficient economic intervention because service buyers 
seek to make payments on practices that would not have happened without 
payments (Wunder, 2007; Engel et al., 2008; Jack et al., 2008). In this context, 
PES payments are expected to be the causal factor of positive change in land 
status (Wunder et al., 2008) and de facto change in land owners behaviour  to 
generate environmental benefits (Sierra and Russman, 2006). According to 
Ferraro (2002) incentives should be aligned directly and explicitly with resource 
protection. The logic is to pay for what generates additional environmental 
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services compared to program counterfactual and not pay for practices that would 
have been undertaken anyway  (Ferraro, 2002; Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Milne and 
Niesten, 2009). As such, concerns over the additionality in PES programs have 
been raised: that PES may not in fact induce the desired land use changes 
and/or ecosystem services. 
 
Additionality is of greater interest to funders of environmental management 
interventions and the wider community, as it is essential for assessing 
intervention impact (Engel et al., 2008). However, while, additionality is frequently 
used as an indicator of PES effectiveness, it is extremely difficult to demonstrate 
due to practical and methodological challenges of measuring the service itself, 
estimating baselines and identifying leakage (Aukland et al., 2003; Wunder, 
2007). With respect to leakage, Sommerville et al., (2009) show that prior 
estimation of spatial and temporal scales at which an intervention will be 
additional is vital to allow the comparisons of outcomes. However, due to the 
challenges of establishing additionality, these estimates are addressed 
qualitatively (Sommerville et al., 2009). 
 
Leakage or the shift of environmental problems from one place to another 
happens when damaging pressure (i.e. deforestation) from land receiving PES 
payments is shifted into neighbouring or other lands that are not under contracts 
or receiving payments (Wunder, 2007; Wunder et al., 2008; Bremer et al., 2014). 
In this context, leakage  (positive externalities) is considered as an unintended 
impact of PES intervention, especially when non-crop land is brought into crop 
production when a PES program recipient clears one plot of land to substitute for 
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another under a conservation contract (i.e. afforestation or reforestation) (Wu, 
2000). For example, for every 100 acres of land removed from crop production 
under the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the central United States, 20 
acres of non-cropland were brought into crop production (Wu, 2000).  Leakage 
can also occur indirectly when the establishment of PES conservation practices, 
such as conservation of forest or promotion of land diversion, reduces land 
available for food production, and so increases food prices and/or deforestation 
elsewhere to produce food (Wunder et al., 2008). 
 
In addition to additionality and leakage, longer-term permanence of land use 
changes and supply of ecosystem services induced by short-term intervention 
remain a vital concern for most PES programs (Napier, 1991; Wunder, 2007; 
Jack et al., 2008; Ferraro and Pressey, 2015).   Creating a long lasting supply of 
ecosystem services has been acknowledged as a prerequisite for PES program 
success because most PES contracts are not made indefinitely (Wunder, 2007; 
Engel et al., 2008). Under voluntary transactions principle, service providers can 
decide to end the implementation of introduced conservation practices when the 
payment ends (Nkonya et al., 2005). In a situation like this, a PES program will 
be considered ineffective in the provision of ecosystem services if it results in the 
abandonment of practices when payments end (Wunder, 2007).  
 
The costs at which additional ecosystem services are achieved are significant in 
explaining the effectiveness of a PES program (Jack et al., 2008; Wunder et al., 
2008).  These costs include the service providers’ opportunity costs of benefits 
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foregone from alternative land use and the initial costs of establishing and 
maintaining improved land use practices (e.g., construction of terraces, agro 
forestry and maintenance of trees) (Wunder et al., 2008). In addition to 
investment and maintenance costs on the providers’ side, these costs occur on 
the buyers’ side as well. On the buyers' side, transaction costs can be defined as 
all costs which are not payment proper which can be divided into start up and 
running costs (Wunder et al., 2008). With regard to the role of costs in PES 
program participation, it has been argued that rational decision makers (the 
potential service provider) are unlikely to accept payment unless the payments 
exceed their opportunity costs and the costs of establishing and implementing the 
desired activities (Jack et al., 2008).  A PES program could be cost effective, if 
the service providers were able to receive payments that cover their opportunity 
and investment and maintenance costs of participation (Engel et al., 2008; 
Wünscher et al., 2008). Other costs are the transaction costs incurred by a PES 
program implementing agency or organisation. These costs arise from PES 
program establishment requirements (including information procurement such as 
performing scientific baseline studies, program design and negotiation costs) and 
recurrent costs of implementation (including payment administration, monitoring 
and sanctioning) (Pagiola and Platais, 2002; Wunder, 2007; Wunder et al., 2008). 
 
Although the effectiveness of an agro-ecosystem based PES program can be 
explained by its additionality, leakage effects, permanence and involved costs 
such as transaction and opportunity costs, most studies  are considered to lack 
rigorous evaluation (Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; Pattanayak et al., 2010 
Tacconi et al., 2010). According to Ferraro and Pattanayak (2006), rigorous 
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evaluation creates inferences about unobserved counterfactual outcomes that 
would have occurred without the intervention. However, this is difficult to 
articulate due to non-random nature of the design of many PES programs and 
associated difficult to disentangle the effects of an intervention or program (i.e. 
conservation impacts such as change in land use) from the effects of other policy 
measures and broader economic trends (Ferraro and Simpson., 2002; Ferraro 
and Pattanayak, 2006; Wunder, 2007; Margoluis et al., 2009; Djamhuri, 2012). 
 
Quasi-experimental research design can address the counterfactual problem 
(Flanders, 2006; Ho et al., 2007) as illustrated in chapter 2 section 2.4 and 
chapter 3 where the causal-effect model (section 3.2.3) and the propensity score 
matching and implementation (section 3.6) are explained. However, there are 
numerous challenges that are encountered in evaluating conservation programs 
including PES.  
6.4 Challenges of Evaluating Conservation Interventions - PES  
One of the challenges in evaluating the success of conservation projects like PES 
is the time lag between the intervention and realization of measurable impacts 
which is often very long that conservation impacts occur outside project time 
frame (Ferraro, 2009a; Prowse and Snilstveit, 2010). Changes to ecosystem 
services (i.e. improved water quality and quantity) that are attributable to a 
particular intervention are difficult to establish because of life cycles and natural 
fluctuations in species and ecosystems that occur over many decades (Mary, 
2001).  
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Another challenge in conducting impact evaluation of PES is the lack of 
appropriate baseline data, due to rare incorporation of evaluation component in 
the programs design phase (Ferraro, 2009a). Evaluation of outcome or impact is 
often an afterthought issue with no attention to evaluation requirements at 
program inception (Ferraro, 2009a). Consequently, no baseline data are collected 
before the intervention, and little or no good data are collected during the project 
life appropriate for evaluation.  
 
Also, conservation intervention whether at large scale or small scale works in 
complex, dynamic, and often unpredictable settings that can cause under-
reporting or over-reporting of the outcomes or impacts of an intervention 
(Wunder, 2007; Jack et al., 2008). Due to complex spill-over effects, intervention 
effects can go beyond the recipients and the area of an intervention that might 
not be captured or underestimate outcomes due to crowding in effects (Wunder, 
2007; Ewers and Rodrigues, 2008; Wunder and Albán, 2008). For example, 
interventions in agro-ecosystem that are packaged with technical assistance and 
marketing efforts could make some of promoted SLM practices  so profitable that 
they are expanded into previously unused land to increase income (Ewers and 
Rodrigues, 2008; Wunder and Albán, 2008; Wunder and Börner, 2011b). 
Furthermore, when PES intervention affects productivity, prices of goods and 
labour market, it can trigger unintended land use change pressure in areas not 
targeted by PES program (Wunder and Börner, 2011b).  
 
The scale at which intervention is implemented poses another challenge for 
outcome or impact evaluation of PES programs. Many PES programs have been 
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implemented in small catchments as pilot programs. Small scale coverage of 
PES program like EPWS intervention makes it impractical to conduct 
measurements of water quality and quantity downstream (Lopa et al., 2012). 
Related to this is the likelihood that water quality and quantity can be reduced by 
what is happening between the areas of intervention and water quality and 
quantity measurement area or where improved services are expected to benefit. 
Unsustainable land use activities of farmers who lie between the areas where 
interventions are carried out can greatly reduce water quality and quantity 
downstream and thus compromise the effectiveness of the upstream intervention. 
 
Also, it is very challenging to conduct measurement of improved water quality 
and quantity in an intervention like EPWS program where some farmers 
participated in the implementation of SLM practice and others did not (Lopa et al., 
2012). In a situation like this, little improvement in the measurements of water 
quality and quantity may not be explained by the ineffectiveness of the program 
as the activities of those who did not participate in the program might be the 
reason for lack of improvement (Lopa et al., 2012). Furthermore, as other farmers 
may still be in the process of adopting SLM practices, measurements of water 
quality and quantity could result in the underreporting of outcomes.   
 
6.5 Assessing Effectiveness in Conservation 
Acknowledging the barriers that environmental practitioners and scientists 
encounter in conducting impact evaluation of conservation interventions, Ferarro 
(2009a) argues that challenges or barriers stipulated above are not limited to the 
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field of environmental policy; they are also pervasive in all social policy fields. 
Consequently, Ferarro (2009a) suggests that, since many environmental 
programs are aimed at affecting human behavior, either as individuals or as 
collectives, measuring intervention impacts on the intermediate outcomes or 
impact of behavioral changes can overcome some of the challenges involved in 
evaluating environmental outcomes and impacts of conservation interventions 
(Sabourin and Lamarche, 2005; Ferraro, 2009a). Conservation interventions work 
by changing behaviors responsible for environmental problems (Sabourin and 
Lamarche, 2005). Thus, examining the causal mechanisms linking a policy 
intervention with behavioral change, such as intervention activities on behavior is 
vital (Scullion et al., 2011; Thomas and Koontz, 2011). 
 
Conservation initiatives involve diverse types of activities which influence 
conservation targets directly or indirectly and that may each contain different 
outcomes and suitable measures of success (Kapos et al., 2008; Kapos et al., 
2009; Kapos et al., 2010). Payments are not the only incentives from a PES 
conservation intervention that impact individual decisions. Individuals, can 
indirectly be influenced by other positive and negative incentives within a larger 
socio-political framework that can influence conservation indirectly such as those 
which enhance or provide alternative livelihoods, policy and legislation, education 
and capacity building (Kapos et al., 2010).  
 
Conceptually, activities that influence conservation indirectly are remote from 
conservation targets. However, each can have key outcomes that occur earlier in 
the sequence and which are fundamental to reducing threats to ecosystem, or 
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improving responses of conservation targets (Kapos et al., 2009). For livelihood 
related activities, the key intermediate outcomes are the change in resource use 
behaviour, abandonment of the relevant damaging practices or uptake and 
maintenance of sustainable practices. As for capacity building, education and 
awareness rising, the intermediate outcomes are the increase in the quality of 
conservation action and change in behaviour by the intended audience targeted 
by the work. As regards policy and legal work, the intermediate outcome is the 
enforcement of policies or legislation promoted’ (Kapos et al., 2009, p.339). 
These conservation activities are interlinked, as they can collectively or 
individually lead to numerous intermediate outcomes such as those shown in 
Table 6.1  (Kapos et al., 2008; Kapos et al., 2009; Kapos et al., 2010).     
 
As these conservation activities have intermediate outcomes that occur earlier, 
for which information is available and easier to measure, the effectiveness of 
conservation intervention can be evaluated in terms of its additionality, leakage, 
permanence and cost effectiveness (Kapos et al., 2008; Kapos et al., 2009; 
Kapos et al., 2010). This chapter therefore, uses the EPWS program as a case 
study and employs quasi-experimental mixed methods approach (see Chapter 3) 
to evaluate the additionality, leakage, permanence and cost effectiveness of an 
agro-ecosystems based PES program intervention to deliver water quality and 
quantity to downstream users.  
6.6 Materials and Methods 
This chapter follows the generic descriptions of case study and methods 
described in chapter three to evaluate the environmental effectiveness of the 
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EPWS program in terms of its additionality and leakage effects as well as 
sustainability and cost effectiveness to provide water service (water quality and 
quantity) to downstream water users. In order to overcome the time lag challenge 
involved in evaluating conservation impacts that occur outside the project time 
frame, the study focuses on the evaluation of intermediate outcomes of the 
intervention that occur earlier, for which information is available and thus easier 
to measure (Kapos et al., 2008; Kapos et al., 2009; Kapos et al., 2010). Also, the 
study elicits local peoples’ perceptions of the effectiveness of the program 
through interviews, surveys and participatory rural appraisal methods, as has 
been widely used in conservation impact studies in developing countries 
(Sabourin and Lamarche, 2005; Lund et al., 2009; Lund et al., 2010; Scullion et 
al., 2011; Veríssimo, 2013). This approach has been used by Agrawal and 
Chhatre (2006) to assess forest conditions, Husain and Bhattacharya (2004) to 
assess forest area, Paré et al., (2010) to assess forest degradation, Meshack et 
al., (2006) to assess forest regeneration, and IFRI (2008) to assess species 
diversity and vegetation density.  
 
Studies that build on local perceptions and knowledge are considered to be 
highly cost effective (Danielsen et al., 2005; Lund and Treue, 2008; Anadón et 
al., 2009; Lund et al., 2009; Lund et al., 2010). While this study focused on 
behaviour change and perception as they constitute low cost and technology 
useful for research and development projects in developing countries, the 
approach was viewed in relation to other methods such as remote sensing and 
inventory methods (Lund et al., 2009; Lund et al., 2010). However, whilst remote 
sensing methods are also low cost, they are not very effective in detecting 
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changes in farm and forest quality beyond changes in farm size and forest cover 
over significant period of time (Lund et al., 2009; Lund et al., 2010).  
 
Essential attributes of an effective PES program outlined in section 6.2 and in 
Table 6.1, namely additionality, leakage, permanence and cost effectiveness 
(Wunder, 2007; Jack et al., 2008) framed the evaluation indicators. Data 
generated through propensity score matching (3.6) with 116 program participants 
and 116 non participants were used. The household questionnaire included 
closed and open ended questions used to collect data on observed and 
perceived environmental outcomes of EPWS intervention in terms behaviour 
change. Perceptions on behaviour change from both participants and non-
participants were assessed on various indicators used to assess the 
effectiveness of the EPWS program shown in Table 6.1. In addition, sixteen focus 
group discussion (FGDs) and thirty two key informant interviews (KIIs) were 
performed with program participants and non-participants. Stratified purposeful 
and extreme case sampling for the purpose of learning from highly unusual issue 
were used (Margoluis et al., 2009). Therefore, focus group discussions and key 
informant interviews were used for the purpose of validating respondents’ 
perceptions through triangulation which involved asking the same question asked 
from one method such as in household interviews to key informants and focus 
group discussions to enhance construct validity of the method (perception-based 
methods).  
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Table 6.1. Data types and sources for examining the attributes of PES 
effectiveness  
Effectivenes
s attribute  
Assumption Question  Source of 
data 
Additionality - Program participants have 
more land under agro-
forestry and reforestation 
than non-participants 
- Percent of farm under agro 
forestry and  reforestation 
HS  
- Program participants have 
many SLM practices than 
non-participants 
- Number of SLM practices i.e. 
Terraces (bench and fanya juu 
terraces, grass strips, trash 
lines, afforestation, contour 
bunds, riparian reforestation 
and agro forestry. 
HS,   KII & 
FGD 
- No difference between 
program participants and 
non-participants in tree 
planting behavior before 
EPWS 2008. 
- Has your household planted 
any woodlot or trees on farm 
before EPWS 2008? 
HS & KII 
- There is significant 
difference between program 
participants and non-
participants in tree planting 
behavior after EPWS 2008. 
- Has your household planted 
any woodlot or trees on farm 
after EPWS 2008? 
HS & KII 
- Fewer program participants 
use chemical fertilizers  than 
non-participants 
- Do you apply chemical 
fertilizers in your farm? 
HS 
- More program participants 
apply organic fertilizers than 
non-participants 
- Do you apply organic fertilizers 
in your farm? 
HS 
- More program participants 
apply integrated pest 
management than non-
participants 
- Do you practice integrated 
pest management? 
HS 
- Fewer program participants 
practice slash and burn 
agriculture than non-
participants 
- Do you practice slash and 
burn agriculture 
HS 
- Game and wildlife 
numbers\diversity increased 
- How do you compare game 
and wildlife numbers\diversity 
now with before EPWS -2008? 
HS & FGD 
- Sign of natural regeneration 
in degraded areas increased 
now with EPWS compared 
to before EPWS 
- How do you compare sign of 
natural regeneration in 
degraded areas now with 
before EPWS -2008? 
HS & FGD 
Leakage - Incidences of forest fire 
decreased 
- How do you compare 
incidences of forest fire now 
with before EPWS -2008? 
HS & FGD 
- Encroachment into the forest 
for agriculture decreased 
- How do you compare 
incidences 0f people 
encroaching into the forest for 
agriculture now with before 
EPWS -2008? 
HS, KII & 
FGD 
- Incidences of illegal forest 
logging decreased 
- How do you compare 
incidences of Illegal forest 
logging now with before EPWS 
– 2008? 
HS, KII & 
FGD 
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Permanence - People are willing to join and 
keep SLM practices without 
EPWS payments 
- Why implement and keep SLM 
practices? 
HS, KII & 
FGD 
- Benefits of SLM practices 
are higher than costs 
 
- What are the benefits of the 
SLM practices 
- Are benefits of SLM practices 
higher than costs 
KII & FGD 
- Importance of PES 
payments compared to other 
benefits of the program 
- How important payments are 
compared to other benefits? 
FGD 
Cost 
effectiveness  
- Costs of introducing and 
monitoring SLM practices 
are low  
- What mechanisms are used to 
promote and monitor SLM 
practices? 
KII& FGD 
- Farmers are able to 
overcome SLM adoption 
costs 
- Were payments sufficient to 
cover adoption costs? 
- Are there any challenges 
encountered in adopting SLM 
practices 
HS, KII& 
FGD 
- Program intervention 
intensives were important  
- What incentives were 
important? 
KII& FGD 
Key: HS-Household Survey, KII-Key Informant Interview) and FGD-Focus Group Discussion  
 
A propensity score matching technique (Chapter 3) was used to match the 
treatment group (program participants) with control group (non-participants) 
(Table 3.18 and 3.19) for attribution purpose. A simple difference approach 
(Baker, 2000) was used to assess the effectiveness of EPWS program to deliver 
ecosystem services. Household data was analysed using descriptive statistics and 
attributes of interest (Table 6.1) compared between the EPWS program 
participants and non-participants. Relevant themes and quotes were drawn from 
focus group discussion and key informant interviews to support quantitative data 
(Neuendorf, 2002).  
6.7 Results 
6.7.1  Estimates of the Program Additionality Effects  
The estimate of the additionality effect of the EPWS program on the change in 
the behaviour of program participants as a result of program activities  when 
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compared to non participants is positive (Table 6.2). Statistically significant 
changes are observed for the increase in the number of conservation approaches 
practiced by a household and increased proportion of program participants 
planting woodlot/trees on their farm after EPWS program, using organic fertilizers 
and practicing integrated pest management systems (Table 6.2). In addition, the 
finding in Table 6.2 shows that on average, program participants have 6.92% 
more land under agro-forestry and afforestation practices that would not have 
happened without EPWS program. With respect to the number of conservation 
practices, the program participants had a significantly higher number of practices 
than non-participants. Furthermore, more program participants had planted 
significantly more trees on their farms after EPWS and increased the use of 
organic fertilizers and integrated pest management. 
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Table 6.2. The effect of the EPWS program on respondents behaviour change   
  Mean 
Difference 
between 
participants 
and non-
participants 
Std. Error 
Difference 
between 
participants 
and non-
participants 
Minimum Maximum t-test 
Percent of land under agro-
forestry  
and afforestation 
6.92 2.60 10 95 2.67  
Number of conservation 
approaches 
0.98 0.13 1.00 6.00    7.53** 
Has your household planted any 
woodlot or trees on farm before 
EPWS 2008? 
0.09 0.06 0 1 1.47 
Has your household planted any 
woodlot or trees on farm after 
EPWS 2008? 
0.19 0.05 0 1 4.02** 
Do you apply chemical fertilizers 
in your farm? 
0.01 0.01 0 1 1.00   
Do you apply organic fertilizers in 
your farm? 
0.28 0.06 0 1 4.42** 
Do you practice integrated pest 
management? 
0.22 0.06 0 1 3.64** 
Do you practice slash and burn 
agriculture 
0.00 0.04 0 1 1.00 
Note: Minimum 0 =No and Maximum 1=Yes. Analysis for statistical significance refers to 
statistical independent samples t-test for differences in means of two different groups of 
samples derived from Mann-Whitney U. **P<0.01, *P<0.05. Field data collected in 
household questionnaires between March and May 2011. 
 
According to the key informant interviews conducted with EPWS officer, between 
2009 and 2010 more than 170,000 trees were planted by the program 
participants and their survival rate was 85% in May 2011. In 2011, more than 
93,622 trees were planted by both program participants and non-participants. 
This happened after landowners who did not want their names registered with the 
program were granted permission from the EPWS program to collect tree 
seedlings from the program seedling nursery. However, as shown in Figure 6.1, 
the uptake of SLM practices including terraces (bench terraces and fanya juu), 
afforestation and contour bands (banana and pineapples) for EPWS program 
participants is significantly higher than that of non-participants.  
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Figure 6.1. SLM practices implemented by program participants and non-
participants.  
Note: 1: Analysis refers to statistical independent samples t-test for differences in means 
of two different groups of samples. **P<0.01, *P<0.05. Field data collected in household 
questionnaires between March and May 2011.  
 
 
Uptake of afforestation was significantly higher among program participants while 
the uptake of agro-forestry practices did not show difference between program 
participants and non-participants. Key informant interviews and focus group 
discussions suggested that agro-forestry was relatively compatible with the 
existing land use system and easy to implement (Figure 6.1). Agro-forestry was 
in-line with pre-program farming system of both program participants and non-
participants. A female key informant in Lanzi village said that “agro-forestry is 
easy to implement on a small piece of land compared to the establishment of 
afforestation which would require more land”. According to focus group 
discussions, farmers who have adopted agro-forestry interventions plant trees at 
the boundaries of farms to avoid in-farm competition with other crops and other 
trees are planted in erosion hotspots.  
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According to CARE key informant and focus group discussions, tree seedlings 
were made available to participants by EPWS through the establishment of a tree 
nursery in each program village. In addition, 18 households established their own 
tree nurseries with a variety of tree seedlings of their own choice. Tree species 
planted in the project and on farm nurseries included exotic fruit trees such as 
mango Mangier indicia, orange Citrus sinensis, avocado Persea Americana, 
livestock fodder Leucaena leucocephala, and  Casuarina spp., Allanblackia 
stuhlmannii for oil bearing fruits and trees for timber including Grevillea robusta 
and the native Faidherbia albida and Khaya anthotheca.  
 
6.7.2  Leakage Impacts of the EPWS Program 
On leakage effects of the EPWS program, there are no significant differences 
between the perceptions of the program participants and non-participants of 
incidences of forest fire, encroachment into the forest for agriculture and illegal 
forest logging (Table 6.3). According to 80% of program participants and non-
participants during household questionnaire, incidences of forest fire, 
encroachment into the forest for agriculture and illegal forest logging had 
decreased by 2011 compared to 2008 before the EPWS program began. The 
main source of forest fire was said to be fire started to clear and prepare farms 
for cultivation and keep away snakes. According to the focus group discussions, 
program activities which involved training, establishment of fire control groups 
and fines have been very effective in stopping the use of fire in preparing farms.  
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Table 6.3. Respondents’ perception of the effect of the EPWS program on 
community behaviour change that threatens forest quality now (2011) with EPWS 
intervention compared to past 2 years before (2008) 
  Mean 
Difference 
between 
program 
participants 
and non-
participants  
Std. Error 
Difference 
between 
program 
participants 
and non-
participants 
Minimum Maximum t-test 
Incidence of forest fire 0.15 0.07 1.00 5.00  1.61 
Encroachment into the forest 
areas for agricultural land 
-0.05 0.08 1.00 5.00 -0.64 
Illegal forest logging 0.12 0.07 1.00 5.00  1.71 
Note: Minimum and maximum represent Likert Scale values where 1=Decreased a lot, 
2=Decreased a little, 3=Remained same, 4 Increased a little and 5=Increased a lot. Field 
data collected in household questionnaires between March and May 2011.  
 
 
With respect to encroachment into forest to establish or expand agricultural land, 
the survey results show that 84% of program participants and 92% of non-
participants surveyed consider this practice to have decreased greatly. The 
average size of plots farmed by program participants for various crops has 
increased from 2.4 acres to 2.9 acres between 2008 and 2010 and plot sizes 
farmed by non-participants have increased from 1.9 acres 2.4 acres over the 
same period. According to focus group discussions, this has been a beneficial 
increase in the use of steep sloped land which was not in use for crops and 
planting trees.  
 
Illegal forest logging was also reported to have significantly decreased as 
indicated by 75% of program participants and 83% of the non-participants. 
According to focus group discussions, training provided to program participants 
and non-participants in village workshops and public village meetings, a fear of 
relocation and of being fined cash were the main factors that contributed to a 
reduction in forest encroachment, illegal logging and setting fires. Collective 
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responsibility was described by the focus group participants and key informants 
as the best method of ensuring protection of the forest reserve against 
encroachment by agriculture, illegal logging and fire. These activities were 
described as risky activities which were secretly reported to the village authorities 
and forest office. A key informant in Lanzi village explained that “it is not possible 
to tell who will report you if you break the rules because all people in the 
community are guards. We don’t want one person’s illegal activity to cause 
relocation of the whole community”. The secret reporting was considered 
successful because in 2011, among others, the former council leader was 
secretly reported for illegal timber possession and was fined TSH 500,000 (US$ 
323).  
 
6.7.3  Permanence 
Survey findings show that 73% of program participants were willing to continue 
the implementation of the introduced SLM practices and 62% of non-participants 
were planning to join the program (Figure 6:2). According to focus group 
discussions conducted with the program participants, training provided by the 
program was perceived to have enabled an increase in crop yields alongside the 
construction of terraces. Also, expected benefits from timber harvests and fruit 
trees and increase in fertility have motivated program participants to continue 
implementation of SLM practices and non-participants to join.  A male farmer, 
program participant in Nyingwa village explained that “we are planting these trees 
for our future source of income from timber and fruit sales and for our children’s 
source of building materials”. Another female farmer, program non-participant in 
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Lanzi village explained that “in addition to planting trees for timber, they are very 
important source of fire wood which will save us time we use to walk and collect 
fire woods”. Other reasons explained by the participants of focus group 
discussions were the future increase in non-timber forest products, control of 
landslides and erosion, micro-climate regulation and water retention.   
 
Figure 6.2. Program participant’s willingness to continue with EPWS and non-
participants planning to join the program. Field data collected in household 
questionnaires between March and May 2011.  
 
 
The desire to continue implementation of SLM practices even when payments 
are not received was also expressed by program participants in focus group 
discussions. When the benefits of the EPWS program were ranked in order of 
priority by focus group participants, the payments were ranked the fourth most 
important benefit of the program, after 1) improved agricultural practices offered, 
2) environmental conservation, and 3) exposure to external models of SLM 
practices. Other benefits were 5) markets for crops and 6) local social capital. 
Introduction of high value crops such as tomato, cabbage, beans, groundnuts 
and livestock was mentioned by focus group participants as added incentive for 
retaining terraces permanently. These crops are a means of increasing 
household cash income and nutrition. 
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6.7.4  Cost Effectiveness - Transaction and Opportunity Costs 
According to the EPWS key informant, a number of approaches were adopted to 
ensure services are provided at the lowest possible cost and monitored. One of 
these is the aggregation of land owners under village authorities to minimise the 
transaction costs of contracting individual farmers. In addition to the use of village 
authorities as they are entitled to enter into contracts like EPWS on behalf of 
farmers who do not have land entitlement, the village authorities were obliged to 
monitor compliance as they were contract holders. Furthermore, extension 
services and training through local paraprofessional technical partners in 
collaboration with EPWS staff were used to minimise transaction costs.   
 
A number of challenges were experienced by the participants and non 
participants on their ability to participate in the program and adopt SLM practices. 
According to program participants and non-participants asked on these 
challenges in the household questionnaire, adoption and implementation of SLM 
practices were constrained by the delay of payments, lack of manure and 
insufficient payments (Figure 6.3). Also, key informant interviews and focus group 
discussions with program participants revealed that PES payments that had been 
received were not sufficient to cover the costs involved in the adoption of SLM 
practices. Conversely, incentives such as provision of manure, improved seeds, 
local and external training and extension services are more important than cash 
PES payments.  
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Figure 6.3. The constraints on farmers’ participation. Field data collected in 
household questionnaire between March and May 2011.   
 
Other incentives were more attractive and considered more useful than 
insufficient PES payments. A key informant in Nyingwa village explained that 
“high yields of terrace planted cabbage achieved in 2010 was the result of 
applying manure, as well as using improved seeds and extension support 
provided by the EPWS program through extension services”. Another key 
informant from Dimilo village explained that “If I could choose between cash 
payments and other incentives such as manure, training and extension services, I 
would choose other incentives”. In addition, a key informant from Kibungo village 
explained that “…if it was not for the training, social networking and that the 
terraces and trees are for my future benefit, I would quit the program because the 
cash payments received are insignificant and delayed…like now we have not 
received the second payments and the people whose farms were measured late 
have not received their payments”.  
 
Delay of PES payments and lack of manure were fundamental concerns to 
program participants and non participants. Some interpreted delay of payments 
as the act of cheating as payments did not materialize on time as promised by 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
Delay of the payments Lack of manure Low EPWS payments 
P
er
ce
n
t 
Participants Non-participants 
222 
 
the intermediary organization staff. Consequently, suspicion over the 
intermediary organization were built that CARE staff were cheating them. A key 
informant from Lanzi village explained her concern about the program as “…my 
expectation was that this program was not going to cheat on us like children. 
Several times I have been told the payments are going to be disbursed soon but 
since my farm was measured seven months ago I have not received any money. 
I have reached a point of not trusting the EPWS staff”. Another key informant in 
Kibungo village who was expecting to spend the payments on manure and a pipe 
for irrigation explained that “…although I constructed terraces and planted maize 
and beans, I am not expecting to harvest anything from this farm as the crops are 
dying out due to the lack of manure and water. I expected to receive the 
promised payment to spend on manure and a pipe for irrigation”.  
 
Low payments and lack of manure were explained as impediment to the adoption 
of bench terraces and fanya juu terraces. During focus group discussions with 
program participants and non participants, adoption of these practices was 
considered difficult because for newly constructed terraces to be productive, 
manure is needed especially during the first few years that the newly constructed 
terraces begin to gain fertility. This was particularly challenging for the poor and 
those with small land parcels. A key informant in Dimilo village who was not a 
program participant but wanted to construct terraces explained that “…..I would 
like to construct terraces in my farm, but I cannot afford manure which is highly 
required in the first four years of newly constructed terraces. People with small 
pieces of land like me would like to construct terraces but it will not be possible 
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without external support to provide materials, especially manure which was only 
provided once to people who joined earlier”.  
6.8 Discussion  
The chapter has evaluated the environmental outcomes or the effectiveness of 
EPWS program in terms of its additionality and leakage effects as well as 
sustainability and cost effectiveness to provide water service (water quality and 
quantity) to downstream water users. The evaluation of intermediate outcomes of 
the intervention that occur earlier, for which information was available and ease 
of measure helped to overcome time lag challenge involved in evaluating 
conservation impacts that occur outside the project time frame (Kapos et al., 
2008; Kapos et al., 2009; Kapos et al., 2010).  
 
The analysis of the study findings suggests that, while EPWS program is 
relatively new as it only began in 2008 as a pilot program, already the empirical 
evidence reveals positive changes in the effectiveness attributes of the program.  
Estimates of increases in the number of conservation practices implemented by 
farmers and the size of land under SLM practice suggest additionality of the 
EPWS program in its potential to supply water services that would not happen 
without the intervention.  This suggests that the changes observed, particularly 
those that require greatest investment such as bench terraces and agro-forestry, 
would not have occurred without the EPWS program (Wunder, 2007; Wunder et 
al., 2008).  
 
224 
 
The observed high uptake of agro-forestry in the EPWS program is associated 
with the common practice of planting trees on farms and homesteads in rural 
Africa (Franzel and Scherr, 2002). Mixing trees with crops such as banana and 
coffee and planting trees on farm boundaries do not involve a complex operation, 
unlike terracing, and thus does not limit participation (Pagiola et al., 2008). 
However, the construction of terraces by some project participants was 
interesting given their rejection in the 1950s under British colonial authority 
(Young and Fosbrooke, 1960; Carswell, 2006).  
 
The findings suggest that the programs’ spillage effects are more evident than 
leakages. The findings have demonstrated the adoption of SLM practices among 
neighbouring non-participants the finding which has been illustrated by Lopa et 
al., (2012, p.41) that “farmers who are not part of the scheme have started to 
copy land interventions, suggesting they are willing to experiment but wish to 
avoid the formal structures of the scheme”. The findings have also demonstrated 
the influence of the EPWS program training on enhancing the enforcement of 
social norms and by-laws against illegal activities such as fire, illegal logging and 
forest encroachment. The revealed collective responsibility which involved the 
reporting of illegal practices is an important noticeable spillage effect of the 
program. Related finding has been reported by Sommerville et al., (2010) that 
individuals who changed their environmental degrading behaviour as a result of 
fear originated from local institutions were less likely to return to the behaviour. 
This implies that long-term conservation benefits can be achieved with the 
involvement of local communities and promotion of local governance in managing 
natural resources (i.e. forest) (Sommerville et al., 2010).  
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The permanence of the PES program in delivering ecosystem services is a 
subject of concern because of the temporary nature of payments in many 
programs (Wunder et al., 2008). If environmental services are externalities, the 
assumption is that they will only be generated as long as payments are received, 
thus payments in a PES program should be ongoing rather than finite (Pagiola 
and Platais, 2007; Pagiola et al., 2007). Otherwise, farmers will revert to previous 
land uses once payments end as has been observed in other previous 
conservation approaches that relied on short term payments (Lutz et al., 1994). 
Contrary to these views, study findings show that SLM practices under EPWS 
program are inducing long lasting sustainable land use changes and 
conservation behaviour on the farmers and thus depart from the logic of stopping 
conservation when payments end.  The stated desire of participants to continue 
implementing SLM practices such as terraces and agro-forestry even without 
payments suggests the potential temporal scope of PES programs that are 
implemented in agricultural settings (Tacconi et al., 2011). Once established, 
SLM practices are privately more profitable to farmers when compared to 
previous practices and so are likely to be retained (Pagiola et al., 2007). Thus, 
short term payments, in addition to other non-monetary incentives such as 
training, manure, seeds, tools (i.e. hoes, machetes and spades) which were 
highlighted as important by farmers in the context of the EPWS could be 
sufficient to induce a sustainable change in land use. This suggests that ensuring 
continued influence of training, manure, and improved seeds, tools (i.e. hoes, 
machetes and spades) seems more important than payments. 
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This may not always be the case, however, as Pagiola and Platains (2007) have 
demonstrated that farmers can be divided into three groups - ‘Farmers for whom 
SLM practices are sufficiently profitable to justify adoption with no additional 
inducement; second, farmers for whom SLM practices are profitable once 
established, but for whom initial costs make adoption unattractive; and third, 
farmers for whom SLM practices are not profitable, even once established. Only 
for farmers in group two would short-term payments be sufficient to sustainably 
‘tip the balance’. Farmers in group three may adopt the practices while receiving 
payments, but would abandon them once payments cease. Farmers in group one 
would adopt the practices even without payments, so PES would not change their 
behaviour; at best, it might accelerate changes that would have occurred 
anyway’. 
 
How short term payments should be used to induce long term effects is another 
critical question to be considered. For some practices such as agro-forestry and 
reforestation, short-term payments can be sufficient to sustain them, but long-
term payments will often be necessary to enable farmers who implement 
practices such as terraces to sustainably change their land use choices in ways 
that support their livelihoods and provide more ecosystem services. Even in the 
case of farmers for whom short-term payments are satisfactory to induce long-
term adoption of SLM practices, longer-term payments may still be desirable 
because of the conditionality they allow on other land use decisions, such as 
preventing burning fields or cutting trees in other parts of the farm. Cases in 
which short-term payments are sufficient are thus likely to be the exception rather 
than the rule.  
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As the findings of this chapter have revealed, opportunity costs and transaction 
costs incurred by the service provider in the adoption of SLM practices constitute 
fundamental concern for the adoption and implementation of agricultural based 
PES programs in developing countries. The findings have revealed that, while the 
participants of EPWS program receive cash payments to cover their transaction 
and opportunity costs in addition to other non-financial incentives such as 
training, manure and farm tools, a significant preference was placed on the non-
cash incentives over cash-ones. However, while non-cash incentives constitute 
cash implications, it is likely that the program participants do not take them into 
account as additional incentives to the received cash incentive.  
 
 Other studies have also reported the dissatisfaction of service providers with 
cash incentives to cover their transaction and opportunity costs and their 
preference has been for non-cash incentives (Dudley et al., 2007; Kosoy et al., 
2008). This could imply that service providers are open to a broader 
conceptualization of PES and are willing to participate without cash payments. 
Farmer motivation for participation is inclined towards non-cash incentives which 
support the acquisition of farm inputs such as manure, hoes, machetes and 
spades, training and extension services which are expected to enhance 
participation by poor service providers.  
 
While this may be the case, cash incentives are inevitably important to cover the 
participants’ opportunity costs for the first few years of adoption of improved land 
management practices (Wunder and Börner, 2011a). Essentially, cash incentives 
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are necessary to cover the foregone incomes of farmers from the activities they 
would have undertaken without PES. For example, in the EPWS program, cash 
payments are intended to cover the opportunity costs of the adoption of SLM 
practices for the first four years. After this time, the benefits from some of these 
practices are expected to cover the opportunity costs of participation.  
 
In view of the transaction and opportunity costs of the EPWS program, one can 
argue that PES programs in agricultural land are expensive and technically 
complex when compared to forest based PES programs. The main argument 
here is that, when PES programs require land use modification such as the 
adoption of new technologies, they tend to be more complex and cost ineffective 
than when they require farmers to do nothing on contracted land as in forest 
protection PES programs. Thus, dealing with transaction costs in use-modifying 
PES programs is much harder than in use-diverting programs (Wunder, 2007; 
Wunder and Börner, 2011a). High transaction costs in use-modifying PES arise 
from the costs of organising service providers in prime agricultural areas with 
higher population densities than in forest margins. In order to reduce transaction 
costs involved in contracting individual farmers for PES programs implemented 
on agro-ecosystems, the aggregation of land owners under village authorities is 
essential. Apart from helping to reduce transaction costs, the approach helps to 
deal with land tenure issues in places where land rights are under village 
authorities (Lopa et al., 2012). The use of village authorities to monitor 
compliance of adopted practices, would thus reduce monitoring costs likely to be 
commonly encountered in agro-ecosystem PES programs where remote sensing, 
often considered cheap, is less feasible (Wunder, 2007). Additionally, the use of 
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local trained paraprofessional technical partners is essential to reduce transaction 
costs and sustain the provision of extension services to farmers.  
 
6.9 Conclusion  
This chapter evaluates the environmental effectiveness of the equitable 
payments for watershed services (EPWS) program in terms of its additionality 
and leakage effects as well as sustainability and cost effectiveness to provide 
water service (water quality and quantity) to downstream water users. Using 
mixed methods quasi-experimental research design with propensity score 
matching method, the counterfactual effect of the program from the data collected 
from both program participants and non-participants was established.  
 
The findings illustrate that the program have had additionality effects, positive 
leakages and promising sustainability of adopted SLM practices as well as 
positive measures for cost effectiveness. On additionality, the findings show that, 
the land under agro-forestry and reforestation practices increased by 6.92% 
amongst program participants. Also, more program participants use organic 
fertilizer, practice integrated pest management and plant woodlots. In addition, 
the program has also resulted in positive leakages such as decreased incidences 
of forest fire, forest encroachment and illegal logging. On sustainability, the 
findings show that once established, SLM practices are privately more profitable 
to farmers and so are likely to be retained after the program has been phased 
out. The main reason for this is based on the future value expected from the 
adoption of SLM practices such as increased crop output from constructed 
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terraces and manure, fire wood and timber products from agro-forestry and 
afforestation interventions. In this context, PES payments could be a catalyst tool 
to foster investment in improved and sustainable land-use practices.  
 
The findings of the study suggest that the EPWS program participation has 
managed to generate additional conservation whereby the percent of land under 
agro-forestry and reforestation and number of conservation approaches have 
increased as a result of the program. While the additionality effect of the EPWS 
program is significant, there is considerable likelihood that the effect could be 
much higher given the fact that the control group were selected from the same 
population as the treatment group. This control group might have been affected 
by the effect of ‘neighbourhood’, whereby farmers tend to copy technology or 
acquire information about a particular technology from their neighbours. The 
comparison of the impacts with program participants/treatment group and non-
participants/control group in the same area can potentially underestimate the 
reported impact of the program in terms of the program additionality.  
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 Chapter 7: Discussion  
7.1 Introduction 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) are being promoted to support 
environmental stewardship in agricultural and forest landscapes, and to 
contribute to poverty reduction in developing countries (Pagiola and Platais, 
2007). However, in Sub-Saharan Africa, and Tanzania in particular, limited 
research has been conducted to understand the effectiveness of PES programs 
implemented on agro-ecosystems to achieve poverty alleviation and 
environmental conservation objectives (Ferraro, 2009b; Branca et al., 2011).  
Also, there is significant lack of rigorous evaluation of conservation instruments 
that create inferences about unobserved counterfactual outcomes that would 
have occurred without the intervention due to non-random nature of the design of 
many of conservation instruments – i.e. PES programs and ICDPs (Ferraro and 
Simpson., 2002; Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; Wunder, 2007; Ferraro, 2009a; 
Margoluis et al., 2009; Tacconi et al., 2010; Djamhuri, 2012). As such, it is 
increasingly important to conduct rigorous evaluation studies to understand 
whether these objectives are achieved.  
 
The data presented in this thesis are specific to the EPWS program implemented 
in Kibungo ward of Morogoro Region in Tanzania. This case study shed light on 
the effectiveness of an agro-ecosystem PES program by considering the 
participation of the poor and factors that affect participation (chapter 4) as well as 
livelihood outcomes (chapter 5) and conservation outcomes (chapter 6). The use 
of case study, mixed methods quasi-experimental research with moderately high 
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external validity, the design permits some generalizability of findings (Vaessen et 
al., 2007; Margoluis et al., 2009). Therefore, the study extends on the literature 
that applies rigorous methods to the evaluation of agro-environmental PES 
programs and conservation instruments in general. This study comes at a time 
when there are many calls for more rigorous evaluation of conservation 
instruments that look for what works and what does not to ensure scarce financial 
resources for conservation are used on what works (Ferraro and Pattanayak, 
2006; Ferraro, 2009a; Pattanayak et al., 2010; Miteva et al., 2012).  
 
The findings and arguments presented in the previous three chapters as well as 
the literature reviews in chapter two are brought together in this chapter. Starting 
with the methodological reflections, then summary of the findings, the sections 
after review each of the research objectives set at the start of this thesis. 
Objectives one, two and three are revisited in respect of the main results, the 
contribution this has made to the literature, and how these findings have 
advanced knowledge in this area. Synthesising the results from these three 
objectives enables discussion of the overall contribution of this thesis, specifically 
how the formation of farmer groups, labour exchange, formation of trust, 
information, training of paraprofessionals and non-cash payments are crucial to 
consider in the design and implementation of PES programs in agro-ecosystems 
to achieve poverty reduction and conservation objectives. Through this 
discussion, it is argued that the poor who are eligible can participate in agro-
ecosystem PES programs and that their livelihoods and conservation behaviour 
can change for better than non-participants. 
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7.2 Methodological Reflections  
In achieving research objectives presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 successfully, a 
mixed methods quasi-experimental research design with propensity score 
matching was used. A household survey, focus group discussions and key 
informant interviews were used to collect data from the EPWS program 
participating and non-participating households. The mixed method approach, 
used throughout the research, permitted flexibility in data collection whilst 
retaining rigour through triangulation of data sources and gathering of in-depth 
and rich data. The use of quasi-experimental mixed method research design with 
propensity score matching permits the following methodological reflections.  
 
Firstly, the integration of concepts from technology adoption, impact evaluation, 
livelihoods and environmental conservation literature to generate research 
question, guide data collection and analysis processes facilitated the 
understanding of the effectiveness of an agro ecosystem PES program. This 
integrated approach has enabled the understanding of landholders’ participation 
and the determinants of EPWS program participation (Chapter 4), direct and 
indirect financial and non-financial livelihood outcomes of the EPWS program 
(Chapter 5) and the environmental effectiveness of the program in terms of 
additionality, leakage, permanence and cost effectiveness in the supply of water 
ecosystem services (Chapter 6).  
 
Secondly, the evaluation of intermediate outcomes of the intervention that occur 
earlier, for which information is available and easier to measure helped to 
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overcome time lag challenge involved in evaluating conservation impacts that 
occur outside the program or project time frame (Kapos et al., 2008; Kapos et al., 
2009; Kapos et al., 2010). This approach carries forward efforts of devising 
feasible approaches required for rigorous evaluation of conservation program 
including PES programs when evaluation of long term impacts is not feasible. 
The study findings add to the limited literature on the evaluation of intermediate 
outcomes of PES programs implemented in agro ecosystems in Tanzania and 
Sub-Saharan Africa in general.  
 
Thirdly, quasi-experimental research design with propensity score matching 
helped to address attribution challenge involved in the comparison of outcomes 
of program participants (treatment group) with the outcomes of non-participants 
(control group) due to the lack of baseline data.  Also, the use of propensity score 
matching helped to address the selection bias challenge between the treatment 
and control group to facilitate the understanding of the causal effects 
mechanisms of the treatment on outcomes (Ferraro and Pressey, 2015). In 
addition, the use of independent – samples t-test carried out using SPSS for 
windows helped to identify the significance of differences between program 
participants and non-participants on various attributes of environmental and 
livelihood effectiveness.  
 
Fourthly, the use of mixed methods in chapters 5 and 6 helped to address spatial 
scale and leakage challenge between the area at which the intervention is 
implemented and areas where effects or benefits are expected and between the 
outcomes of treated and non-treated households within the intervention area.  
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Also, mixed methods enhance deeper understanding of the rigorously generated 
evidence of the effectiveness of an intervention, by expanding on why and how 
intervention works or does not work, and under what circumstances in order to 
inform improvement or revisions. Furthermore, the use of mixed methods 
approach through sequential integration of quantitative (i.e. a logistic regression 
model to investigate the significant factors that determine a farmer’s decision to 
participate in the EPWS program) and qualitative methods in chapter four 
enhanced detailed understanding of the quantitative findings.   For example, 
while the quantitative approach was useful for showing the participation of the 
poor and factors that determined program participation, qualitative methods 
enriched these findings by showing why and how the poor have been able to 
participate in the program.  
 
Fifthly, the use of mixed methods quasi-experimental research design with 
propensity score matching carries forward the efforts of devising feasible 
methods required for rigorous evaluation of conservation program including PES 
programs.  Also, the use of quasi-experimental and propensity score matching 
approach to investigate the livelihood and environmental outcomes of the EPWS 
program in this thesis has significantly contributed to the understanding of how to 
implement rigorous, ex-post, empirical outcome evaluations of PES conservation 
programs. The use of rigorous ex-post impact evaluation studies are extremely 
needed to ensure that the limited financial, human, and political resources 
devoted to conservation programs are put to good use that works (Ferraro and 
Pattanayak, 2006; Pattanayak et al., 2010; Tacconi et al., 2010; Blackman, 2013; 
Ferraro and Pressey, 2015). The following sections revisit the objectives and 
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synthesis of the key findings and explore the implication for agro-ecosystem PES 
programs. 
7.3 Summary of Findings 
The thesis consists of three chapters which address three objectives. Chapter 4 
shows that the eligible poor households are participating in the program and that 
household farm size, access to information, perceptions of the participatory 
nature of the program design and the magnitude of change in required farm 
management are positive determinants of a farmer’s decision to participate in the 
EPWS program. Although the poor are participating in the EPWS program, their 
ability to adopt some of SLM practices such as terraces seems to be challenged 
by initial investment costs such as manure and the opportunity costs of foregone 
incomes due to the time lag before the systems become productive, particularly 
during the first few years after constructing terraces. Furthermore, the findings 
demonstrate that early adopters have influenced their neighbours to adopt SLM 
practices in the EPWS program.  
 
Chapter 5 shows that the EPWS program has both direct and indirect financial 
and non-financial impacts on participants compared to non-participants. Also, 
with regard to poverty and gender equity questions, the study finds that the poor 
and women have not been made worse in terms of their household’s average 
number of cash income, share of cash income from different sources and 
average cash income as a result of their participation in the EPWS program. 
Overall, direct financial payments are the most obvious impact of PES for 
program participants (Pagiola et al., 2005; Molnar et al., 2008). EPWS conditional 
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payments ranged between US$8-US$48. However, they were considered an 
important source of cash income to farmers that adopted SLM practices. The 
programs’ indirect financial benefits included increased land value, sources of 
income, average annual income, and harvests of crops such as maize, beans, 
bananas and sweet potatoes as well as livestock such as chickens and goats 
amongst the program participants. Furthermore, for non-financial impacts, the 
program has resulted in a significant increase in the amount of training and 
relationships of trust amongst program participants. On the other hand, the 
findings show that the increase in land value has reduced access to land 
amongst landless households who used to rent idle land.  
 
Finally, chapter 6 presents the findings on the effectiveness of the EPWS 
program in terms of its additionality and leakage effects as well as its potential for 
sustainability and cost effectiveness in the supply of water ecosystem services. 
The main findings in this chapter are the following. Firstly, the findings on 
additionality effects of the program show positive and significant change in the 
behaviour of program participants on the increase in the number of conservation 
approaches practiced by a household. The program has also increased the 
proportion of program participants planting woodlot/trees on their farm after 
EPWS program, and those who use organic fertilizers and practice integrated 
pest management systems (Table 6.2). Also, program participants have more 
(7.92%) land under agro-forestry and reforestation practices that could not be 
achieved without the EPWS program. Secondly, finding on the leakage effects of 
the program shows considerable decrease in the incidences of fire, 
encroachment into the forest for agriculture and illegal forest logging in 2011 
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compared to 2008 before the program began. Thirdly, while PES payments were 
considered insufficient to cover the costs incurred, the program participants were 
willing to maintain SLM practices because of the realized and future benefits such 
as increased crop yields from terracing and future benefits of planting trees such 
as timber harvests, soil fertility, fire wood and fruits. Fourthly, on cost 
effectiveness, the use of trained paraprofessionals, and contracting village 
authorities for aggregated individual land owners and monitoring compliance 
minimised transaction costs. Also, lack of manure, delayed and insuficient 
payments constrained program participation and adoption of terraces. 
Additionally, manure, improved seeds, local and external training and extension 
services are more important to service providers than cash PES payments. 
7.4 Synthesis of Findings across Result Chapters  
So far, as shown in the summary of findings (7.2), the findings in Chapter 4 have 
identified a set of factors that influence participation in the EPWS program. 
Chapters 5 and 6 report the direct and indirect financial and non-financial 
livelihood and environmental outcomes of the program respectively. This section 
integrates the main findings from these three result chapters to discuss the 
empirical and theoretical contribution of the findings on the participation of the 
poor and the determinants of participation, as well as livelihood and 
environmental outcomes of a PES program in agro-ecosystems.  
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7.4.1  Revisiting Objective one:  to examine Participation and the 
Factors which Determine Participation Decision in the EPWS 
Program. 
Chapter four addressed objective 1 and investigated the participation of 
households in the EPWS program and the factors that determined program 
participation. The assessment of whether the poor are participating in PES 
programs was vital because, in developing countries, the need for PES programs 
to achieve poverty reduction is one of its vital objectives (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; 
Pagiola and Platais, 2005; Porras et al., 2008). This assessment contributes to 
empirical evaluations gap that assess the participation of poor households and 
factors that determine participation decision in PES programs implemented on 
agricultural land in sub-Saharan Africa and developing countries in general. 
 
The analysis within the chapter built on the results in chapter 4 shows that the 
relatively poor but eligible households are participating in the EPWS program and 
their participation has not been limited to the simpler practices such as agro-
forestry but they have also been involved in the construction of terraces. 
However, it is important to note that participation in some PES programs like 
EPWS program is limited to households that are eligible to participate because 
payments are made for service provisions or undertaking land use practices that 
provide services (Pagiola et al., 2005). In the EPWS program, payments were 
only released after the verification of establishment of agreed SLM practice, 
meaning that implemented practices formed the basis of payments (Lopa et al., 
2012).  
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Participation of poor in PES programs has been reported elsewhere by Pagiola et 
al. (2010) in a silvopastoral PES program in Colombia where poor households 
were able to keep up with their wealthier counterparts in terms of program 
participation. However, there are some empirical findings which contribute to the 
identification of specific factors that tend to affect program participation and 
technology adoption decision. One of these is the access to information and 
technical assistance as demonstrated by EPWS program and other studies 
elsewhere (Adesina et al., 2000; Adesina and Chianu, 2002; Pattanayak et al., 
2003; Zbinden and Lee, 2005). However, access to information was very much 
linked to the attributes of the program. According to Kosoy et al.,(2008), 
attributes of a PES program are important in influencing farmer’s decision to 
participate. In the EPWS program, public meeting conducted in program villages 
and local training workshops provided information needed by farmers to make 
participation decisions.  
 
Another empirical contribution with regard to the understanding of the influence of 
program attributes in affecting program participation and adoption decision is the 
program inclusiveness or participation of farmers in the program design phase 
(Chapter 4). Kosoy et al.,(2008) show that farmer participation in program design 
is an important attribute which can critically determine the extent to which a PES 
program is voluntary. This is a vital attribute because participation of farmers in 
the design phase of the program develops their trust and a sense of program 
ownership (Biggs and Farrington, 1991; Murdoch and Marsden, 1995; Kosoy et 
al., 2008; Man and Sadiya, 2009; Asmah, 2011).   
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Further empirical contribution to understanding factors that affect program 
participation with regard to program attributes is made by the finding that 
availability and access to technical assistance is vital in program participation 
decision and adoption of SLM practices. The importance of efficient technical 
assistance in the adoption of SLM practices is widely recognized (Tacconi et al., 
2010; Branca et al., 2011). According to Kosoy et al. (2008), successful adoption 
of SLM practices requires sufficient qualified technical staffs. As demonstrated 
by the finding in Chapter 5, the availability and access to technical assistance 
through EPWS program activities was an important ingredient for the adoption 
of SLM practices. The program built the capacity of local technical staffs 
through training programs and collaborations between government and non-
government institutions working in Kibungo Juu ward through regular meeting. As 
such, program’s technical staffs stationed in the program villages played an 
important role in providing technical assistance to the farmers and training 
paraprofessionals were considered relatively more acceptable and accessible 
locally. These program attributes are vital because program participation and 
adoption decisions are often preceded by awareness or learning period (Agarwal 
and Prasad, 1998). 
 
Additional empirical contribution made by the finding is that household land sizes 
(Chapter 4) affects farmers’ program participation decision and their flexibility to 
adopt some SLM practices introduced in agro-ecosystems PES program. The 
influence of household land size is widely reported in other studies on program 
participation and adoption of agricultural technologies (Lasley and Nolan, 1981; 
Nowak, 1987; Ayuk, 1997; Ur-Rehman and Chisholm, 2007; Yiridoe et al., 2010). 
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For example, in studies such as  Tenge et al.(2005) in Tanzania and Amsalu and 
De Graaff (2007) in Ethiopia, farm size is identified as a significant factor that 
influences the adoption of soil and water conservation measures.  
 
Farm size can significantly constrain farmers’ flexibility in terms of distributing 
land into different SLM practices and thus be limited to adopt some practices in 
agro-ecosystem PES programs. Flexibility is an important advantage that farmers 
with a large farm (often rich) have over farmers with a small farm (often poor). 
However, while household land size can significantly determine program 
participation, land tenure, particularly customary land tenure, prohibits 
implementation of permanent structures such as construction of terraces and tree 
planting (i.e. agro forestry, reforestation and afforestation). This means that, there 
will be some people with large farm sizes who may not be able to participate in 
some PES programs.  
 
Another vital empirical contribution to the understanding of the factors that can 
affect participation and adoption of some SLM practices in agro-ecosystem PES 
program is the importance of farmer groups in assisting adoption of difficult SLM 
practices. In the EPWS program, the construction of bench terraces and “fanya 
juu” terraces were considered very difficult without extra external labour 
assistance in some households (Chapter 4). However, through farmer groups 
formed to encourage work collaborations, members including the poor were able 
to construct terraces and livestock sheds through labour exchange. Farmer 
groups are widely acknowledged to enhance technology adoption (Norman et al., 
1988; Loevinsohn et al., 1994; Barham and Chitemi, 2009). In Uganda, Kenya 
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and Ethiopia, farmer groups have enhanced capacity building among farmers, 
promoted more market-oriented production, improved social assets, increased 
savings and credit, changed the mindset of extension service providers, 
influenced rural development, contributed to the national extension policy, 
increased transparency, and balanced gender participation (Abaru et al., 2006).  
 
More empirical contribution in the understanding of the participation of the poor in 
agro-ecosystem PES program is that while the poor can participate in the 
program and construct SLM practices such as bench terraces and “fanya juu” 
terraces, they can be significantly constrained by initial establishment and 
maintenance costs. Initial establishment costs include costs for inputs like 
manure and improved seeds, while maintenance costs include costs incurred 
during the transition phase from conventional agricultural practices to the time 
adopted SLM practices become profitable. Small payments that are insufficient to 
cover these costs and conditional payments in which payments are made after 
verification of implemented practices present major concern regarding the 
adoption of SLM practices in agro-ecosystem PES program by the poor (Chapter 
6).  Without adequate economic incentives, poor farmers could encounter 
temporary negative economic returns which may greatly hinder them from 
benefiting from SLM practices. 
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7.4.2  Revisiting Objective Two: to Evaluate the Livelihood 
Outcomes of the EPWS Program on Program Participants 
Compared to Non-participants.  
Objective two was addressed in chapter five where quasi-experimental and 
mixed methods research design with propensity score matching methods were 
used to investigate the direct and indirect livelihood outcomes of the EPWS 
program. The analysis within the chapter built on the results in chapter five, with 
the main empirical contribution that -  while PES mechanism was not designed 
for poverty alleviation (Pagiola et al., 2005), evidence from the EPWS program 
demonstrate positive and significant improvement in the livelihoods of the 
program participants compared to non-participants. Direct and indirect financial 
and non-financial outcomes for program participants are more than for non-
participants. This is not surprising because, as demonstrated by Pagiola et al., 
(2005) and Wunder (2005), PES programs generate more benefits to the 
households that participate. Payments or rewards under PES are conditional on 
the provision of ecosystem services or undertaking land uses likely to provide 
ecosystem services (Wunder, 2005; Cole, 2010).  
 
Another empirical contribution made by the finding is on the understanding of the 
preference of farmers on non-cash payments over cash payments when PES 
programs are implemented on agro-ecosystem landscapes. Evidence showed 
that while the received payments constituted an important part of a household’s 
cash earnings, there was significant preference for non-cash incentives such as 
improved seeds, manure and training which were offered by EPWS program to 
the participants. However, preference on non-cash payments does not suggest 
that cash payments were completely not important. In the EPWS program, cash 
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PES payments were considered an important source of a household’s cash 
income with high degree of spending flexibility. Some recipients of these 
payments invested their money in productive assets such as chickens and goats 
and on improving houses, buying clothes, radios, and furniture as well as pay 
school fees and purchase improved seed.  
 
Cash payments in PES programs are vital because they are easily convertible 
into local goods and services as prioritized by the receiver (Pagiola et al., 2005; 
Pagiola et al., 2010). Financial capital is recognised as the most flexible form of 
capital and is known to reduce household vulnerability through its relatively 
straightforward conversion into other forms of capital (Ellis, 2000b). It can be 
invested in both farm and non-farm assets that permit diversification and income 
generation (Ellis et al., 2003). In studies for the livelihood impacts of PES 
programs in Cidanau watershed program implemented in West Java, Indonesia 
(Leimona et al., 2010), Nhambita Community Carbon Project located in Sofala 
Province, Mozambique (Jindal, 2010), and Regional Integrated Silvopastoral 
Ecosystem Management Project, implemented at sites in Colombia, Nicaragua 
and Costa Rica (Rios and Pagiola, 2010), cash PES payments were found to 
play important role in household transactions. For example, the Mozambique 
case reports that, although small, PES income in lump-sum enabled investment 
in things such as land, home improvement, payments of debts and for medical 
services (Jindal et al., 2010).  
 
Additional empirical contribution of the finding is that intervention activities such 
as local and external training programs are essential in improving non-monetary 
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livelihoods of program participants such as capacity building on technical 
knowledge, social capital enhancement and community visibility. Training course 
on the variety of SLM practices that the program participants in the EPWS 
program went through enhanced their awareness of PES and its environmental 
benefits, land management, governance of local organisations, and business 
development skills. Furthermore, social capital enhanced through community 
associations such as farmer networks and farmer groups helped farmers to 
overcome challenges involved in implementing SLM practices as well as 
developing priorities and guiding developmental activities in the community. 
Strong social capital helps to reduce the transaction costs of PES programs and 
provide other social benefits (Tacconi et al., 2010).  
 
Another contribution of the finding is the understanding that immediate benefits of 
PES intervention on agro-ecosystem landscape and expected future benefits of 
undertaking SLM practices such as planting trees for timber, fuel wood and fruits 
motivated landholders to use their previous idle land. As a consequence, the 
landless and the small landowners suffer from reduced access to once idle, 
uncultivated land and marginal lands put into use by the landowners because of 
promised benefits from PES payments and savings for future generation. This 
has also been reported by German et al. (2010) in the Bushenyi District in 
Uganda where access to land among the landless was reduced as a result of the 
expansion of forest carbon sequestration in the Trees for Global Benefits 
Programme.  
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Although PES programs are not typically designed with the goal of poverty 
alleviation, the evidence indicated that EPWS program provided the service 
providers with many benefits including direct and indirect financial and non 
financial resources to women and the poor. This study suggests that there is no 
sufficient evidence that women and the poor will be worse in terms of reducing 
their household’s average number of cash income, share of cash income from 
different sources and average cash income as a result of their participation in a 
PES program implemented on agro-ecosystems. 
 
However, the participation and share of outcomes for women is less than for 
men; the fact which is largely correlated to land ownership (Englert, 2008; 
García-Amado et al., 2011). Notwithstanding these land ownership facts, findings 
demonstrate in part that the program has established compensation mechanism 
that take into account the needs and priorities of marginalized and poor people 
who are eligible to participate in the program to improve their quality of life and 
contribute to poverty reduction (Lopa and Mwanyoka, 2010). These efforts need 
to be enhanced given the important role that women play in rural land-use 
management such as in water and soil conservation in agriculture and 
afforestation to improve their access, ownership and control over land.  
 
7.4.3  Revisiting Objective Three: to Evaluate the Effectiveness of 
the EPWS Program in Terms of its Additionality and Leakage 
Effects as well as its Potential  for Sustainability a nd Cost 
Effectiveness in the Supply of Water Ecosystem Services.  
Chapter 6 addressed objective 3 and investigated the effectiveness of the EPWS 
program through intermediate outcomes likely to indicate the potential of the 
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intervention to increase quantity and quality of water supply downstream. In doing 
so, quasi-experimental and mixed methods research design with propensity 
score matching technique was developed to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
intervention in terms of its additionality and leakage effects, as well as 
sustainability or permanence of induced behaviour change and the effectiveness 
of the associated cost (transaction and opportunity costs). This approach helped 
to overcome attribution problem and other evaluation challenges such as time lag 
between the intervention and realization of measurable impacts, lack of 
appropriate baseline data and scale and dynamics of interventions (Ferraro, 
2009a; Prowse and Snilstveit, 2010). 
 
The analysis provided empirical evidence regarding the additionality effect of the 
EPWS intervention. Additionality is one of the key attributes of an effective PES 
program in delivering ecosystem services (Wunder, 2007) which concern service 
buyers as they seek to make payments on practices that would not have 
happened without intervention (2007; 2008). The findings in Chapter 6 suggest 
that a PES program implemented on agro-ecosystem landscape can ensure 
delivery of ecosystem services such as improved water quality and quantity 
service by enhancing the implementation of SLM practices.  Evidence in this 
study shows that compared to non-participants, EPWS program participants have 
6.92% higher land under agro-forestry and reforestation practices that would 
have happened without the program. Also, program participants have undertaken 
more SLM practices than non-participants. In addition, the program had more 
spillage outcomes (positive externalities) than leakages (negative externalities) 
from decreased incidences of fire, forest encroachment and illegal loggings which 
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are other indicators that the EPWS program is potentially effective in the 
improvement of water quality and quantity supply downstream. 
 
Another empirical contribution of the finding is that the sustainability of behaviour 
change or supply of ecosystem services in agro-ecosystem PES program is not 
exclusively dependent on PES payments. PES literature shows that conditional 
payments is a fundamental feature of PES programs which affect permanence or 
sustainability of service provision (Wunder, 2007; Engel et al., 2008; Jack et al., 
2008; Tacconi et al., 2010; Tacconi et al., 2011). This feature was employed in 
the EPWS program, where payments were only released after the verification of 
establishment of agreed SLM practices (Lopa et al., 2012). Despite this 
establishment and challenges like delay of payments and low payments identified 
by program participant, a good number of program participants (73%) expressed 
willingness to continue the implementation of SLM practices while 62% of non-
participants were planning to join the program.  
 
The analysis of the findings suggests that SLM practices for improving quantity 
and quality of ecosystem services introduced through PES are likely to be 
permanent or sustainable when behaviour change or land uses desired for 
service provision by service users are the practices desired by service providers 
(Wunder, 2007; Pattanayak et al., 2010). In the EPWS program, the construction 
of terraces was enhancing farm profitability by maintaining soil nutrients on site 
and increasing crop productivity (Branca et al., 2011; Lopa et al., 2012). Also, 
practices such as agro forestry, afforestation and reforestation were increasing 
the water holding capacity of land, while the trees planted under the program are 
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beneficial (i.e. provide green-manure, fruits, timber, and other non-timber 
products) to households who are then likely to find it worthwhile maintaining them 
(Reynolds et al., 2010; Branca et al., 2011; Lopa et al., 2012). Furthermore, as 
Chapter 5 finding shows, expected benefits from high value crops such as 
tomatoes, beans, groundnuts and livestock are added incentives for 
implementing SLM practices even without payments. Benefits that those farmers 
who joined the program earlier had started to notice through crop production 
increase, (Chapter 5) are important motivations behind enrolment and likely 
permanence or sustainability of the implemented SLM practices. 
7.5 Scaling-up and Transferability of Findings 
An important issue within the evaluation of the effectiveness of an agro 
ecosystem PES program and within development and conservation community is 
the transferability and scaling up of lessons learnt from a local case study. 
Identifying lessons to be learnt from case study research in order to inform the 
design and implementation of PES conservation initiatives in other agro 
ecosystem landscapes is vital for conservation and development practitioners in 
developing countries. This is particularly important for those developing countries 
with the interest of designing and implementing PES programs in agro 
ecosystems to achieve poverty alleviation and supply of ecosystem services 
through SLM practices. 
 
By carrying out evaluation of an effectiveness of an agro ecosystem PES 
program, it was possible to investigate whether there are generic findings that 
may have implications for other agro ecosystem landscapes in the region and 
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beyond. These types of findings can be commonly scaled up from the case study 
to their larger archetypal livelihood region in Tanzania, sub Saharan Africa and 
other developing countries, in particular for the design and implementation of 
PES for people located at the margins of biodiversity rich areas and on steep 
slope watersheds, whose primary income source is small scale agriculture. Areas 
like these can be considered as the larger archetypal livelihood region of this 
study. In many developing countries, agricultural lands managed by the poor (i.e. 
low-income people) are often located at the margins of biodiversity rich areas and 
on steep slopes in watersheds (Adams et al., 2004; FAO, 2007b; Bulte et al., 
2008; Branca et al., 2011). For example, Nelson and Chomitz (2007) shows that 
in Honduras and Guatemala, about 70% of areas in 77 most sensitive 
watersheds explored were inhabited by the poor. 
 
Many of the communities in these landscapes experience almost the same 
challenges that impede the uptake of SLM practices despite their ecological, 
social and economic benefits (Liniger et al., 2011).  These challenges include 
knowledge gaps due to the lack of access, and inadequate training of local 
extension officers (TerrAfrica, 2007) and short term opportunity costs due to 
negative economic returns associated with the transition phase from conventional 
agricultural to more sustainable practices with long run economic returns (FAO, 
2007a; Liniger et al., 2011). For example, during the transition to new practices 
such as terraces, yields tend to vary or even decrease significantly as production 
systems adjust to a new equilibrium (Graff-Zivin and Lipper, 2008; Giller et al., 
2009). These costs lead to negative adoption behaviour on the part of poor 
landholders who may be confronted with higher risk aversion, higher discount 
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rates and less capacity to make investments (Graff-Zivin and Lipper, 2008). Other 
challenges are low education levels (Graff-Zivin and Lipper, 2008), access to 
financial facilities to support up-front investment costs of input costs such as 
labour and fertilizers or manure (FAO, 2007b; TerrAfrica, 2007) and insecure land 
tenure that decreases the ability of a landholder to capture the future benefits of 
making investments in land productivity (Antle and Diagana, 2003).  
 
Given the advantage of quasi-experimental research design with moderately high 
external validity that permits some generalizability of findings (Vaessen et al., 
2007; Margoluis et al., 2009), this section integrates the main findings from the 
three result chapters to discuss the implication of the findings and lessons that 
can be learnt for the design and implementation of PES on agro-ecosystem 
landscapes in developing countries perspective. While the eligible poor have 
been found to participate in the EPWS program and though their participation is 
not limited to the simpler practices, one should not jump to the sanguine 
conclusion that all eligible poor households everywhere will always be able to 
participate in agro ecosystem PES programs. There may be cases where eligible 
poor households may find it impossible or difficult to participate as a result of 
local institutional and specific PES program attributes (Chapter 4) (Kosoy et al., 
2008). The analysis of the factors that affect program participation as identified in 
this study can help to inform the design of agro-ecosystem PES programs to 
reduce potential impediments to the participation of the eligible poor households.  
 
Ensuring availability and access to information, technical assistance and local 
and external training programs as well as building community associations such 
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as farmer networks and farmer groups as demonstrated by EPWS program is 
vital for enhancing program participation decision, adoption of SLM practices and 
livelihood as well as environmental benefits. Public meeting conducted in 
program villages during the program design phase and local training workshops 
are fundamental mechanism through which to enhance information needs by 
farmers to make participation decisions as well as to build their trust and feel of 
program ownership. As the successful adoption of SLM practices require 
sufficiently qualified technical staff who may be employed by a PES program as 
technical staffs, training and building the capacity at the local level for 
paraprofessional is vital for they are considered easily accessible and would 
ensure permanence of the availability and access to technical knowledge after 
the program life time given the short life span of many PES programs. Capacity 
building should be focused on tangible aspects of the specific PES program and 
problems that put barriers at the local level in implementing PES, particularly lack 
of right information about the concept of PES and the implementation of different 
types of SLM practices such as knowledge of where and how to construct 
different types of terraces and types of trees to plant and their management.  
  
As the analysis of the findings has shown, SLM practices in PES program 
implemented in agro-ecosystem landscapes may be attractive to farmers, but 
lack of upfront investment and maintenance costs may be limiting their uptake 
and up scaling of new practices. As such, upfront investment financing is 
essential for initial establishment and maintenance costs to farmers who face 
constraints to capital, and who lack a supply of new required inputs or markets for 
new outputs (Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007). This suggests that when upfront 
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investment financing is available and improved SLM practices are very attractive 
to farmers, where payments could function as a transitory adoption subsidy 
(Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 2001). Upfront investment financing should consider 
farmer preferences as some farmers would prefer non-cash payments such as 
improved seeds and manure over cash payments. 
 
Dealing with transaction costs in use-modifying PES programs is considered 
much harder than in use-diverting programs (Wunder, 2007; Wunder and Börner, 
2011a). High transaction costs in use-modifying PES arise from the costs of 
organising service providers in prime agricultural areas with higher population 
densities than in forest margins. In order to reduce transaction costs involved in 
contracting individual farmers for PES programs implemented on agro-
ecosystems, the aggregation of land owners under village authorities is essential. 
Apart from helping to reduce transaction costs, the approach helps to deal with 
land tenure issues in places where land rights are under village authorities (Lopa 
et al., 2012). The use of village authorities to monitor compliance of adopted 
practices, would thus reduce monitoring costs likely to be commonly encountered 
in agro-ecosystem PES programs where remote sensing, often considered 
cheap, is less feasible (Wunder, 2007). Additionally, the use of local trained 
paraprofessional technical partners is essential to reduce transaction costs and 
sustain the provision of extension services to farmers.  
 
To ensure permanence and sustainability of behaviour change and supply of 
ecosystem services in agro-ecosystem PES programs, programs should ensure 
that SLM practices introduced for service provision are the practices desired by 
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service providers (Wunder, 2007; Pattanayak et al., 2010). This requires flexibility 
that provides options to allow landholders to choose from a range of SLM 
practices which are suitable to their land. For example, the menu of SLM 
practices offered by EPWS program comprised practices such as terraces (fanya 
juu and fanya chini terraces), grass strips, trash lines, afforestation, contour 
bunds, riparian reforestation and agro forestry with timber, firewood and fruit 
trees). Mixing SLM practices, particularly planting multi-purpose tree species 
ensures that, as the trees mature, farmers can fulfil many of their timber and non-
timber requirements such as fodder, firewood and fruits from their farmlands, thus 
reducing leakage effects that involve forest encroachment.  
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 Chapter 8: Conclusions 
8.1 Summary of Contributions  
This thesis has examined participation and livelihood and environmental 
outcomes of an agro ecosystem PES program implemented in Morogoro, 
Tanzania.  The case-study approach has combined mixed methods quasi 
experimental approach and propensity score matching technique to prioritise 
rigorous attribution of the livelihood and environmental outcomes of the 
intervention, which remain under-utilized in evaluation of conservation 
interventions.  Mixed-methods were used throughout the data collection and 
analysis of the data enabling triangulation of data, and the flexibility that is 
necessary to understand the effectiveness of a conservation intervention. 
Therefore, using the case study of the EPWS program in Tanzania, this 
thesis has provided empirical evidence on the potential of an agro-ecosystem 
PES program to provide ecosystem services and achieve poverty reduction 
as well as factors that can affect program participation and adoption of SLM 
practices.  
 
While assessing the factors that affect program participation and adoption of 
SLM practices, Chapter 4 highlights that farm size, access to information, 
participation of farmers in the design phase and the change in farm 
management required by the program significantly influence the landholder’s 
decision to participate in the EPWS program. Participation of the poor 
households who are eligible (landholders) and able to participate in the 
EPWS program are implementing SLM practices and they are not limited to 
the simple practices but they are also constructing terraces. Farmer groups 
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formed in association with the EPWS program have facilitated construction of 
terraces and work collaborations among members. Ideally, the formation of 
farmer groups along with the implementation of SLM practices through PES 
is vital to facilitate work collaborations in a more effective way.  
 
Assessing the direct and indirect financial and non financial outcomes of the 
EPWS program (Chapter 5), this thesis demonstrates that the participants of 
the EPWS program including the poor and women have not been made 
worse in terms of their household’s average number of cash income, share of 
cash income from different sources and average cash income as a result of 
their participation in the EPWS program. It also exhibits that while cash 
payments to EPWS program participants in return for the adoption of SLM 
practices are important, indirect financial and non financial outcomes 
enhanced through program activities such as training programs, supply of 
manure and improved seeds are also significant. The participants have 
significant more average annual cash income, more yields from crops such 
as beans, tomatoes and cabbage, and more livestock like chickens and 
goats. They also own more consumer durables such as machetes, hoes, 
radios, mobile phone and spades. In addition, there was significant reduction 
of their frequency of reducing number of meals eaten in a day, frequency of 
having to limit portion size at meals times and frequency of skipping entire 
day without eating, frequency of purchasing food on credit and difficulty in 
satisfying household food needs. Furthermore, the program participants have 
significantly received more training and extension services as well as more 
networks and relationships of trust. Additionally, this thesis shows that 
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increased value of land translated to higher land rents and reduced 
availability of land however, which adversely affected the access of land to 
landless and land-poor households. This clearly requires greater attention 
during the design of PES programs.  
 
Examining the environmental effectiveness of the EPWS program (Chapter 
6), this thesis further illustrates that the program has had additionality effects, 
positive leakages and promising sustainability of adopted SLM practices as 
well as positive measures of cost effectiveness. The additionality effects of 
the EPWS program on the change in the behaviour of program participants 
include an increase in the number of conservation approaches practiced by a 
household and increased proportion of program participants planting 
woodlot/trees on their farm after EPWS, and increased proportion of 
households using organic fertilizers and practicing integrated pest 
management systems. Leakage effects of the EPWS program include the 
significant decrease of the incidences of forest fire, encroachment into the 
forest for agriculture and illegal forest logging of which there are no 
significant differences between the perceptions of the program participants 
and non-participants. On the sustainability or permanence effectiveness of 
the program, the finding shows that SLM practices are likely to last even after 
the program has been phased out because of the future value or benefits 
expected from the adoption of SLM practices such as increased crop output 
from constructed terraces and manure, fire wood and timber products from 
agro-forestry and afforestation interventions. Once established, SLM 
practices are privately more profitable to farmers when compared to previous 
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practices and so are likely to be retained. With regard to cost effectiveness, 
the findings show that the EPWS’s approach of contracting village authorities 
to aggregate land owners under their authorities and monitoring compliance 
reduced costs of contracting individual land owners and monitor compliance. 
Additionally, the use of local trained paraprofessional technical partners did 
not only reduce costs of hiring external extension partners, but provided 
conditions for sustained provision of extension services to farmers even after 
the program life span.  
 
Based on the findings of this study it can be said that women and poor 
households that are eligible (landholders) to participate in the EPWS program 
are participating and implementing SLM practices (Chapter 4). Furthermore, 
the participants of the EPWS program including the poor and women have 
not been made worse in most indirect financial and non financial outcomes 
assessed in this thesis including their household average number of cash 
income, share of cash income from different sources and average cash 
income as a result of their participation in the EPWS program (Chapter 5). 
However, these outcomes should not be interpreted literally without taking 
into consideration the intervention activities such as training events, provision 
of extension services, training of paraprofessionals, supply of manure, farm 
tools i.e. spades, hoe and machetes and improved seeds which enhanced 
participation and adoption of SLM practices. This implies that the design and 
implementation of PES programs on agro ecosystems in other contexts 
similar to that of EPWS program, should take into account the factors that 
affect participation of the poor households and those that enhances 
  260 
additionality of program, reduce leakages as well as the factors for 
sustainability and costs effectiveness. These designs should also consider 
costs that service buyers and intermediary organization would likely incur 
such as costs of contracting individual service providers, monitoring 
compliance and providing extension services. 
8.2 Implications 
The findings of this study allow identification of a range of measures that 
could help address challenges that the poor service providers and service 
buyers or intermediary organization would encounter in designing and 
implementing PES programs on agricultural ecosystems in poor resource 
countries like Tanzania. The findings are of particular relevance to the 
Government of Tanzania’s KILIMO KWANZA policy which seeks to address 
challenges that hinder agriculture (i.e. includes crops, livestock, fisheries, 
forestry and bee-keeping) development such as poor access and low use of 
improved seeds and fertilizers, under-investment in productivity enhancing 
technologies, limited access to financing for uptake of technologies and 
limited use of available water resources for irrigated agriculture (Mbunda, 
2011). Linked to KILIMO KWANZA, the design and implementation of PES 
programs in agro ecosystem can be optimized by the following insights from 
the findings. 
 
Firstly, costs of establishing and maintaining SLM practices in agro 
ecosystems can be reduced in a number of ways. Aggregating individual 
landowners under village authorities is an essential mechanism that can 
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reduce transaction costs involved in contracting individual landowners. Also, 
costs of monitoring compliance of adopted SLM practices can be reduced 
when village authorities are contracted. Contracting village authorities is vital 
because land rights in rural areas where PES programs are likely to be 
implemented are often under village authorities. Additionally, costs of 
employing external technical assistants can significantly be reduced by 
training and using local trained paraprofessional technical partners who can 
sustain the provision of extension services to farmers after the program life 
span. 
 
Secondly, the supply of ecosystem services from PES programs 
implemented in agro ecosystem landscapes is likely to be permanent or 
sustainable when introduced SLM practices for service provision are the 
practices desired by service providers. This implies that the design of PES 
programs for agro ecosystems should allow many options and flexibility that 
would permit landholders to choose from a range of SLM practices those 
which are suitable to their land and expectations. Also, the participation of 
farmers in the design phase of PES programs is essential to ensure the 
inclusion of their preferences in terms of including SLM practices and non 
cash rewards of their choice.  
 
Thirdly, because of the future value or benefits expected from the adoption of 
SLM practices such as increased crop output from constructed terraces and 
manure, fire wood and timber products from agro-forestry and afforestation 
interventions, PES payments could be a catalyst tool to foster investment in 
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improved SLM practices. Thus, short term payments, in addition to other non-
monetary incentives such as training, manure, seeds, tools (i.e. hoes, 
machetes and spades) which were highlighted as important by farmers in the 
context of the EPWS could be sufficient to induce a sustainable change in 
land use. This suggests that ensuring continued influence of training, 
manure, and improved seeds, tools (i.e. hoes, machetes and spades) seems 
more important than payments. 
 
Fourthly, while cash payments to participants in return for adoption of SLM 
practices are important, other forms of incentives such as training, supply of 
manure and improved seeds are also very important. This preference is more 
pronounced in agro-ecosystems PES (use-modifying) than in PES programs 
focused on forest land (use-diverting PES programs) where the financial 
incentives are the key motivation for participation of land owners. Benefits 
such as increased crop yields; increased value of land; strengthened 
institutions; increased trust; expanded internal and external networks and 
increased knowledge of farmers and capacity in farming, leadership and 
business, are all transferable assets which can underpin activities outside the 
PES program and thus offer potential to enhance rural development. 
 
Fifthly, acknowledging local informal rules and empowering local 
communities through local and external training programs to set their own 
rules which can then guide them to achieve conservation objectives is very 
important. Informal rules established by farmer groups were useful in guiding 
their operations to achieve their collective obligations of the program. Also, 
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the program induced collective responsibility in the community and secret 
reporting on illegal activities helped to reduce leakages from forest reserve 
encroachment, illegal logging as well as illegal forest fire and slash and burn 
agriculture.  
8.3 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 The findings of the study suggest that the EPWS program participation has 
managed to generate additional livelihood and conservation outcomes that 
would not have happened without the intervention.  While the additionality 
effect of the EPWS program is significant, there is considerable likelihood 
that the effect could be much higher given the fact that the control group was 
selected from the same population as the treatment group. This control group 
might have been affected by the effect of ‘neighbourhood’, whereby farmers 
tend to copy technology or acquire information about a particular technology 
from their neighbours. The comparison of the impacts with program 
participants/treatment group and non-participants/control group in the same 
area can potentially underestimates the reported impact of the program in 
terms of the program additionality.  
 
Because of the short term nature of the EPWS program, there is a need to 
conduct another research after at-least five or ten years to assess the long 
term sustainability of the land use changes introduced by the program. Data 
should be collected from both program participants and non-participants to 
measure subsequent changes to land use. Also, it should examine the extent 
to which land uses introduced during the program life have been retained 
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or/and further expanded by program participants or/and adopted by non-
participants. In addition, it should examine what practices experienced 
continued expansion to whom and why? This study will be very useful to 
address the main PES concern related to short term payments that gains 
from PES payments would be lost once the program ended.  
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